# A Centrist Theory of Afro-Arab Communication

A Model for Development

Saleh Kh. Abu'Osba

2010

A Centrist Theory of Afro-Arab Communication:

A Model for Development

A Centrist Theory of Afro-Arab Communication:

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Finally, the author is grateful to his wife and children for their patience, comfort and love during the Ph. D. program.

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

A Centrist Theory of Afro-Arab Communication:

A Model for Development

<u>**Background to the Problem**</u>

The emergence of Third World nations in the international system calls for a re-examination of the existing communication processes that are manifested in global relations. Various regions attempt to identify single channels that would coordinate the voices of these new states. One such channel is the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.).

Within the O.A.U., we have a mixture of African and Arab states, all attempting to articulate appropriately their genuine concerns. From such an association, we see the need to develop strong ties for mutual development and harmony. A full recognition and acceptance of the Afro-Arab potential can accelerate the development of the region. But in order to achieve such goals, we need to re-examine, among

several issues, our communication content and processes.

Nowadays, the reality of Afro-Arab nations manifests itself in a close relationship among their peoples and demands a coordinated plan of development. This is accomplished through a variety of channels such as the O.A.U., Afro-Arab dialogue, bilateral relations, and unified situations in the U.N. during casual deliberation and crucial confrontations.

Communication among member states of the O.A.D. and other Arab states can play a crucial role in development, if we understand the reality of the historical links between those nations. Such understanding should recall the fact that Africans and Arabs had constructive historical and cultural experiences in various inter-ethnic relations. Yet, most writers who deal with the African world view disregard its Arab dimension (Diop, 1963; Daniel, 1974; Williams, 1976; Asante, 1980). Furthermore, many writers, when they deal with Africa, deal only with Sub-Sahara Africa and the Arab section of Africa is frequently excluded on the grounds that it is part of the Middle East and its inhabitants are not Blacks (Stewart Smith 1974:11; Cowan et. al., 1965:22; Hanna, 1964:vii, Karp and Bird, 1980).

Bohannan and Curtin (1981:35) contend that "the differences between races cannot be specifically defined physiologically, but rather depend on cultural points. The continuity of physical types in modern man has no 'natural'

breaking points--there are only stereotypes from which all persons are removed in at least some degree. Only by fiat can the distinction be made." Race then, cannot be an absolute justification to exclude the Arab dimension in Africa. The fact is that the Arabs of North Africa make up 75% of the whole Arab population and about 25% of the population of Africa. The Arabs of Africa include a significant number of Blacks, particularly in Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Egypt, Mauritania, Comoro Island, Libya and Morocco.

See the 1980 World Bank Atlas, Washington, D. C.:World Bank.[1]

Racial integration between Arabs and East Africans is a historical fact with many consequences. For example, the Swahili language resulted, in part, from constant Arab-Bantu marriages. Furthermore, Arab traders and settlers stimulated the development of Swahili civilization by bringing in new techniques of writing, architecture, religion, law, government and commerce. So, it was the Bantu-Arab hybrid that produced this unique civilization (Davidson 1969:212-213 and 1971:110-111; July, 1974:00; Davidson, 1974:121; Murphy, 1978:229-233; Oliver and Fage, 1978:97-103; Goods 1966:33).

It is important to point out that Afro-Arab cultural relations existed before and continued during the penetration of Islam

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[1] See the 1980 World Bank Atlas, Washington, D. C.: World Bank.

into Africa. Ethiopia, for example, has a mixed population of Agau and Arab, especially in its Axum region from which the first major Ethiopian civilization emerged (Davidson, 1974:37; Murphy, 1978). Also, the Afro-Asiatic language stock, although associated closely with Caucasoid peoples in northern Africa and Arabia, includes the languages of a number of important Negroid peoples, such as the Rausa and several others of the Nigerian Plateau and Bornu areas (Greenberg, 1976:431, Murphy, 1978:48-49 and 65).

Murphy (1978:133) argued that" originally all the writing in Rausa country was in Arabic. Probably in the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century, Rausa itself developed a modified Arabic script." The same observation can be made about Swahili (Davison 1974: 223).

In addition, strong cultural similarities can be discerned that clearly demonstrate the close bind between Arabs and Africans. Roberts (1980) has observed that:

cultural similarities in belief systems, temporal and supernatural relationships and the basic mores of society clearly manifest themselves in both Arab and African communities. Family structures among both Arab and African are the same, polygamy being widely accepted as a form of marriage, which unites more than the members of the conjugal unit. Marriage, thus, is considered to be a means for reinforcing extensive group values, including the perpetuation of the species, rather than primarily as a means of promoting the happiness of nuclear families of an individual (Roberts 1980:15).

All the above can be essential in understanding the African world view and in formulating what may be called an Afro-

Arab centrist model or perspective, a centricism that encompasses both African and Arab elements.

This Afro-Arab centrist model will help us to understand Afro-Arab communication processes and will lead us to effective communication that will help in the development of the region. Extensive models are examined here and from these will emerge the above concept.

Inter Afro-Arab communication is of fundamental importance in the promotion of regional development and to the improvement of intergroup relations. Further, it is necessary that the significance of international communication be recognized in the planning of national development policy. Thus, the proposed research is concerned primarily with communication, specifically, the function of mass media with respect to national development in the Afro-Arab context. Mass media can create an ambience for the emergence of a new consciousness of Afro-Arab identity, can create a desire for national development, and can help in achieving plans for development.

Thus, it is important to evaluate theories and models which deal with the effects of communication. This effort aims to apply these theories of development in the Afro-Arab context.

Everette Dennis (1978:4) has described the approaches of media effects from a historical perspective as two steps forward, two steps back, while Severin and Tankard (1979:246) have characterized the theories of effects of

American mass communication during the last fifty, as going in cycles. For a time, one theory will be dominant, but eventually, it comes to be replaced by another. These cycles--as described by Severin and Tankard--are 1) the Bullet theory, which was a view that attributed great power to mass communications; 2) the Limited Effects Model, which began to emerge in the 1940s and viewed mass communications as having small effects; 3) the Moderate Effects Model which characterizes research on the effects of mass communication in the 1960s and includes the information-seeking paradigm, the uses and gratification approach, the agenda-setting function, and the cultural norms theory; and 4) the Powerful Effects Model, which is just beginning to emerge. This last model postulates that mass communications can have powerful effects if they were used in programs or campaigns that are carefully prepared according to communication theory principles. We are concerned with development communication -- mainly effective communication in society. We will review the theories of the effects of communications to see how they can fit in the Afro-Arab context.

In general, classification of theories of communication is not mutually exclusive. For example, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the effects of mass communication had been seen as essential in national development (Lerner, 1958; Schramm, 1962).

A review of extant Western research on the impact of mass media will reveal the impact on individuals (micro level) more than on society (macro level). The discussion, however

of the effects of mass communication on development cannot be restricted to the macro level, since society is not less than a collective of individuals. In this particular section of this chapter, we will review briefly some of the relevant schools of thought on mass communication and society by examining the works of scholars like Laswell, Cantril, Noelle-Newmann, Klapper and others who have contributed to the development of models of communication. In the second chapter, the focus will be specifically on development communications and Afrocentricity as a philosophical approach for understanding communication.

Mass Communication Effect

In the days of World War I and before World War II, there was enthusiasm for the all-powerful propagandist who used the mass media as his vehicle in influencing and controlling attitudes, opinions and behavior. Harold Lasswell (1927:627) states that "most of that which formerly could be done by violence and intimidation must be done by argument and persuasion." In 1938, the broadcasting program, "the Invasion from Mars," enhanced this theory (Hadley Catril 1940). This approach can be traced in the 1970s in the works of Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann in her article, "Return to the Concept of Powerful Mass Media." She argues that the limited laboratory studies of media impacts failed to take into account three decisive factors about mass media which work together to restrict selective perception: ubiquity of the media, cumulation of messages and consonance of journalists. Several years later she contended that:

Results of empirical studies from the last decade in the Federal Republic of Germany show the media rather as agents of change, show their molding influence although only under certain conditions, the most important of which is a majority agreement of argumentation and representation in the media, 'media consonance.' This influence, however, does not appear to be unlimited. Therefore, a considerable gulf between media consonance and attitude of the population can arise. Not only through its content but also through the mere existence of a medium, is social change effected. This is shown by the example of television (Noelle-Neumann, 1980:676).

Just as the above perspective emphasizes the influence of mass media in social change, we are prone to agree with the conclusion, generally, when we deal with the Third World, and particularly when we deal with the Afro-Arab context. It appears that the patriarchal structure of Afro-Arab society and the level of illiteracy may give the mass media a significant role in society.

The limited effects theory emerged with a study of Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet of voter behavior conducted in Erie County, Ohio, U.S.A., in the 1940 Presidential campaign. Another study in Elmira, New York, was conducted by Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1977) in the Presidential election campaign of 1948. Berelson et. al. concluded that the role of the mass media in the campaign could be viewed from the following perspectives: (a) the more exposure to the campaigning in the mass media, the more interested voters become and the more strongly they come to feel about their candidate; (b) the more exposure to the campaign in the mass media, the less voters chanted their positions and the more they carried through on election day; (c) the more exposure to the campaign in the mass media,

the more correct information the voters had about the campaign and the more correct their perceptions of where the candidates stood on the issues (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1977:676-7).

In addition, Lazarsfeld et. al. (1944) in their work, <u>The People's Choice</u>, have suggested that the media, rather than being an agent of conversion, were more likely to reinforce preconceived beliefs. And whatever influence media did have, it was likely to be filtered through opinion leaders, from which the theory of the two-step flow developed.

Lazarsfeld and Merton (1975) see the social role of the mass media as the status conferral function, the enforcement of social norms and the narcotizing dysfunction. These functions are favored in the American context since the mass media in the United States are supported by big business concerns to maintain the system. In the Afro-Arab context the media functions are primarily geared toward the perceived achievements of development and social change (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1975:494-502).

Elihu Katz developed the hypothesis of the two-step flow of communication in 1956. He argued (1975:365) that "opinion leaders, despite their greater exposure to the media, are primarily affected not by the communication media but by still other people." He goes on to say that the two-step flow hypothesis appears to be germane to contracts as channels of communication. He sees interpersonal relations as channels of information, sources of social pressure; and sources of

social support, and each relates interpersonal relations to decision-making in a somewhat different way.

Other studies such as Hovland et. al. (1949) have suggested that orientation films were effective in transmitting information but not in changing attitudes. They contend that the media were more likely to reinforce preconceived beliefs, rather than being an agent of conversion; and whatever influence media did have, it was likely to be filtered through opinion leaders.

Moreover, Joseph Klapper (1960) states some generalizations about mass communication effects. Among them was that the effects of mass communication must always be looked at from the selective processes, selective perceptions and interpretation, selective exposure and selective retention. These and other factors become active in normal communication and are all likely to increase the native potential of mass communication for reinforcing existing views; and, in general, to reduce the likelihood that such communication will effect conversions.

All the above perspectives suggest a limited effect of mass communication, particularly when they deal with change. Some of the above studies have a limited laboratory context and should be viewed within that realm. The laboratory environment would not provide an appropriate context for the study of socio-cultural, psychological and historical dimensions in the various complex processes involved in mass communication. Moreover, with regard to the application of these studies, it should be recognized that in

the case of the Afro-Arab context, such studies did not focus on social change, an effect which is favored in that context. The primary role of the mass media in Afro-Arab countries is to promote economic and social development.

There are many factors that influence the role of mass media: 1) factors dealing with the nature of media such as ubiquity of the media, cumulation of messages and consonance of journalists (Noelle-Neuman, 1973:76-2), factors dealing with the audiences; and 3) factors dealing with the context of the communication process. All these factors make the communication process complex. It is in this light that it was suggested that researchers might, more fruitfully study social change by analyzing how social systems process information and by identifying structural barriers that are properties of the socio-political system rather than by inquiring into specific agents of change in individual behaviors (Nwankwo, 1978:2). So, to understand that process and its effect in the Afro-Arab context, one must take into account all these combined factors. We may find that a singular approach to communication effect such as the moderate model will not interpret the role of media in development in the Afro-Arab context. Hence, communication effects need many approaches for clear understanding. This explains the existence of several theories in this complex process.

In the late 1960s and the 1970s, the moderate effects model was established through four approaches:

1) the information-seeking paradigm;

2) the uses and gratification approach;
3) the agenda-setting function; and 4) the dependence model.

The information seeking paradigm focuses on an individual's information-seeking behavior and attempts to identify the factors that determine that behavior. The researchers realize that information utility or usefulness, intrinsic interest in a particular topic, entertainment value, need for variety, and personality characteristics such as high or low dogmatism could influence the selection of a message (Atkin, 1973; Donohue and Tipton, 1973).

Similar to the information seeking paradigm, the uses and gratification approach, provides a broader perspective to explore individual media behavior (McGuire, 1974; Rosengren, 1974; Mendelsohn, 1974). Elihu Katz et. al. (1974) state five elements of this approach. Among them are three having particular relevance here. One is that the audience is' conceived of as active i.e., an important part of mass media use and is assumed to be goal-directed. Thus, much media consumption may be interpreted as a response to needs felt by the audience member. The audience member expects to experience some form of need-satisfaction through his media use behavior. A second approach argues that people bend the media to their needs more readily than the media overpower them. A third approach contends that the media compete with other sources of need satisfaction. The needs served by mass communication constitute but a segment of the wider range of human needs and the degree to which they can be adequately met through mass media

consumption certainly varies; consequently, a proper view of the role of the media in need satisfaction should take into account other functional alternatives--including different, more conventional, and 'older' ways of fulfilling needs (Katz et. al., 1974:11-22).

In a real sense, the information seeking paradigm and the uses and gratification approach focus on the receiver, and they go back to the empirical mass communication research. But both of them do not explain media effects in their social context.

Going forward, the agenda-setting hypothesis tries to build a relation between the source and the receiver through the agenda. Agenda-setting asserts a positive relationship between what media emphasize and what audience comes to regard as important. McCombs and Shaw (1979:41) argue that "audiences not only learn about public issues and other matters from the media, they also learn how much importance to attach to an issue or topic from the emphasis the media place upon it." McCombs and Shaw (1977) write, "People do learn factual information about public affairs and what is happening in the world, they also learn how much importance to attach as issue or topic from the emphasis placed on it by the mass media   : (McCombs and Shaw, 1977: 5) . In reports both prior to and during political campaigns, the news media to a considerable degree, determine the important issues. In other words, the media set the 'agenda' for the campaign. Moreover, they see the agenda-setting function of mass communication as the ability to effect cognitive change among individuals, to

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structure their thinking. They argue that here may be the most important effect of mass communication, its ability to mentally order and organize our world for us (McCombs and Shaw, 1977:5).

Indeed, this function of agenda setting is important to the development communicator. In this sense he can recognize the importance of his messages. In a real sense, this function harmonizes with the assumption (Seymour-Ure, 1976:28-40) that the nature and production of mass media effects are determined by their relationship to three aspects: timing, frequency and intensity.

The last approach which we will discuss is the dependency model by Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976a:6l-75), DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach (1976:261-7). The authors try to fill the gap in the last three approaches by stating an integral relationship among audiences, media and the social system. So they suggest that media effects can be explained in taking into account sets of variables--individually, interactively and systematically. Hence, they see that audience depends on media information to meet needs and attain goals through a three-way interaction among audiences, media and society. Furthermore, this model suggests that variation of dependency comes from the degree of social stability. When social change and conflict are high, reliance on the media for information increases (Nwankwo, 1971).

This model suggests that mass communication affects three areas: cognitive, affective and behavioral. The effect of mass communication on these areas depends on the degree to

which audiences are dependent on media. At the center of this model is that media will affect people to the degree that they are dependent on media information.

This model can explain the role of media at the macro level in circumstances of instability. It does not explain how the media can affect people in development campaigns. Moreover, while the dependency model 'considers the effect on the audiences based on the degree of their dependency on media information, the model may not be valid on some issues of development, particularly when the communicator aims to create some specific effects in development campaigns.

None of these approaches can alone interpret the process of media effect. The most appropriate approach that we will suggest is an integrated approach of all the theories. Such an approach will help the development communicator in planning his campaign. As an example, we can combine many approaches to understand a specific issue in "development campaign in which agenda-setting function, use and gratification, information-seeking, two-step flow of information and dependency model, can give the development communication planner an insight to design a message which takes into account

 1) the message; 2) the audience; 3) the society; and 4) other factors which can affect the communication process.

Furthermore, the complexity of the development communication process demands an examination of many

variables that will affect Afro-Arab communication. This calls for an examination of communication models that deal specifically with development. This task will be accomplished in the next chapter when we discuss the works of Lerner, Schramm, Grunig, Rogers and others. The suggested model will encompass multi-theoretical approaches in an integrated whole.

Proposed Problem and Research Questions

The proposed research problem for this investigation focuses, therefore, on the Afro-Arab world view (Afro-Arab centric) as a complementary philosophy applicable to the study of communication. It is proposed that selected analyses of the historical, social and cultural relations between Arabs and Africans would yield valuable information as well as facilitate the establishment of the concept of Afro-Arab Centricity. Such analyses would enable us to understand communication processes and relationships in the African and Arab context, particularly in view of renewed attempts to unite the African continent.

The first task of the investigation is to critically evaluate the literature on the topic so as to explore the social, cultural and historical foundation for the construction of the Afro-Arab centrist model of communication. The main purpose of this exercise is to seek information that would help in answering the question: On what basis can an Afro-Arab centrist model of communication be built?

The second task is to construct an adequate centrist model of Afro-Arab communication and analyze its parameters so as to seek answers to the questions:

1. How helpful is the proposed model in the understanding of the centrist theory of Afro-Arab communication?

2. How can the model be applied to further societal development in the Afro-Arab context?

This study views the Afro-Arab context as made up of all countries that are members of the Arab League and/or are indigenous to the African continent or region. This definition (view) postulates that populations in this context share similar social, cultural, political, economic and historical experiences. The study details this mutual environment.

Development is defined here as a comprehensive process of societal change involving human and material advancement to a better standard for the benefit of the majority of the people in such areas as the human, educational, technological, economic, etc.

This definition subsumes the concept of modernization, a process by which institutions evolve historically and are adapted to the rapidly changing functions and needs of society.

Methodology

The method utilized in this work is historical-critical. Because of the subject, the most appropriate method has to be the historical critical approach. ' As Ker1inger (1973) has observed the historical approach is the critical investigation of events, development and experiences of the past, the careful weighing of the evidence of the validity of sources of information on the past, and the interpretation of the weighted evidence (Kerlinger,1973:701).

The historical approach, as Isaac and Michael (1977) have noted "reconstructed the past systematically and objectively by collecting, evaluating, verifying and synthesizing evidence to establish facts and reach defensible conclusions." (Isaac and Michael, 1977:19).

In order to achieve a suitable presentation of the subject, the following procedure is adopted:

1.   Selection of extant text that treat Afro-Arab relations (books, mimeographs and articles).
2.   Selection of extant text writings on sociology, history and anthropology of Africans and Arabs to investigate the similarity of their contexts.
3.   Selection of extant writings on Afro-centricity.
4.   Selection of extant communication theories that primarily deal with effects and national development.
5.   Critical analyses of the above documents.
6.   Postulation and critical analyses of Afro-Arab Centricity.

Rationale and Significance of the Study

As stated earlier, the task of development is a constant preoccupation in several areas of the world today. For over twenty-five years, scholars from various fields have researched their topic of development from various western perspectives. This study seeks to establish a different but complementary view of our understanding of a given communication process. This view embodied in the concept of Afro-Arab centricity. The term is coined to highlight the relationships that exist between Africans and Arabs and the philosophies, patterns and structures of communication that cut across both groups. Since national development is a central key, it is incumbent on communication scholars from Africa and the rest of the Arab world to investigate possible philosophies, structures and patterns of communication peculiar to the two groups to facilitate development. Furthermore, an identification of the above could lead to a promotion of better relationships between Africans and Arabs. It is necessary to know and understand the cultural accomplishments and trends of the past in order to gain perspective on contemporary and future directions of Afro-Arab centricity. It is, indeed, upon the above basis that the current study is predicated.

The major values of this study are, therefore:

1. The formulation of an approach which departs significantly from current approaches of Afro centricity as an alternative communication philosophy.

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2. A seminal presentation of an Afro-Arab communication perspective applicable to development.

3. The development of Afro-Arab world view that would, in particular, facilitate communication between the two groups, as well as communication with others.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

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REVIEW OF LITERATURE

An adequate examination of extant development communication approaches as they apply to the Afro-Arab context requires, first of all, examining the function of the media in the process of development; second, discussing the different approaches to development communication, such as those advanced by Lerner, Schramm, Rogers, Grunig and others; third, critically analyzing the above approaches with a view to developing an alternative model of communication for the Afro-Arab context; and finally, a critical evaluation of the concept of Afro centricity aimed at establishing a complementary approach- to development communication.

Media Function

Harold Lasswel (1975:85) distinguished between the following functions of the media; 1) the surveillance of the environment; 2) the correlation of the parts of society in responding to the environment; and 3) the transmission of social heritage from one generation to the next. These functions, it seems miss the role of communication in social change and development. The following discussion will treat the above in some detail.

Laswel argues that the function of surveillance of the environment discloses threats and opportunities affecting the value position of the community and of the component parts within it. On the other hand, Berelson (1975) identified the effectiveness of communications on public opinion, by this formulation:

Some kinds of communication on some kinds of issues brought to the attention of some kinds of people under some kinds of conditions, have some kinds of effect. (Berelson, 1975: 531).

The above position stated in the forties is central for our understanding of the function of the media in the process of development. Unfortunately, many authors on the subject have failed to examine this. Berelson (1975:539-52) explained further the different kinds of effects on public opinion which are related somehow to development: 1) the media have a major influence in producing an interest in public affairs by constantly bringing them to people's attention in a context of presumed citizenly concern. The agenda-setting function of the media is implied in Berelson's position (without naming it) as is further evidenced in the following statement:

The media set the political stage, so to speak for the ensuing debate. In addition, there is some evidence that private discussions of political matters take their cue from the media's presentation of the issues; people talk politics along the lines laid down in the media (Berelson:1975:542).

2) The communication media may also promote, in actuality, but without intention, a sense of political apathy among some of their audience. Berelson contended that the media are extremely effective in reinforcement by providing

partisans with the difference and the rationalizations needed to maintain their position. They are effective in bringing to visibility people's latent attitudes. Berelson mentioned the effect of the conversion of opinions, but he did not show us how much power this function can have which is the more relevant function to social change.

It is necessary to point out that many Western writers have assumed the function of media as a reinforcement tool. That is consistent with the Western context, since the mass media are supported and controlled by big business whose major concern is profit--sot it aims to maintain the status quo. Scholars such as Lazarsfeld and Merton (1975: 497-503) point out that there are three social functions of mass media: 1) the status conferral function deals with the status conferring function that mass media serve for public issues, persons, organizations, and social movements; 2) the enforcement of social norms functions which the media reaffirm social norms through exposing deviations from these norms to public view and 3) the narcotizing dysfunction by which the media lift the level of information and cause information deluge for large populations. The deluge is brought about by increasing dosages of information which inadvertently transform the energies of men from active participation into passive knowledge.

Yet, apart from these passive functions in the sense of development, there are many writers who argue that mass media can be utilized in development. Schramm (1967) presents six essential functions of mass communication:

1.   Communication must be used to contribute to the feeling of nation-ness.
2.   Communication must be used as the voice of national planning.
3.   Communication must be used to help teach the necessary skills.
4.   Communication must be used to help extend the effective market.
5.   As the plan develops, communication must be used to help prepare people to play their new parts.
6.   Communication must be used to prepare the people to play their role as a nation among nations. (Schramm, 1967:36-42).

The functions prescribed by Schramm are vital in the development process.

De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach (1975:266-269) suggest four functions of the media: 1) reconstructing of social reality; 2) formation of attitudes when the audience relies heavily upon media information; 3) agenda-setting and 4) expansion of people's system of beliefs. These functions apply in development contexts.

Many other researchers have also discussed the functions of mass media (Fagen,1966:5l-2; Roberta, 1977:379-83; Budd-Ruben, 1979: 19-25; Moeller, 1974: 203-04; Pye, 1967:4-8; Pfeiffer, 1972: 183¬185; Encel, 1978: 43-44).

Contrary to the richness of Western literature dealing with the functions of mass media, few works on this topic can be obtained from the Third World. Dube (1978:106-108) discusses the role of communication in development by suggesting that communication is regarded as a mobilization mechanism. He, also, suggests specific functions of the press in the development process. He describes the Indian experience in utilizing mass media in development. He states, for example, that there are three primary functions of newspapers: 1) to provide information; 2) to focus attention on issues and problems and initiate debates on alternative approaches and 3) to be a watchdog, exposing corruption, nepotism, inefficiency and assorted failures or misdeeds with courage and conviction. In light of the development process, all these functions can be crucial. But as we see them, they do not differ from the functions of the press in the West. Hence, they do not provide additional functions in the development process in the Third World Context.

There is, however, another writer Olav Stokke (1971:83-92), who explains the role and functions of the mass media in the African context: 1) the mass media may have the function of nation building. That is, the mass media may have the function of national and social integration by identifying and focusing on national symbols, national interests, values and aspirations; 2) mass media provide a direct link between the government and governed, and between the national executives of nation-wide organizations and their grass-roots organizations; 3) mass media provide information at the level of adult education; 4) mass media mobilize the population for development efforts by motivating and

stimulating such efforts and by directing attention to their achievements; and 5) mass media are instruments for molding public opinion with regard to their own achievements, aims, aspirations, policies and values. Of course, no one can deny that these functions of mass media are crucial in national development in the Third World.

Insofar as this investigation on media's function is concerned, it is suitable to affirm the validity the functions of development communication as stated by Jamison and McCanany (1978). These functions are:

1. To motivate.

Development communication is certainly often devoted to this general goal, whether it is to motivate a country politically toward national unity, or to arouse the public against a common external enemy, or to motivate a group toward a self-development activity.

2. To inform.

Information in this context refers to a wide variety of things local, national, and international news; messages about the availability of social services, and announcements concerning an event o importance to the audience.

3. To teach.

It can be used i.e. for non-formal education--in both the basic cognitive-skill areas and in the work-skill area.

4. To change behavior.

Changing behavior is the most difficult goal to achieve of the ones outlined in this series, yet it has a great importance for the typically isolated rural dweller (Jamison & McAnany, 1978: 61-64).

Of course, these functions are the core of development communication. Further, our examination of development communication models will reveal the importance of these functions.

Western Approaches to Development Communication

Since the Second World War, the attention of western scholars has focused on the development of the newly emerging nations of the so-called Third World. There is, moreover, much literature about the development process. As Stockwell and Laidlow (1981:6¬18) suggest, this literature can be classified in the following approaches.

1. The Psychological Approach

This approach suggests that the presence or absence of economic development depends upon the general personality trait or psychic state of a particular society. This approach is rooted in the works of (David McClelland (1961) and E. E. Hagen (1962).

2. The Ideal Type Approach

This approach suggests that some indices can group the characteristics of societies into different stages of development-¬indices such as annual per capita income, rate of infant mortality or level of energy consumption. This approach, therefore, suggests that economic development would be seen as a process in which the developing areas become more like the Western Societies. Stockwell and Laidlaw explain this model as this:

the process of economic development in any society is associated with a shift away from a "traditional" social structure characterized by ascription, particularism and functionally diffuse roles to a "modern" social structure characterized by achievements, universalism and functionally specific roles. (Stockwell and Laidlaw, 1981:9).

W. W. Rostow(1960) identifies five stages in the economic development process: 1) traditional society; 2) precondition for take-off in which the traditional values and practices begin to breakdown; 3) take off wherein economic growth gets underway; 4) drive to maturity characterized by economic growth integrated into the larger international system; and 5) high consumption.

3. The Diffusionist Approach

According to this approach, an underdeveloped society adopts a particular item or items from a more advanced society in order to enhance its own development. This approach suggests that the underdeveloped areas will enhance their development by grants and/ or loans from developed societies, by adopting modern methods of agriculture and industrial production and by adopting values,

attitudes and Western behavior patterns (Stockwell and Laidlaw, 1981:11-12).

Stockwell and Laidlaw (1981) in order to establish the fourth approach criticize the preceding approaches for their ethnocentric notion that the developing societies have to become more like Western societies. Moreover, they see that the diffusion model is limited by virtue of the fact that it explicitly places emphasis on the economic and social structural aspects of the problem, while paying insufficient attention to demographic dimensions of development. On the other hand, both the psychological and ideal type approaches assume that underdeveloped areas are blamed for their underdeveloped status. This emphasis neglects, for instance, the external factors that participate in creating that condition and still impeding national development such as colonialism in the past, and neo-colonization and imperialism in the present day.

4. A Societal Approach

According to Stockwell and Lailow (1981) this approach is essentially an elaboration of the diffusionist approach by incorporating into it some useful features of the psychological and ideal-type approaches.

This approach suggests that the problem of underdeveloped areas has three dimension: 1) economic, 2) demographic and 3) socio-cultural. This approach, like the others, does not give the socio-cultural aspects of the underdeveloped areas any positive role in the development process. Nevertheless,

this approach considers that the traditional value system and institutional structures frequently function to aggravate both the economic and the demographic dimensions of the problem.

Communication Approaches to Development

In the field of mass communication, the western models of mass communication for development do not go far from the preceding approaches. Western development communication models suggest, as we will see, that developing countries should use communication to promote Western values, their technology and their social organization, to achieve modernization.

Lerner's Model

Lerner in his classical study of The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing in the Middle East considers that empathy is crucial in his model. Lerner states

As we shall show, the Western model of Modernization exhibits certain components and sequences whose relevance is global … The model evolved in the West is an historical fact. That the same basic model reappears in virtually all modernizing societies on all continents of the world, regardless of varieties in races, color (Lerner, 1964: 46-47).

Lerner considers the Western model of modernization as a baseline in the development process. In a real sense, then he based his theory of modernization on some assumptions:

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1. Empathy:

He defines it as the mechanisms of introjection that "enlarges identity by attributing to the self certain desirable attributes of the object--others are 'incorporated' because I am like them or want to be like them" (p. 49). So he considers empathy the inner mechanism which enables newly noble persons to operate efficiently in a changing world.

2. Mass Media as Mobility Multiplier.

He argues that mass media have been teachers of interior manipulation by simplifying perception (what we see) while greatly complicating response (what we do). He explains:

The expansion of psychic mobility means that more people now command greater skill in imagining themselves as strange persons in strange situations, places and times than did people in any previous historical epoch. In our time, indeed, the spread of empathy around the world is accelerating. The earlier increase of physical experience through transportation has been multiplied by the spread of mediated experience through mass communication (Lerner 1958:52).

3. The System of "Modernity."

Lerner contends that the media spread psychic mobility most efficiently among people who have achieved in some measure the antecedent conditions of geographic and social mobility. Information flow forms a system which is tightly interwoven. Institutional variation in one sector will be

accompanied by regular and determinate variation in the other. So he considers the communication system as both index and agent of change in a total social system. Lerner suggests four phases of moderation: 1) urbanization, 2) literacy; 3) media participation and 4) political participation (Lerner, 1958:55-6). In order to explain his hypothesis he states, "the model of modernization follows an autonomous historical logic that he phase tends to generate the next phase by some mechanism which operates independently generate the next phase by some mechanism which operates independently of cultural or doctrinal variations" (Lerner, 1958:61).

Lerner contends that increasing urbanization tends to multiply natonal increases in literacy and media participation. Literacy operates as the pivotal agent in the transition to a fully participant society. When people are equipped to handle their new experience of modernization, and to handle the new experiences of their literacy conveyed by media, they will seek the satisfaction which integrates these skills. Thus, media participation raises participation in all sectors of the social system.

There are the main ideas of Lerner's model which have been heavily criticized by many scholars (Inayatallah, 1978: 57-59; Krippendorff, 1979:72-73; Grunig, 1978:73-75; Melody, 1977:37) both from the West or Third World Countries. Ronald Benge (1972) criticized the ethnocentrism of this model by saying that:

such statements are valid only if one thinks of individual countries out of a time and place context, as if they were isolated experiments in God's

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laboratory. One difference is that the new countries are not the workshops of the world, and whatever their attitudes, a high proportion of their peoples are unemployed or at least under employed. The 'components and sequences' are hardly likely to be repeated (Benge 1972:121).

Others like Eisenstadt (1978:43-44) declared the end of the earlier model of modernization by presenting models that stress the historical dimension of the process which is not universal. The modernization process depends on the broad set of internal conditions of the developing societies or the situation in which they are caught and on the degree to which the international system fosters dependency or competition.

Wilbur Schramm (1964) posits a strong belief in the role of communication in development. He states:

In the service of national development, the mass media are agents of social **change. The specific kind of social change they are expected to help accomplish is the transition to new customs and practice and, in some cases, to different social relationships. Behind such changes in behavior must necessarily lie substantial changes in attitudes, beliefs, skills, and social norms (Schramm, 1964:114).**

This view, like the preceding one, is ethnocentric. It suggests that social change implies solely, a radical change in characterological and socio-psychological dimensions of developing societies by borrowing "alien" norms and moves. Schramm, however, goes on to state some very important functions of the media. These are, media as watchmen, aiding in decision-making, and as teachers.

In spite of our agreement with his prescribed functions, we do not see that introducing mass media in a developing society would be followed inevitably by development, though the efficiency of mass media will be governed with many variables in their context.

Other writers such as (Ithiel de Sola Pool, .1963; Frederick W. Frey ,1963_ 1973; Lucian W. Pye, 1963) have discussed the role of mass media in development and modernization in the same manner by emphasizing the Western vision of development.

General Critique

It seems that the deficiency of the western approach comes from the following main points:

1.   This approach neglects the diversity of cultures that differentiate one society from another which will be essential to the understanding of development through its psychological, social, cultural, political and economical dimensions.
2.   This approach does not differentiate between modernization and development. The latter is a comprehensive process while modernization can be the material aspect of development.
3.   This approach presents a linear view of modernization, while, in the real sense, modernization does not occur the same way in different societies.
4.   This approach emphasizes economic development while it seemingly disregards human development, both of which can be tied together to achieve national development.
5.   Introducing modernization does not necessarily call for a breakdown of the traditional societies' structure and values as this approach suggests.
6.   It emphasizes the dependence of developing countries on developed countries, and it does not recognize the external constraints of economic and cultural imperialism.
7.   The great emphasis on the role of mass media in the development process disregards the importance of interpersonal communication, and its role through the multi-steps flow of information in developing countries.

Diffusion of Innovations Model

Further, the diffusion of innovations model of Rogers and Shoemaker (197l) emerged from the two-step hypothesis. The diffusion model also depends on multi-steps of flow of information. The diffusion of innovations depends upon four elements: 1) the innovation; 2) communication through certain channels; 3) overtime and 4) members of a social system. The innovation means an idea, practice or object perceived as new by an individual (Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971:18-9). Communication, the diffusion process occurs through mass media and interpersonal channels. So these writers suggest some theoretical generalization about characteristics of opinion leadership (Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971:217-19).

1. Opinion leaders are more cosmopolitan than their followers.

2. Opinion leaders have greater change agent contact than their followers.

3. Opinion leaders have greater social participation than their followers.

4. Opinion leaders have higher social status than their followers.

5. Opinion leaders are more innovative than their followers.

6. When the system's norms favor change, opinion leaders are more innovative, but when the norms are traditional,

opinion leaders are not especially innovative (Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971:217-19). They contend that the role of opinion leadership works through the multi-step flow which suggest that "there are a variable number of relays in the communication flow from a source to a large audience" (Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971:209).

Rogers and Shoemaker suggest that elements in the diffusion of innovation and the S.M.C.R.E. communication model of Berlo are similar:

Elements in S.M.C.R.E. Model Corresponding elements In the diffusion of innovation

Source	Message	Channel	Receiver
Inventors scientists change agents for opinion leaders	innovation	Communication channels mass media or interpersonal	Members or social system

In their model they consider that Mass media channels are more effective in creating knowledge of innovation, whereas interpersonal channels are more effective in forming and

changing attitudes toward the new idea" (Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971:39).

The authors see that the diffusion of innovations is a time consuming process. The time is seen in diffusion in 1) the innovation-decision process; 2) innovativeness, and 3) an innovation's rate of adoption. They suggest a model for the innovation-decision process which consists of four functions or stages:

1. Knowledge: the individual is exposed to the 'innovation's existence and gains some understanding of how it functions.
2. Persuasion: the individual forms a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward the innovation.
3. Decision: the individual engages in activities which lead to a choice to adopt or reject the innovation.
4. Confirmation: the individual seeks reinforcement for the innovation-decision he has made, but he may reverse his previous decision if exposed to conflicting messages about the innovation (Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971:103).

This model, as they explain, contains 1) antecedents; 2) process and 3) consequences. The antecedents consist of the variables that affect the innovation-decision process for a given individual--variables such as the individual's personality, his social characteristics and his perceived need for innovation. Further, there are other variables that affect

the innovation-decision process, such as social systems variables consisting of social system norms, tolerance of deviancy and communication integration. Also, there are other variables that deal with the perceived characteristic of innovation such as relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, triaability and observability (Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971:103-4).

The role for communications in this model can be explained as this: cosmopolite and mass media channels provide the individual with the knowledge of the innovation. For the persuasion function, the localite interpersonal channels form the perceptions of innovation from development agencies to their clients, and create among individuals a climate for modernization. This model suggests central planning for development and top-down communication campaigns.

This model adds some significant elements to Lerner's model. First, it adds time as element of the process; second, it adds the importance of interpersonal communication in that process; and third this model stresses different variables that can affect the process. These variables have been classified as personal and social system variables. It is necessary to point out that the diffusion of innovation model is ethnocentric--that is, by stressing non-local mass media and bringing in innovation by aiming to change the developing societies' values and structure.

It seems to me that one of the major deficiencies of this model is its concentration on the individual more than on the collective approach. It does not call for integration of local

culture with the innovation. Furthermore, this model, by suggesting top-down communication, neglects the importance of grass-roots aspects.

This model was criticized by many writers. Even Rogers himself would write a revision (1976a, 1976b, 1980) to this model. He writes about "The Passing of the Dominant Paradigm" and about "The Rise and Fall of the Dominant Paradigm." In his revision, Rogers states the major challenges to the basic assumption of the diffusion approach which are related to the power of communication in generating development regardless of socio-economic and political conditions. Rogers (1976a: 126-128) criticizes the western intellectuals for their ethnocentrism and for perspectives which blame the developing societies for their undevelopment, and he asks for recognition of external constraints on development. Rogers (1976: 130-31) sees that there are many alternative pathways for development. Hence, he suggests new elements in development; 1) the quality of distribution of information, socio-economic benefits and so forth; 2) Popular participation in self-development planning and execution 3) self-reliance and independence in development; and 4) integration of traditional with modern systems, modernization in a syncretization of old and new ideas with the exact mixture somewhat different in each locale--hence the role of communication in development changes according to the preceding alternatives. Rogers argues that "it was realized that the role of mass communication in facilitating development was often direct and only contributory rather than direct and powerful. But this depended upon such

circumstances as the media, the messages, the audience, and the nature of the intended effects" (Rogers, 1976: 135).

Further, he sees the needs for structural change as well as communication. He (1975:139) suggests that the role of mass communication is self development implies a different role for communication than top-down approach to development. So this new approach suggests that the role of development agencies is to communicate in answer to the locally initiated requests. So, mass media will feed local groups with information about their needs.

Decision-Situation Model

Some of these alternatives were already suggested by Grunig (1969, 1971, 1978) in his approach to development communication. Grunig (l969; 566-67), (1971;581-582) argues that the role of communication is a complementary force to development. It is contributor to, but not a prime factor of development unless structural changes come first to initiate the development process. Grunig (1978), suggests a change in the communication paradigm. His model is called decision-situation model. It suggests that change creates the need for communication. So the structural change must come first and communication then enlarges and supports the consequences of that change by making more individuals aware of new opportunities. This model is receiver-oriented and predicts communication behavior rather than its effect. This model suggests that individuals will seek information when they perceive a problem. Furthermore, the individuals will seek information only about alternatives which are

feasible within their environment. So it suggests four types of decision situations and/or decision modes:

1.   Problem solving is a type of decision situation in which the individual recognizes that alternatives are present and a problem exists.
2.   Constrained decision is characterized by physical or structural blocks within the system which rule out all but one alternative or a limited range of alternatives.
3.   Routine habit is characterized by a close-minded individual in an open structure.
4.   Fatalism is the attitude in which the individual neither recognizes a problem nor has alternatives available within his structure.

Grunig (1978) contends that development communication messages have little effect because the media and action agencies communicators are individuals from the upper and upper-middle class who perceive their role to be preserving the system at the status quo and controlling its low-income members rather than changing the system. (Grunig, 1978:78-86) For effective communication, Grunig (1978: 74-5) argues that "professional communicators should seek information from their audiences so that they in turn can give relevant information to their audiences." This model presents important elements in development communication such as emphasizing structural change, the role of communication and the communicator-clientele relationship. But it also has its own deficiency. First, it does not explain

how structural change occurs and whether it can occur without communication. Second, even if the communicators are from upper and upper-middle class, their status is not the sole factor that determines the role of communication in the change process. There are many other important factors such as politics, ideology and leadership that affect the role of communication, as we will see later in our proposed model. Third, the generalization about the effect of communication cannot be valid unless we take it within its given milieu. Fourth, this model disregards the importance of the traditional system in development. All this demonstrates ethno-centric nature of this perspective which would then be included among models discredited now by many scholars.

Critique from Third World Perspective

In the 70s, many writers from the developing countries have criticized the Western model of development communication (Beltran, 1976: Bordenave, 1976; Inayatuallah, 1976; Roling, et. al., 1976; Dube, 1976; Rahim, 1976). All of them criticize the ethnocentrism of Western development concepts, and they suggest the incorporation of the traditional systems and their values with modern systems. Sayed Rahim (1976:223-25) found that diffusion research emphasizes the diffusion of material things and does not give attention to the diffusion of new ideas and of new social relations. Furthermore, diffusion research, in examining the communication relationship between initiators and adopters of innovations, assumed a one-way dependency relationship. This kind of research blocks seeing the reverse flow of ideas and innovations from the poor to the rich, from the less

developed to the more developed and so forth. Also, diffusion research makes the individual the unit of analysis. This is inappropriate in a traditional village society, where the sanctions of authority and consensus are important determinants of individual decisions.

Beltran (1976), after his criticisms of Western models, suggests a new approach which stems from understanding communication integrally and dynamically as a process in which all components deserve comparable and undislocated attention. It also stems "from the conviction that such a process is inextricably interwoven with the structure of total society, and particularly, with the economic determinants of this structure" (Beltran, 1976:36).

Inayatullah (1976) tries to move away from the ethnocentric perspective by refusing Western or Asian models; he supports a global model for development. He poses three assumptions for what he called a model for mankind:

1. All resources within a nation belong to the whole nation and should be utilized for the benefit of all its classes and regions; so world resources belong to all humanity and should be used for the benefit of all humanity.

2. The poverty of underdeveloped countries is not entirely of their own making, and therefore, they should not have to eradicate it on their own.

3. A major lesson of political development in Western countries should be applied in order to develop effective

political strategies for meeting the new challenge. This lesson is that political and economic elite responded to the demands of the underprivileged only when organized political pressure was generated from below and was exercised to extract changes in the distribution of economic and political power (Inayatullah, 1976: 241-252).

Inayatullah's model is too idealistic when it suggests that the resources of the world could be shared for the benefit of all humanity. But historically, however, the selfish and greedy nature of humanity hardly leaves space for such an assumption.

Afro centricity As a Challenge to Eurocentric Perspective

Communication does not take place in a vacuum but always in its context. As Charles Kraft (1978:417) explains: "no communication takes place in a vacuum. There are always world view-based pre-suppositions, beliefs, understandings and other concepts in the minds of the participants that pervade the presentation and the reception of the communication."

Afrocentricity emerges as an alternative to Euro centricity in all disciplines of social science (Williams, 1976: Diop, 1976 and Asante, 1979). As Cummings and Daniel (1980:117) state,

An Afro centric perspective holds that the whole history and culture of Black people constitute the proper internal frame of reference for giving explanations and critical assessments of Black communication (Cummings and Daniel, 1980:117).

Daniel (1974:XIV) relates Black communication to "those patterns of communication which are a function of the integrated primary assumptions which make up the African World view." Asante (1980) who advocates and rationalizes the Afrocentric perspective, explains that "there are three broad views of cultural reality: Afrocentric, Eurocentric, and Asiocentric. These views have been fashioned by the histories, mythologies, motifs, and ethos of the people who constitute geographically close genepools." (Asante, 1980:5-13)

As Asante explains, we can distinguish between the three perspectives in the following manner: The Afrocentric viewpoint holds that all modalities and realities are united and move in one grand manner. There can be no separation between material and spiritual, profane and sacred, form and substance. The human being, acting with personal power, can animate, activate, and galvanize the material or the spiritual. The continuity from material to spiritual is the reality of the Afrocentric viewpoint.

Asiocentric viewpoints hold the material as an illusion that the real only comes from the spiritual. Therefore, Asian philoso-concepts are enamored with spirit-over-matter notions.

In contrast to this view is the Eurocentric perspective on reality. It holds that the material, the experiential, is real and that the spiritual is an illusion. Everything that is not within sense experiences becomes nonsense.

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Asante (1980:6-8) considers history, mythology, creative motifs and ethos four communicative factors which affect .communication and can be considered as communication elements. He contends that the centrality of a world view based upon Africa is the essence of Afrocentricity which binds its place in the origins of civilizations as well as in every compartment of post-modern history. The Afrocentric perspective is valid for African people but becomes invalid for others. Thus, Asante, and others disregard the Arabs from this perspective. The African worldview becomes A Black world view, since many of the writers see the Arabs of North Africa as white and invaders (Diop, 1978; Williams, 1976; Asante, 1980:12-13).

Ellen Grant (1979) states that there are three constituents of the Afrocentric communication model: values, world view and communication systems. As she exp1ans, "values that influence the attitudes and norms of behavior within the Black culture also affect the Black's attitudes and norms of behavior within the Black culture also affect the Black's ability to adapt within his own psycho-behavioral frame of reference, and to structure ego and super-ego strengths through contact with the family (Ellen Grant, 1979:27). World view as she defines it "is our value orientation of our place in society and the relation to the environment" (Ellen Grant, 1979:37). There are many factors such as religion, socialization and family which determine world view.

None of the writers who discuss Afrocentricity asks themselves whether African values differ from Arab values, or whether the African world view differs from the Arab

world view, or what the similarities or differences are between religion, socialization and family structures of Arabs and of Africans? The questions are necessary primarily because a significant percentage of Africans inhabit Arab speaking areas or use the Arabic language.

An Arab, an Afro-Arab and/or Black Arab will ask himself where his position lies in the preceding world views i.e., Afrocentric, Asiocentric, Eurocentric. Surely, he will find himself neither in the Asiocentric nor in the Eurocentric context. He will find himself close to some degree to the Afrocentric perspective.

Excluding the Arab dimension from Afrocentricity calls for a complementary approach to Afrocentricity that posits the Arab dimension in its proper place; thus, what we suggest is Afro-Arab centrism.

The problem with those writers who deal with Afrocentricity is that while they ask for a "purposeful (approach) giving a true sense of destiny based upon the facts of history and experiences" (Asante, 1980; 64), they read history and interpret experience in a skeptical manner. While they ask Afrocentricity to reinterpret history in a way that differs from how the Euro-Americans write and interpret history, they commit the same fault by accepting their interpretation and their writings.

For example, Williams (1978) writes about "White Arab imperialists," "that Asian imperialism, though rarely ever mentioned was and still is even more devastating for the

African people than that of either Europe or America; and that the Arabs' white superiority complex is not one white less than that of Europe or America, although their strategy of "brotherhood" deceives naive Blacks." (Williams,1978:35-6).

In contrast, DuBois (1974) writes from an Afro-Arab perspective, not from "Euro-perspective," about the Arabs in Africa:

In Africa we do not speak of the "conquest of Egypt" by the Moslems. In A. D. 637, a small band of Mohammed's followers crossed from the Arabia Peninsula into Egypt and established a colony near where Cairo now stands…The Copts, who has suffered torture, imprisonment and death from the European "Christina," regarded the Arabs as liberators (DuBois, 1974:34)

She continues to say that:

As it became clear that the Arabian armies were bent on wrestling Egypt and all North Africa from the grasp of Roman Legions; wherever they went Africans joined their ranks: Egyptians, Libyans, Berbers, Moors, Numidians. (DuBois, 34-35).

Billingsly (1974) writes that:

Blyden… found as early as 1860 that in his visits to Moslem communities, he was extremely impressed by the intellectual activities, industry, dignity and diplomacy of the Muslim black. Islam seemed to strengthen and hasten independence and self-reliance. It seemed to improve social and political organizations without disrupting African Society… Islam tended toward equalitarianism and brotherhood while it discouraged racial prejudice. The Muslim religion had helped develop the African personality, purge African customs of their grosser elements, encouraged abstinence, foster industry, scholarship and race pride. It kept intact most African customs and institutions and acted as a unifying factor by transcending tribal divisions (Billingsly, 1974:162).

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If we borrow Mazrui's (1976:446) words, "there are times when anti-Arabism within black Africa is simply a manifestation of black pro-westernism"

Al Mazrui (1976) writes:

The distinction between Arabs and Black Africans is not dichotomous but has the complexity of a continuum… Within Africa itself the range of color among the Arabs runs indeed from white to black; even within Egypt, the range of color is virtually as wide as it is in the Arab world, as a whole (Mazrui 1976:73).

Other writers such as Maquet (1972:122) states that "what Africa wants to adopt--knowledge obtained from the written word, technique and efficiency--was, to a degree brought before the eleventh century by the Arabs."

Nathan Hare (1974) quotes Leopold Senghor who says that "the perennial dialogue between Arabo-Berber and Negro-Africans, is the symbiosis of two complementary ethnicities." (Nathan, 1974:47)

Afrocentricity concentrates on "Blackness" as identity coined with a unity of culture. But this argument is not sufficient when we review the history. Mazrui (1976) states that:

What is often overlooked is that Egypt was conquered by the Arabs from the deserts of the Peninsula who were darker than the Egyptians they subjected. The Arabs from the Peninsula were also darker than the Syrians whom they converted to Islam in that first wave of conquest… If the Sudanese Arabs are dark, so are many of the inhabitants of Mecca and Medina. They may not be as dark as the Sudanese, though some of them are. The Arabs of Mecca and Medina are a blend of Asia and Africa. (Mazrui, 1976:106-7).

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An Arab writer Jahiz writes in the late 8th century that "there are black tribes among the Arabs, such as the Banu Sulaim B. Mansur and that all the peoples settled in the Harra besides the Banu Sulaim are Black" (Jahiz, 1977:118). Here we are not going to advocate the notion of race. On the contrary, we are going to argue that "Blackness" is not enough to be a boundary for Africans. We argue that the Unity of Afro-Arabs goes beyond color to encompass the history, the culture and a common element which constitutes an Afro-Arab world view.

For example, religion is considered an important element of a given world view. John S. Mbiti (1970) finds:

points of similarity between Islam and traditional religions (in Africa) in belief and ritual, which paradoxically facilitates quick or smooth conversions but hinder the process and manifestation of a deep or radical Islam. It means, then that traditional religions accommodate Islam and Islam accommodate them. (Mbiti, 1979:331-2)

Ronald Benge (1972) explains the widespread influence of Islam in Africa: He states, "Islam does not attempt to attack African traditions and customs, for example, polygamy, the 'bride price' system, or many 'so called' animalistic practices. Also, Islam simply brings to the African a more precise knowledge of a God in whom they already believe." (Benge, 1972: 91).

Writers of Afrocentricity do not try to examine the similarities and mutual aspects of Africans and Arabs--an examination crucial in establishing their world view. These aspects are family structure, socialization, interaction

between the temporal and supernatural, ethnic relation and interaction history. Moreover, they disregard the reality of Afro-Arab relations, hitherto, which affect their own life economically and politically.

The acceptance of the Afro-Arab centricity will help to understand the reality and potential of the region. An African scholar, George Roberts (1980), in seeking the reality and potential of Arabs and Africans, observes that

By 1970 it had become clear to me that even Africans and Arabs shared in the faulty view of their distinctiveness. Not apparent to the majority of Africans and Arabs were the similarities with which geography, foreign incursions, and cultural evolutions had endowed them, and the degree to which concerted acknowledgement of them might alleviate the impediments to their viability as modern nation-state (Roberts, 1980:9).

It should be clarified, however, that Afrocentricity has presented an alternative perspective to the existing Western perspective. Furthermore, it emerged from different philosophical premises upon which to look at development phenomena. At this point, Afrocentricity is at its embryonic stage. Because of this peculiar characteristic several aspects that could be directly related to development communication are yet to be discerned. Of course, the Afro-Arab centric perspective does not contradict Afrocentricity. It is complementary, and, as we mentioned earlier, will encompass the African and Arab elements. This combination will give the perspective its real philosophical premises upon which to look at development phenomena. The following can be derived within an Afro-Arab context.

1. An alternative development communication paradigm to the existing paradigm.

2. Methodological considerations, e.g. a diversion from the sole or exclusive emphasis on empirica/quantitative to the inclusion of the subjective/analytical.

3. Message development based on the indigenous structure for development communication and external communication.

Constructing the Afro-Arab centric perspective, actually, will fill the void that Afro centricity has created. That will be our aim in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III

AFRO-ARAB CENTRICITY: HISTORY AND CURRENT ISSUES

The future of Africans and Arabs, if contemplated realistically, must be based upon a frank understanding of their inter-related history, cultures, problems, aspirations, destinies and their potential capabilities with which they can utilize their own resources for the benefit of their people.

It is difficult for any single Arab or African country to achieve alone sufficient national development (Saudi, 1980; Nyerere, 1973 and 1974; Nkrurnah, 1950). Thomas Hodgkin (1978) observes that the size of African states is not economically large enough to construct a modern economy alone. The only way to achieve the economic reconstruction and development essential to fulfill the aspirations, needs, and demands of the peoples of Africa is through a sustained shift to continental planning, so as to unite thereby increasing the resources, markets and capital of Africa in a single substantial economic unit. This can be achieved through agreements into a binding continent-wide pact. This can be drawn to other aspects of development in Africa (Hodgkin, 1968:22-3). Communication indeed has a large role to play in such achievements. In this chapter a presentation of the core area of concern is presented--Afro-Arab-centricity as the basis upon which communication can indeed facilitate the achievements of the basic aspirations for national development.

Suspicions and Mistrust

One of the problems which impedes achieving a unified approach to development is the atmosphere of mistrust that exists between Africans and Arabs., Trimingham (1980)

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observes that "there were phases when African nationalist leaders mistrusted Arabs even when they were receiving encouragement and material help. But Black Africans were going through a phase of re-adjustment as well as Arabs."

An African writer, Wayas (1979) observes that the Arabs and Black Africans have worked together in the Organization of African Unity and United Nations for nearly two decades. Despite such cooperation, old suspicions have lingered. The leaders of both sides have maintained, at least, a semblance of unity and brotherly lines (Wayas, 1979:82).

The suspicions and mistrust probably led Asante (1980) to state the following:

Furthermore, the overlay of the indigenous cultures of Africa with Arabic culture began in force during the religious invasion of Islamic Jihads from the Arabian peninsula. These circumstances added not only to distortion of African history, but also to the distortion of the communication reality between Africans and non-Africans. The problem is so elephantine that it will take many years to remove (Asante, 1980:54).

Such statements as the above demonstrate suspicions. A reality in Africa is different from how an Afro-American can see it. This is because Afro centricity advocates "color" and "race" which is basically different from Continental Pan-Africanism of Arabs and Africans advocated by African politicians such as Nkrumah Kenyatta and Azikiwe. This concept posits that the destiny of the whole of Africa lies in political and economic unification of all the territorial units (Nyang and Vandi, 1980).

In December 1981, an Afro-Arab Conference was held in Luanda, Angola. Members of Arab and African political parties, mass organizations and national liberations movements attended that conference. Conference participants analyzed their problems and the possibility of a combined struggle against their common enemy as well as the creation of complementary economic, cultural and propaganda activities. The Luanda Declaration of the Afro-Arab Conference states the following position as one cause of the mistrust between African and Arabs:

The imperialist propaganda through TV, radio, cinema magazines, news agencies and publishing houses influences the minds of the Afro-Arab masses and seeks to distrust their unit and isolate them from their friends in the World. The imperialist mass media trigger differences among tribes, ethnic and religious communities, as well as, among Africans and Arabs of various skin colours.

This conference and many others offer a good medium for improved Afro-Arab communication to clear up the mistrust and suspicions by a mutual understanding of their problems, aspirations and destinies.

Mistrust and suspicions could be dismissed if one studies carefully Afro-Arab relations which lead to an understanding of their historical and geographical connections together with their similar worldviews.

Joseph A. Baldwin (1980) argues:

It is clear that in order for the collection of people to occupy the same space (geographical relatedness) and time (historical relatedness) long enough for their definitions to achieve group relevance and consensus, necessarily

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requires the existence "of some more concrete and fundamental force to bind them together and anchor their collective identity (Baldwin, 1980:78).

If this is right, then the Arabs who entered North Africa 1400 years ago and the African people of North Africa who have inhabited that area for thousands of years have enough geographical and historical relatedness to bind them together to Africa.

Slavery

Another aspect of mistrust between Africans and Arabs is the slave trade. Slavery is culturally defined. In ancient African cities, we have documentary evidence that clearly demonstrates that some form of slavery existed among Africans (Bohannan and Curtin, 1971:265-8; Davison, 1961 and 1964). Another writer explained that "All slaves were supposed to be taken in accordance with established African law, that is, in 'just' war, as proven criminals and had to be purchased in legitimate fashion" (Wiedner, 1962:71).

One must hasten to say, however, that slavery as a notion is not being questioned or condoned. What is being argued here is that various societies worldwide had systems through which captives in battles were kept in some form of bondage. (Saudi, 1980:72-3). The act of keeping one in bondage is the act in question.

Taking a further look at slavery from its cultural standpoint, the form of slavery that existed in the United States, chattel slavery, was unique. In the West Indies, slavery as practiced by the British and French was different from the American

institution which- treated the slaves in inhuman ways (Mannix, 1978). Winthrop Jordan (J973) explained the American experience in slave trade by stating that:

The slave was treated like a beast. Slavery was inseparable from the evil in men, it was God's punishment upon Ham's prurient disobedience. Enslavement was captivity, the loser's lot in a contest of power. Slaves were in field of heathens (Jordan, 1973:56).

This type of slavery was institutionalized and rationalized (Jordan, 1973).

On the contrary when we look at Arab-African relations, particularly in the eastern section of the African continent, it resulted not only in enslavement for some Africans, but led to a scattering of Africans in several Arab countries of the region resulting in a significant intermingling between Africans and Arabs.

The Arabs incorporated and assimilated the African elements in their society. Maybe the exceptions were the Zinj slaves in Southern Iraq during the Abbasids dynasty (Clubb, 1975). The incorporation of African slaves in Arab society was a phase of integrative mechanisms of Arabization. The foregoing process is explained by Young (1979) in this manner:

An interesting example lies in the disappearance in the Arab world of the very large number of African slaves who have been absorbed into Arab societies.... The integrative mechanisms of Arabization and Islam ultimately completed the task (Young, 1979:105-6).

The absorption of slaves in Arab society has a historical continuum. Davidson (1961: 23) said that: "Many Negro slaves of Andalusia enjoyed a special code of law awarded by royal authority; and their principal judge was one of their own folk and represented them, was known as the "Negro Count." With the passing of the years they mingled with their free neighbors and lost their ethnic identity.

The absorption of Africans and persons of African descent in Arab societies led to situations in which they attained positions of distinction and authority in the Arab world (Irwin, 1977).

Moreover, the Arabs had nothing to do with the race of slaves that Saudi (1980:9_wrote about the Black and White slaves in the Muslim World. He stated that the total identification of blackness with slavery which occurred in North and South America never took place in the Muslim world. There were always white slaves as well as black ones.

To sum up, slavery of any type is condemned. It is crucial to look at the radical differences in forms of slavery to determine the social impact on the system. In the case of Arab slavery, all the evidence points to the direction that it was consistent with the form of slavery practiced by Africans themselves. Both systems integrated the slaves into the society at large.

Race and Ethnic Relations

The misunderstanding, mistrust and the suspicions between Africans and Arabs can be eliminated with understanding of the area as a united main cultural area. Normal Daniel (1975) pointed out that:

A main cultural area has been called an ecumene (which) refers to large cultural areas with marked characteristics but many cross-divisions and connections with other cultures, without taking cross divisions of class and religion into account (Daniel, 1975:14).

In our investigation we are going to argue that the Afro-Arab region consists of a main cultural area (i.e., ecumene cultural area.).This area has been called by Roberts (1980:12) 'Terramedia.' This term identifies Africa and Arabia as a special unit of the Third World lying, as it were, "between" Euro-America and Asia and sharing many common features.

One of the major misunderstandings between Africans and Arabs comes up from the skin color. Race springs up to distinguish between "white Arabs" and Black Africans." Skin color is employed as a criterion for evaluation by many Black scholars and politicians (Diop, 1978; Williams, 1976).

Color has become a sign of culture and carries with it cultural prejudice (Daniel, 1975:10). In a real sense, then, cultural separation makes the colors different (Davis, 1943).

Distinction between colors and races is not mutually exclusive. Krogman (1952:61) observes further that "If we accept that there are stocks and races, we accept also that

such classification is not a virtuous one, not even a clearly circumscribed one, and certainly not a hierarchal one."

Race with its physical differences has its illusion. Bertran Kraus explains "when we examine the minor subdivisions of races of man, we meet with an entirely different problem. There are not clear cut morphological differences by which all individuals of one race are clearly separated from all members of another" (1964:840).

However, in the case of Africa the status of race can be summarized as Bohannan and Curtin (1971) have explained:

There is not, however, an undisputed 'line' that can be drawn on a map, or distinction that can be made between peoples (in other than statistical terms) with the claim that one is unequivocally Caucasoid and the other Negroid. In even the most Negroid group, there are to be found individuals with light skins and green eyes; in the northern regions of Africa, there are some people with dark skins and kinky hair (Bohannan and Curtin, 1971:44).

Here one is not going to defend the notion of "blackness" or deny it. The argument is that to separate Arabs from their African counterparts is not quite right.

Fanon, for example, (1967) relates his experience in Algier: "Many times I have been stopped in broad daylight by (French) policemen who mistook me for an Arab; when they discovered my origins, they were obsequious in their apologies; Of course, we know that a Martinican is quite different from an Arab"(Fanon, 1967:91).

In a real sense, the Arabs, as many writers have observed, (Amin, 1978; Mazrui, 1976 and 1979; Young, 1977;

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Trimingham, 1980; July, 1974; Scott, 1975; Davidson,1974; Oliver and Fage, 1978) have assimilated a significant stock of Black Africans who later became Arabized. Amin (1978:11) rightly observed that the Arab world cannot be reduced to some or other ethno-racial phenomenon, for Arabization has mixed together many peoples with different origins and different racial components.

Arabs have not traditionally attached attention to the factor of race. Nnamdi Azikiwe (1965:159) observed that "In medieval times, the Arab did not distinguish between the black or brown or white Hamitic, Semitic, Sudanic or Bantu-speaking converts of Islam."

Interaction between Arabs and African is deeply rooted in history in different ways. Mazrui, for example, observes that,

The attachment of the Somalis to a semitic civilization, the points of similarity between Amharic and the written language of pre-Islamic Southern Arabic, the impact of the Arabs on the racial mixture of northern Africa, the penetration and infiltration of Islamic values and culture norms among diverse peoples in West and East Africa, the role of the Hamites in African Civilization and their relationship to Semitic groups, are all part of the total picture of a massive interaction between Semites, Hamites and black peoples (Mazrui, 1976:17)".

Moreover, the interaction between both groups is manifested in the legend and theory that drove the origin of a large group of black population of Africa to the Arabian peninsula, Iraq, Libya and Palestine (Mazrui, 1976: 24-5; July, 1914;125; Murphy, 1978:132; Greenberg, 1969:10-11; Hodgkin, 1975:74-81). These legends exist about the origins of Hausa, Yoruba, Fulani and Fulbe.

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If these legends are not based on historical truth, they still have a symbolic meaning to the bond and interaction between African and Arabs.

Blackness as Politics and Ideology

The feeling of .the importance of the Africans and Arabs to be combined was manifested in the O.A.U. which has not taken color as a factor in its membership. We find nine Arab states, with population of two-thirds of the Arab world, members of the O.A.U.

Before the concept of Pan-Africanism was developed to attach Arabs to the Pan-African family, the concept itself was carrying the idea of race that was a reaction to white colonialism and the claim of superiority. In Rupert Emerson's (1966) words:

Even though Africans generally, having been the principal victims of a prior racialism, repudiate a new racialism asserting itself in a Pan-African guise, it seems very difficult to escape racial conception as one of the basic elements in Pan-Africanism. The concept of Negritude, expounded by Aime Cesaire, Leopold Senghor and others bases itself explicitly on the people of Negro race. (Emerson, 1966:446)

The concept of Negritude enunciated by Senghor (1967:41) is a whole set of civilization values-cultural, economic, social, and political which characterize black peoples more exactly in the African world.

This concept was criticized by some political leaders. They argue that Negritude does not take Pan-Africanism in its larger concept. Alex Quaison-Sackey (1963: 48-9) speaks

about African Personality as a key idea in Pan Africanism which was more comprehensive in scope because it is more limited geographically. This view will bind the Afro-Arab elements together. Moreover, the concept of Negritude was relinquished by the concept of Pan-Africanism which was manifested in African Unity, (Nyerere, 1973 and 1974; Nkrumah, 1980). Toure (1978) argues that the recognition of the cultural unity of Africa is a political choice just as the affirmation of the cultural existence of one "Negro-Africa," "Arab Africa," one "Negro-Berber Africa," and one "Arabo-Berber Africa" derives also from political choice. Toure argues further that:

Color does not concern history. To talk of the African continent is to understand it as a geographical, psychological and social entity, with its historic content. The whole of Africa has experienced colonization, she must henceforth assert herself in freedom and dignity. And to talk of Africa in terms of color is to try to divide the continent (1978:187-8).

He severely criticized Negritude by saying that Negritude became a means of diversion, a means of diversion which favors imperialism while weakening the battle front formed by African Peoples.

However, Senghor himself, did not deny the unique relationship between Arabs and Africans when he delivered a lecture at Cairo University on February 26, 1967. He stated that the White Africans and Black Africans are a mixture. And he points out the points of contact between the Negritude cultures and Arabic cultures, especially in the field of linguistic borrowings of the meaning of words and ideas (Senghor, 1980:16-7).

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From negritude back to Afrocentricity, it was mentioned earlier that Afrocentricity disregards the Arab dimension. It neglects the historical relation between Africans and Arabs. History is an important dimension in social sciences. Without understanding history it is difficult to understand the reality of the present Afro-Arab situation.

As Yu (1978:234) observes, one of the priorities for future research in development communication is "the uses of the past." So understanding history in a correct manner will posit Afro-Arab relations in its appropriate context. C Wright Mills (1970:158-182) investigated the uses of history and contended that without the use of history and without a historical sense of psychological matters, the social scientist cannot adequately state the kinds of problems that ought now to be the orienting points of his studies. We cannot hope to understand any single society, even as a static affair without the use of historical materials. Hence, in order to understand the Afro-Arab wor1dview we must shed light on the historical relation between both groups.

Historical Relations

Afro-Arab relations go deep in history. It is manifested in the intermingling of both Arabs and Africans, communication of cultures, and a strong economic and commercial relationship. Murphy (1978) observes that:

The history of Africa is the history of the migrations and intermingling of peoples… We are slowly learning that in prehistoric times there was far more communication among peoples and exchange among cultures than was formerly imagined. (Murphy, 1978:18).

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The African ties with the Mediterranean world are very ancient, (Balandier 1961:4) and the first contact of major cultures-semitic and negro-was between the Fertile Crescent and Egypt (Wiedner 1962: 15). The contact between Arabia and East Africa was early in the Iron Age (Davidson,1969 25-26).

In tracing the ancient relationships between Africa and the Middle East, July (1974:19) writes:

Most authorities believe that the agricultural movement was in fact from east to west, that knowledge of cultivation, originating in the Middle East, reached the Nile Delta in the late sixth or early fifth millennium before Christ, then travelled southward along the Nile Valley, and finally westward across the southern edge of the Sahara into the central or western Sudan. (July, 1974:19)

Some African ties with Arabs were also established through relations between Arabs and East African. Historians such as July, (1974), Wiedner, (1962), Murphy, (1978), Davidson (1969 & 1974), Oliver and Fage,(1978) , Jackson, (1980) , and Dewing,(1977) have noted that the early contacts between both of the groups produced an Afro-Arab civilization in Axum.

Murphy (1978) states:

The influence of Yemeni Semites was pervasive during the first millennium B. C., than most Ethiopians of the northern and central regions are more closely related in language and basic culture to Arabians than to most other Africans. (Murphy, 1978:48).

Moreover, he explains the ancient relations between Ethiopia and Arabs which goes back to 5000 B. C. Further, he states

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the contact between Bantu and Arab in East Africa to nearly two thousand years. He concludes that the basis for Swahili civilization was being laid by the Bantu immigrants and their Arab trading partners well before the end of the first millennium (Murphy 1978:223-5). The same thing can be said about the Meroitic Kush civilization (Davidson,1974:37; and Murphy, 1978: 41).

The Phoenicians, who inhibited North Africa came from what is known as Lebanon and Palestine, bringing with them the knowledge of iron metallurlagy to Carthage and from there it spread outward through northwestern Africa (Bohannan and Curtin 1971:215). The Phoenicians spoke a Semitic language and were not different in race and origin from the North African Berbers who have populated the regions for thousands of years (Murphy: 1978: 65-6) and according to Davidson (1974:10), they came to Africa some 12,000 years ago.The presence of Phoenicians in north Africa explains the speed, of the spread of Islam in that era. Oliver and Fage (1978:77) state:

In the Maghrib, the way of the Arabs and Islam has been prepared by Phoenician Carthage. In outlook and language the Arabs were closer to the Berbers than the Greeks or Romans could ever be; they were therefore more capable of enfolding them in their own civilization. (Oliver and Fage, 1978:77)

However, the ambivalence of the commercial relations between the Africans and Arabs and the shared values among them facilitate the spread of Islam in Africa. Islam in a real sense was introduced to Sub-Sahara through interpersonal communication. As we know the Moslem

traders played a major role as communicators who carried the Islamic call to Africa.

Hence, when one speaks about Islam one is concerned with it because "to all Muslim Arabs, Islam represents an indissoluble core of identity, a personal possession and a communal heritage" (Sharabi 1966:5). The Islam for Arabs means their culture and their civilization. So we will find a Christian Arab historian Zuraiq writes about Islam:

This religion has influenced every aspect of our Arab culture, for we cannot today understand our ancient Arab heritage, be it in philosophy or science or art, except after a deep study of the tenets and laws of the Muslim religion and after reaching a correct understanding of its spirit and organization. This Arab heritage is part of our present culture; it is rather the foundation on which it stands. (Zuraiq, 1976)

As Jansen (1979:17), also, observes:

Islam is not merely a religion. It is a total and unified way of life, both religious and secular; it is a set of beliefs and a way of worship; it is a vast and integrated system of laws, it is a culture and a civilization, it is an economic system and a way of doing business...It is a spiritual and human totality, this worldly and other worldly. (Jansen, 1979:17)

Islamic Civilization in Africa is not Alien

With Islam the Arabs established close relationship with Africans. The political, social, cultural and economic relations were enhanced. Davidson (1969a) states that in East Africa, "as in West Africa, Islam brought new trading opportunities, new concepts and methods of government, new systems of thought. Africans took all these and worked them into patterns of their own " (Davidson, 1969a:32).

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B1yden (1967:19) explained how the Arab missionaries propagated Islam. He wrote:

Long prior to the rise of Islam, as we have seen above, the Arab merchants had been in communication with the interior of Africa, and had opened the way for the Arab missionary. When, therefore, the Muslim missionary came as the propagator of a higher religion than any that had been known, he did not enter the country as a stranger. The political and social institutions of the Arabs had already been tried and found suitable to the wants and tastes of the Negro tribes; indeed, the two peoples, if not of cognate origin, have by protracted intercommunication, and by the similarity of the physical influences which have for ages, operated upon them, become similar in tastes; and it was not difficult for the Arabs to conform to a great extent to the social and domestic customs of the Africans (Blyden, 1967:19).

The above observation is important for two reasons, firstly; it illustrates the historical inter-relation between Arabs and Africans and their mutual tastes. Secondly, it shows how easy it was for the Arab merchant to communicate with Africans. The significance of this as Blyden explained was that the Arabs were no strangers to the Africans.

Many historians have observed that Islam penetrated the Sub-Sahara by two means--the Arab traders and self-supporting missionaries (Levtzion, 1971:4-15; Bohannan and Curtin, 1971:297; I.M. Lewis, 1974:108-9; Blyden, 1971:305; Davidson,1974:110-2; Martin Klein, 1968:3 ; July, 1974: 64-67 and Medelsohn, 1974). Introducing Islam to Africans was through interpersonal communication efforts. Bohannan and Curtin (1971:296) state that "in many parts of the world Islam became the dominant religion, it was introduced by conquest and spread through state influence; but it came to West Africa through the individual

efforts of merchants from North Africa who happened to be Muslim and acted as amateur missionaries."

Nevertheless, the Jihad (holy war) in West Africa was internal more than external. As Bohannan and Curtin (1971:298) observe

These recurrent calls for holy war were more often internal than external. That is, they were a call for revolution, the overthrow of secular rulers, and the substitution of theoretical government. Only after a theocratic state had been created was the call turned outward toward the conquest and forcible conversion of non-Muslim peoples. It may be surprising then, that a very high proportion of these Jihads or holy wars also had contained an ethnic or national element.

The success of introducing Islam into Africa through effective communication stems from the fact that the African context was proper for such a communication attempted aim at conversion. Though the African cultural context was appropriate for the successful preaching of Islam, one must state that the similarity between the belief systems and family structures and ethnic inter-relations, enhanced the ease with which the religion was propagated. As Benge (1972: 97) notes; "Islam does not attempt to attack African traditions and custo.ms, for example, polygamy, the, "bride price" system; or many so called animalistic practices."

Besides the above, the equalitarian aspect of Islam among all peoples makes such a religion attractive. The Holy Qur'an

states, "O Mankind: We created you from a single (pair) of male and female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know and cooperate with one another" (Chapter 99: 3). Haykal (1976) explains the aspects of equality in Islam thus:

Equality before God calls for genuine fraternity and brotherhood because it imposes upon all a realization of their fraternity in service to God and in the worship of the One Master. (Haykal, 1976:53)

The aim here is not to argue for the superiority of Islam, but rather, to point out a basic premise that if there exists a context conducive for successful communication, the process of communication becomes less tedious. In essence, Africa was susceptible to Islam because the context was conductive.

Blyden (1977:240) observes that:

throughout the history of Islam, in all countries, race or "previous condition" has been no barrier to elevation. Frequent are the instances in which proud Arabs have submitted to the rule of aliens, even if those aliens were Negro slaves. (Blyden, 1977:240)

Other writers (Murphy, 1978; Davidson and Bush: 1966; Davidson 1969, 1974; Trimingham, 1980; Wiedner, 1962; July, 1974; (I.M. Lewis, 1974; John Gray, 1975; Pardo, 1971; Levtzion,1971 and 1967; Jackson, 1980; Oliver and Fage, 1978; McCall 1971) have observed that Islam introduced political economic and cultural development in Sub-Sahara. Islam also introduced with it new concepts in government, law, learning and trade. The introduction of several changes in the Sudanic empires such as Songhai,

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Ghana and the Swahili civilization through Islam are well known.

Islam brought prosperity to the regions (July 1974:78) and opened the way to international relations at that time. In contrast to the Arabs, the European's incursion to Africa brought about domination and exploitation of Africans and the physical resources of the continent through military actions and questionable treaties. Thus, the relationship between African underdevelopment and European development are correlated (Rodney,1974). In addition the Europeans used divisive tactics to manipulate and dominate the Afro-Arabs people by a means of cultural conquest. Freire (1970): observes the situation:

The invaders penetrate the cultural context of another group, in disrespect of the latter's potentialities; they impose their own view of the world upon those they invade and inhibit the creativity of the invaded by curbing their expression. (Freire, 1970:150)

Fanon (1968:236-7) in his book, The Wretched of the Earth, explored the ways in which colonial domination in Africa (North and Sub-Sahara) tried to destroy national culture. He stated that the colonialists managed to disrupt the cultural life of conquered people. This cultural obliteration is made possible by the negation of national reality; (b) new legal relations introduced by the occupying power, (c) the banishment of the natives and their customers to outlying districts; (d) colonial society; (e) expropriation and (f) the systematic enslaving of men and women.

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In contrast to the above experience the Arabs' cultural presence in Africa is significantly different. The character of the appeal of Islam did not destroy the African culture. As Lyndon Harris (1954) explains:

For the majority of tribal Africans, Islam.... appeared as a support and not as a challenge, to their traditional way of life. Within the framework of Islam it has been possible for the convert to retain the greater part of tribal custom without any radical change. In a true sense, no conversion is expected of the tribal African of East Africa in becoming a Muslim, for conversion means a turning away from those aspects of belief and of life which are not acceptable in converting religion (Harris, 1954:334).

Moreover, we find that the belief systems of both Africans and Arabs have no essential conflict. So Herskovitz (1962) observes that:

from a theological point of view, there was not essential conflict between Islamic and aboriginal beliefs; that polytheism is the only tenet inconsistent with being a Muslim. Therefore, East Africans believing in a universe headed by a single deity needed no far-reaching reorientation (Herskovitz, 1962:191).

The Afro-Arab mutual relationship was enhanced through the history and through their reciprocal belief systems, values, social structure, and their life experience.

In brief, realizing therefore that Afro-Arabs have a reciprocal wor1dview will enhance their inter-cultural, political, inter-group and mass communication. In turn, this effort will help in planning for national development and in the efforts to unify the African continent.

Current Issues in Afro-Arab Relations

The political map of Africa and the Arab World, in a real sense, is the product of colonialism during the 19th century and the early. 20th century. Ba1kinazation accompanied colonial rule. The French occupied Algiers in 1830; in 1839 the British occupied Aden. In 1881, the French occupied Tunisia and in 1882 the British occupied Egypt. During 1911-1912, the Italians occupied Libya. In 1920 a French mandate was established for Syria and Lebanon and a British mandate for Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq (Bernard Lewis, 1960).

The mandatory powers created five new states, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Palestine. They decided the structure and boundaries for these states without regarding Arab wishes (Mansfield, 1978:231).

The same process was pursued by the colonial powers in the Sub-Sahara. In the early l870s Britain and France had considered partitioning West Africa into spheres of influence. For example, by 1893 the French established their colonies in the Ivory Coast and French Guinea. In 1900 Dahomey became a French Colony. By 1902 British occupation of Sierra Leone, the Gold Coastand Nigeria was completed. The British declared the protectorate of Zanzibar and Pemba in 1890. Italy had occupied a part of the Eritrean Coast of the Red Sea in 1883 (Oliver and Atmore 1969).

The consequences of colonial domination of this era can be seen in the cultural impact, economic and social consequences and political heritage.

Afro-Arab Cultural Situation

Military invasion was accompanied with cultural invasion. For the latter to succeed the invaded recognized the superiority of the invaders (Ibn Kaldu, <u>Muqqadimah</u>) This idea was picked up by Paulo Freire (1970:151-2) who explains:

The values of the latter (invaders) thereby became the pattern for the former (invaded). The more invasion is accentuated and those invaded are alienated from the spirit of their own culture and from themselves, the more the latter want to be like the invaders; to walk like them, dress like them, talk like them... Cultural invasion is on the one hand an instrument of domination, and on the other, the result of domination. (Freire, 1970:151-2)

The colonial powers pursued different policies which influenced the type of education policies in the colonized societies (Nwankwo 1973:10). Although the British policy was more pragmatic than other colonial policies we find that all the colonies aimed at assimilation of colonized people into the colonial, power, culture.

These policies have resulted in distortions in the communication pattern in the invaded societies. The distortion occurred by imposing the language and educational policies on the invaded by the invaders. The colonial "policy" of a distorted African education was explained by Smock and Bentsi-Enchill (1976) in the following manner:

Each of Africa's colonial powers sought to impose its own language as a second language on its colonies educated elite, largely to serve three purposes: to permit communication between the colonial administration and the local population, to facilitate communication among the various linguistic

communities within the country, and to serve as a carrier of the particular brand of European culture and colonial power was seeking to disseminate. (Bentsi-Enchill, 1976:161).

After independence most of the African states adopted the European language of the former colonial power as an official language. The importance of the African language to be media of discourse has been manifested in the Charter of the O.A.D. in Article XXIX which states that the working languages of the Organization and all its institutions shall be, if possible, African languages, English and French.The Article admits the reality of the position of the European languages is advocated in the hope that one African language or another will be an official language of the O.A.U.

In Africa now as in the Arab World, the Africans and the Arabs are aware of their cultural dependency on the West. It seems that the military to an extent plays a significant role in reducing the cultural component of dependency by reviving certain trends towards indigenous ways of handling things. Ali Mazrui (1967) explains:

If these rural sectors from which the soldiers are recruited are less Westernized, are they not likely to emphasize things indigenous in the years ahead? It is a meaningful question. The experience in Zaire and Uganda seems to indicate that there are possibilities of the military playing a traditionalizing role, sometimes in very simple and naive ways, but nevertheless raising fairly fundamental issues. (Ma z r u i, 1967:292)

We also hear the voice of cultural revolution in the Arab World. In Libya, Qadhafi declared the cultural revolution on April 15, 1973. He   delivered a speech to the forth

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conference of the African Youths Movement on March 23, 1974 at Benghazi. He said to the youths:

If you are African youths, your claim must be to Africa, your culture must be African. This makes cultural revolution in Africa necessary to wash our minds from the consequences of the colonialism and the effects of the aliens. So it is inevitable to create the African personality, African nationality, African culture and African minds" (Qadhafi 1974:475-6).

One of the influences of Western cultures in Africa is manifested in the adoption of alien ideologies and sometimes with modifications and adaptation of these ideologies. It is important to investigate ideology because ideology for most people presents in these days of communications revolution one of the keys of development (Leonard Binder 1966:209).

Many writers (Haim,1976; Emerson, 1963; :Mazrui,1967; Binder,1966) assert that the ideological heritage of the colonial era is the foundation of contemporary nationalism in the developing areas. Mazrui (1967) traces the roots of borrowed ideologies in Africa. He traced the origin of African liberalism from Britain and America, traced the American origins of African socialism in Nkrumah's writings. But as Mazrui explains, Liberalism and Socialism have not exerted their influence only on African conceptions' of their relations with others. What is now emerging is the influence of these two bodies of thought on the new social relations within the African countries themselves and the economic systems they devise.

If we accept the appearance of a westernized elite as an indispensible part of the movement toward nationalism and

socialism, we must recognize that these ideologies will not succeed if the societal milieu is not prepared (Emerson 1963).

In trying to pursue an independent and novel innovation in ideology in the African and the Arab world, African-Arab leaders try to resurrect indigenous ideologies by diversifying the indigenous population toward a re-examination of their own formal cultures (Binder, 1966:213). Julius Nyerere initiated Ujama, tying it to the indigenous tradition. Qadhafi (1975) introduces <u>The Green Book: The Third Universal Theory</u> as an alternative to capitalism and communism. The assertions on African socialism or Arab socialism can be taken in the same regard. The importance of this feeling of introducing independent ideology comes from the feeling of the need for liberation from cultural dependency. Nowadays cultural dependency poses itself -in the international arena. The search for a new world information order is a main concern of the Third World countries, because the free flow of information enhances the cultural independence.

Sepetu (1978) explains that the effect of the imbalance in the flow of information makes it very difficul,t for the non-aligned countries to develop their cultural identity in the absence of cultural identity in the absence of cultural policy due to the lack of a corresponding information and cultural policy (Sepetu, 1979:61).

To conclude, the current cultural situation in Afro-Arab society is in part the production of the colonial period. This is manifested in cultural dependency-particularly among the

elites, which is still enhanced by the one-way flow of information from the West. In the realm of communication, this situation creates a distortion of the communication process, since the process does not comprehensively include the entire contexts addressed above.

Afro-Arab Political Situation

As we have mentioned earlier, the consequences of colonial rule in the Arab world and Africa resulted in new states which emerged through Balkanization policy. The boundaries of these states were drawn without taking into account the unity of language or culture. This process has created a communication problem with the new states, especially African states. In Arab states, sovereignty led to creation of boundaries between the new states. This in turn impeded the communication process between the people of these newly independent states.

However, the feelings of oneness among the Africans and Arabs was obvious on the First Conference of Independent African states which was held in Accra, Ghana from April 15 to 22, 1958. In this conference the Arab states consisted 63% of the participants. The declaration of the conference stated: "We further assert and proclaim the unity among ourselves and our solidarity with the dependent peoples of Africa as well as our friendship will all nations." This indicated the desire of the Afro-Arab states to bridge the gap which has been created by the colonial powers and to enhance the march towards unity of the African continent. The states at the Accra meeting declared:

Desirous of mobilizing the human resources of our respective countries in furtherance of our social and cultural aspirations, we will endeavor to promote and facilitate the exchange of teachers, professors, students, exhibitions, educational, cultural and scientific material which will improve cultural relations between the African states and inculcate greater knowledge amongst us through such efforts as joint youth festivals, sporting efforts, etc. We will encourage and strengthen studies of African culture, history and geography in the institutions of learning in the African states; and we will take all measures in our respective countries (1962:139-140).

One can ask why such inter-African cooperation did not come to fruition. One can see that the cooperation between African states as has been suggested by the African Unity Conference and by the O.A.U. did not come to fruition for the following reasons:

1. The remaining links with the former colonial powers, e.g. the Commonwealth (Johnson, 1964) and the international pressures on the Afro-Arab states (Rothschild, 1964) regarding intra-African political relation. Cowan (1966:120) observes that:

Political decisions on foreign policy questions relating to attitudes toward former colonial powers may be conditioned by largely non-political factors deriving from continuing economic dependence or cultural ties.

2. Affinities to different ideologies which may create contradiction between the states. Ideology helps identify friends and enemies as a basis for policy. Zartman (1966:42) explains:

In nearly every case of bad relations, ideological reasons are cited, although they may or may not be decisive. After their first meeting in 1957, when Nkrumah and Houphouet-Boigny went home, Nkrumah was convinced that Houphouet-Boigny was a colonialist agent and Houphouet-Boigny was convinced that Nkrumah was a local imperialist; subsequent relations between their two countries proved each to be correct in his own mind. (Zartman, 1966:42)

3. Territorial disputes resulting from the Balkanization policy of colonial power, since it established arbitrary political boundaries with no regard to ethnic and linguistic groups. McKay (1966:5) observes:

Territorial dispute includes border delimitation controversies such as the Algerian-Moroccan disputes irredentist movements of the Somali type; friction between Ghana and Togo over the border that divides the Ewe people; and the competition for economic resources such as grazing lands on the Somali-Ethiopian border and minerals in Algeria and Mauritania. (McKay, 1966:5)

4. Leadership patterns. The leaders who led their countrymen to freedom and became charismatic leaders gain the mandate from their authoritanism. Such leaders had their ambitions which resulted in competition between strong personalities. This explains the inability of the Ghana-Guinea Union to become a true federation (Rothschild, 1964:604). This further explains partly the ability of Iraq-Syria Unity despite their mutual ideology and undisputed territories.

Zartman (1966:33) explained that the African heads of state handled foreign policy personally. Intra-African relations among heads of states tend to be personal relations. This is true within Arab context also. The relation between Jordan-Syria, Syria-Iraq as an example can be in some ways understood within the context of the relationship between the heads of state.

With this type of political communication, the individual communication patterns of the leaders became crucial (Nwankwo, 1973b). That is why the O.A.U. and other organizations and bilateral institutions of the Afro-Arab states became important as a pulpit for interpersonal communication which gives toe leaders an opportunity to exchange their ideas and solve their problems which in turn will affect their people.

The above factors as they affect the inter-relationship among African and Arab states also tend to affect the entire context within each society.

Despite all the disturbing factors, the O.A.U. success has been tripled:

1.   It is a necessary forum for Afro-Arab states to work together to understand their reality and to cooperate in creating solid grounds for their mutual interest.
2.   It has unified Afro-Arabs in challenging the colonial powers and create d a solidarity among them to work together to liberate Africa and the Arab world from alien

invaders and colonizers e.g., Algier, Angola, Palestine, South Africa.

3.   It has unified the Afro-Arab states in playing an effective role in international organizations such as their role in the General Assembly of the UNESCO and the Afro-Asian solidarity movement and non-aligned countries.

For example, the Arab and African states played a unified role in attempting to create a new world international information order and a new international economic order. The first was adopted by the UNESCO in its declaration. The later was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI) May 1, 1974.

Afro-Arab Economic Situation

The economic situation in African and Arab states is inherited from the colonial economic structure (Kamarck, 1966) which was established in exploitation of man and resources. This situation creates a real crisis for development. In a World Bank Report titled, "Accelerated Development in Sub-Sahara: An Agenda for Action" (1981) the writers describe the situation in the following manner:

African economics are for the most part small in economic terms, a result of low average incomes and small populations African economics are open; foreign trade typically accounts for about a quarter of GDP. They are specialized economics, most of them agricultural, dependent on the export of two or three primary commodities. Even in the mineral exporting countries, the bulk of the population-rarely less than 70 percent works in agriculture, and subsistence-oriented production which still accounts for half or more of

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the total agricultural output. Only about 20 percent of the population is urban, and modern wage employment absorbs a very small proportion of the labor force in most countries less than 10 percent.

This characterization of Sub-Sahara Africa did not differ from the economic situation in the Arab world despite the wealth of the oil revenue.

The economic situation has its implication on development which controls the ability to achieve plans for development. Such a situation limits the kind of technology which can be transferred to these countries. It also can limit the kind of communication media that can be used, and will affect its efficiency to transmit its messages to the target audiences.

Another aspect which will be affected by the economic factor is the infrastructure, which refer to the physical infrastructural aspects such as communication facilities, power, electricity, banking, etc. social infra-structure such as educational health and welfare facilities (Roberts, 1980:200). All these factors will affect and will be affected by the economic sector. That, in turn, will be reflected on the development process in a given society.

Nowadays, most of the Afro-Arab governments are aware of the need to accelerate the development of their societies. To achieve such an aim these states take on their shoulders the responsibility of planning for national development and implementation of these plans in accordance with the role of mass communication in development. Development communication is perceived as a helpful factor. Many of the

new states may own and/or control the mass media to keep them under their direction (Blake, 1979a; Quebral, 1973).

The capacity of development communication media may be constrained by economic factors such as limited budget. An economic factor such as limited budget determines the quantity of messages and may place some items as first priority and disregard others which may be equally important to the development communication messages as well. Furthermore, a limited budget will affect the quality and capacity of broadcasting facilities.

However, the economic situation in Africa as it is in the Arab world cannot be resolved through developing a single state. The future of Afro-Arabia states depends upon a united economic planning which gives the whole area a complementary role in reconstructing the economy of the whole continent. Green and Seidman (1968) state:

In short, neither rapid economic development nor substantial economic independence can be attained by individual African states acting separately. Continued economic division will entail continued dependence on a limited array of slowly growing export sectors, on foreign economic assistance and foreign private investment, and on a few relatively high-cost consumer and constructing good industries (Green and Seidman, 1968:81).

With the emergence of economic power of the oil-producing Arab states and the ability to participate in the development of the Afro-Arab area, it is predictable that the road to more cooperation among Arabs and Africans is facilitated.

The Arabs feel a commitment towards African development. That was obvious in the Sixth Arab Head of States Summit which was held in Algeris on November 26-28, 1973. The Arab heads of states have decided to do the following:

1.   To cement the Afro-Arab political cooperation and diplomatic relations in Africa.
2.   To strengthen and enlarge the cultural, financial and economical cooperation with the sister African countries on a bilateral level and on regional institutions and especially with the African Bank for Development.
3.   Establishing an Arab Monetary Fund to participate in the social and economical development in the African countries and to give them technical assistance.
4.   To increase solidarity between all states.
5.   To increase the material and diplomatic support for the struggle of the African liberation (Aspar, 1980:97).

This trend was enhanced through many Afro-Arab channels. First through the Afro-Arab dialogue in the Afro-Arab symposium for liberation and development which was held at Khartoum-Sudan in January 7-11, 1976. In this symposium the participants declared that the cooperation and solidarity .among the Afro-Arab peoples and states is inevitably historical (Asper, 1980: 105-6). Also, this trend was enhanced through the First Afro-Arab Foreign Ministers Conference at Dakar-Senegal on April 19-22, 1976. The First Afro-Arab Summit Conference which was held at Cairo

in March 8-9, 1977 issued a political declaration and agenda for Afro-Arab cooperation. There is another declaration on Afro-Arab finance and economic cooperation delineating the organization and procedures to implement Afro-Arab cooperation (Aspar, 1980:111-113).

The awareness of Afro-Arab states of the inevitability of their mutual fate, make such cooperation indispensable. This kind of cooperation is usually made concrete in the form of mutual assistance. For instance, the total of the Arab assistance to Africa at the end of 1978 amounted to $3,873,831,000 (Asbar, 1980:139). Furthermore, this will enhance Afro-Arab centricity as a part of the reality of their daily life. Thus, communications are needed to play a crucial role in the promotion of cooperation between the Afro-Arab states.

Afro-Arab Social Situation

The last aspect of Afro-Arab situation which has been affected by the colonial power is the social aspect. This is obvious in the family structure which is moving in some ways towards the nuclear family structure. The extended family structure is definitely threatened. There is a rapid movement towards industrialization and organization. The effect of this change can be seen as (Lloyd 1966) explains:

The values which prevail in the nuclear family usually differ from those of descent group. Instead of the hierarchical ranking of the latter and the correlation of authority with age, there exists, in the nuclear family relationships which are more diffuse and affectionate. Greater stress is usually placed on individual initiatives and achievements than on the sense of

affiliation and the importance of getting on well with one's fellows that infuses the descent group (Lloyd, 1966:171).

The individual selection of a spouse which was placed mainly on her descent group is changing now to mutual choice in African societies (Lloyd, 1969) and in Arab societies (Hatab, 1976; Goode, 1963; Daghestani, 1970).

The colonial impact has affected to a degree the relationship of the basic values of the family structure in Arab and African societies. For example, the role of the aged people has been replaced by the role of the elites. We do find, however, that between generation there is a mutual respect, and the elites maintain their obligations to their kin in both more and financial obligations.

However, the development planner who wants to succeed in his mission cannot ignore the reality of the family structure and its obligation to the system. The entire system forms the core of the communication process at least at the interpersonal and intergroup contexts.

To summarize this chapter, we have examined the historical relationship between Africans and Arabs and have attempted to clarify some aspects of mistrust between both groups. In order to establish a centrist theory for Afro-Arab communication, we have examined the essential dimensions that unify Africans and Arabs as a cultural group with a mutual world view (See below table 1). Hence, we will next examine the belief systems, social structure, and socialization.

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CHAPTER IV

AFRO-ARAB CENTRICITY:

CULTURE AND THE WORLD VIEW

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Culture and the World View

The communication process is inseparable from culture. A common culture according to Deutsch (1966),

is a common set of stable, habitual preferences and priorities in men's attention, and behavior, as well as in their thoughts and feelings. Many of these preferences may involve communication. It is usually easier for men to communicate within the same culture than across its boundaries (Deutsch, 1966:88).

In the Afro-Arab context, nobody can claim that the cultures of both groups are completely the same, neither can one claim that African societies have also the same culture in every detail. One can talk and write about cultural pluralism within Africa. Some cultural differences do exist among Africans (Herskovitz 1962: 207-8). By the same token, one finds cultural pluralism, in the Arab context also and in the idea of Pan-Africanism within the O.A.U. This problem was stated by Mphahlele (1974) in the following terms:

A national culture is the first reality a people knows, and it must be an organic part, initially define national cultures, but the latter can define Pan-Africanism. In a greater Africa, we may arrive at a point where Pan-African goals do determine certain national objectives, but cultures can only

contribute to Pan-African ideals from a position of national strength. (Mphahlele, 1974:72)

There is no contradiction between the national culture and Pan-African culture (which include African and Arabs). But it is important to understand, however, the nature of the Afro-Arab cultural milieu as a wide cultural unit which includes diversity within unity (Toure 1978: 97-100).

This wide cultural unit has its "private world" and within it we will find its world view that deals with beliefs and values ystems. Philip Bock (1970) explains the concept thus:

For most people, culture defines whose temporal and spatial dimensions are related to social activity. Within this world, culture also teaches what kinds of entities exist and how men should relate to them. It provides standards of values by which men can judge one another and themselves. (Bock, 1979:303)

From culture and from socialization emerges world view. Felaowarde (1974:68) relates that world view embraces the world outside of man in which man lives and the world inside of man in which man has his entire being. Man sees these two worlds as necessary in the most intimate and interdependent, inter-related harmonious relationship, comprising in fact, an indissoluble unity within which each serves as "the polarizing agent for the other.

The world view then consists of a set of more or less systematized beliefs and values in terms of which that group evaluates and attaches meaning to the reality that surrounds it (Glenn:1973).

The world view is central and integral to a cultural frame of reference which would lead us to believe, that it pervasively influences any attempt to communicate across cultural or sub-cultural boundaries (Kraft: 1979:412). That is why when we are investigating the Afro-Arab world view, we are searching for the commonality and similarity between the world view of both groups which will provide better effects for communication messages. Searching for Afro-Arab world view will not prevent the development of sub-world views for sub-cultures, because as Kraft (1970:410) contends: "A group's world view does not, however, completely determine the perception of all of its members at all times."

The importance of world view in communication comes from its functions. Kraft (1978:408-411) states five functions for the world view of a given people; they are 1) explanatory function which provides the people with the explanation of how and why things got to be as they are and how they continue that way; 2) evaluational and validating function; which states that the basic institutions, values and goals of a society find their sanctions in the world view of their culture or sub-culture; and for most of the cultures of the world, the ultimate ground for these sanctions is supernatural; 3) psychological reinforcement functions which requires adjustment between behavior and basic values; 4) integrating function which systematizes and orders for the group their perception of reality into an overall design; and 5) adaptational function which states that the world view devises means for resolving conflict and cultural dissonance. In order for the above functions to be valid in the Afro-Arab

context, we must construct the Afro-Arab world view. In order to achieve this task we will discuss the essential constituents of the Afro-Arab world view; that is, the supernatural belief system values, the social structure and the means of socialization.

The Belief System

Belief in a real sense has a social function. Belief regulates the individual's behavior and demands conformity with morals.

Many writers as we mentioned earlier have observed that Islam penetrated sub-Sahara because Islam did not contradict the African belief system. Here we will investigate the commonality and similarity between both systems recognizing that these similarities extend to some other religions than Islam. The similarities between Islam and African supernatural system comes from four aspects: (1) Believing in a Supreme God; (2) Uniting between spirit and matter; (3) Believing in the Hereafter; (4) Believing in ancestor and spiritual forces.

1. Supreme God

Islam believes in the oneness of God. Islam affirms the absolute unity of God. The Quran says: "Your God is One God: There is No God Save Him, Most Gracious, Most Merciful" (Chapter 11:163). And God is Omnipotent. The Quran says: "Blessed be He. In Whose hands is Domion. And He over all things Hath Power" (Chapter 67:1).

As Tabbarah (1978:69) explains: God's Omnipotence enters into the life of every man which consequently means that one need not seek refuge in other than God to secure or avoid adversities. God is the only refuge to which we can turn.

In African belief systems, we find that despite the diversity of African tribes they believe in a Supreme and Creator God. One also finds among the Dinka clans that "every clan has a divinity which belongs to its members collectively. It is believed to protect them, and is thought of as the source of its continuing existence as a body, just as Divinity is the source of all life." Lienhardt (1974:194) and Gulliver (1966:187) observed that the Jie of Uganda explicitly recognized a supreme or High God for good rains and abundant crops. The High God, who is wholly a power for good, controls the rain and all goodness, but he may punish wrong-doers as a part of his ambience, particularly if the disapproved conduct was brought to his notice by a responsible or a senior Jie.

Marcel D'Hertefelt (1966:430-1) writes about "the creator God of the Rwand of Rwanda: "the term Imaanu referred to a remote creator god who was believed to be essentially good-natured and liberal… he was said to sanction disobedience and revolt against the King, the political authorities and the kinship heads." (D'Hertefelt, 1966:430-1)

If one goes to the Suku of Southwestern Congo, one finds them believing in the Creator God. As Kopytoff (1966: 467) explains IINzambi (the creator) has the least functional

.importance, for it scarcely affects behavior...His presence is seen everywhere and serves as the ultimate explanation of all things..." Moreover, in Yorubaland one finds the high god, (Olorun, literally owner of the sky.) He is invoked in blessing or in thanks, and one may call on him with prayers or by pouring water or kola nuts on the ground (Lloyd 1966:574).

The above description indicates that the African belief in a Supreme-Creator-High God did not differ significantly from what Islam says. As Benge "(1972:91) states, "Islam simply brings to the African a more precise knowledge of a God in whom they already believe."

This section can best be concluded by Mphahlele's words (1974)

Allah absolute. Allah standing outside of and above history. Free from man's recriminations, innocent of man's recriminations, innocent of man's tragedies. Unaccountable for the evil of this world. Man is free of Allah too. Africa and Islam are integrated in a degree more profound than Christianity could ever be with Africa. Where are the points of concord? Islam: is it the Muslim idea of the Absolute in God and the African sense of the Absolute? Endeavor to live Islam in every department of life and the African's totality of vision? Does a direct contact with God correspond with the free and easy way to Divinity through the African ancestors? (Mphahlele, 1974:47)

2. <u>Unity of Spirit and Matter</u>

Sowande (1974:76) would say that in the African world view lithe invisible world is the world of reality; the visible world is the reflection of the invisible and, therefore, the world of unreality...Here there is no room for clear-cup

separation of spirit and its most congealed..." The same observation was found in (John Mbiti,1970:6; Harrison, 1972:XVIII ;and Asante, 1980a:5). In Islam as Tabbarah (1978) explains:

The Spirit united with the body, and their union leads to different sorts of 'calamities.' Many people became slaves to their lusts and their human nature sank down to total beastiality, limiting their lives to the desires of food, drink and the like, even with the skill of thinking granted to them. (Tabbarah, 1978:186)

The writer explains that Islam moderates between extreme spiritualism and exaggerated materialism. In Tabbarah's words: "The truth is that Islam's integration of the spirit and matter agrees with human nature" (p. 191).

On the other hand, the Quran considers our life a matter of illusion (Chapter 57:20) and temporal (Chapter 8:67). The Quran says "Ye prefer the life of this world, but the Hereafter is better and more enduring" (Chapter 87: 16-17) . Haykal (1976: 517) explains that: "Islam links metaphysical thought and personal feelings with the rules of logic and the precepts of science with a bond that all Muslims must discover and grasp if they are to remain Muslims."

In Islam Our Choice, the unity of matter and spirit is explained thus:

A unique feature of Islam is that it does not divide life into watertight compartments of matter and spirit. It regards life as a unity...Thus, Islam does not admit any separation between 'material' and 'moral', 'mundane' and 'spiritual' life and enjoins man to devote all his energies to the reconstruction of life on healthy foundations. It teaches him that moral and material power

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must be welded together Islam aims at establishing an equilibrium between these two aspects of life: the material and the spiritual (10-11).

If we recall that the Afrocentric viewpoint suggests that all modalities and realities are united and move in one grand manner, there can be no separation between material and spiritual, profane and sacred, form and substance (Asante,1980:5-6). This stands in contrast to the spiritual Asiocentric viewpoints and from the material Eurocentric perspective. This will explain why one suggests an Afro-Arab centric perspective. In this manner we can see the aspects of similarity between them in the unity between the spirit and matter and in their perceiving the invisible world in African belief and the Hereafter in Islam in the reality.

3. Believing in Hereafter

Mbiti (1970:6) states that belief in the continuation of life after death is found in all African societies. The faith in the Hereafter and the Day of Judgment is one of the doctrines of Islam. According to the Quran each man shall be his own judge:

And every man's deed have We fastened about his neck; and on the Day of Resurrection will We bring forth with to him a book which shall be proffered to him wide open: Read your book: there need be none but yourself to make out an account against you this day. (Chapter 17:14-15).

According to Islam, the world is a place of trial and man is to be judged on the basis of the life he lives in it. He will have to give an account of all that he does herewith life on the Earth. Life comes to an end after that a new world

begins. In the details the Hereafter in Islam differs from African beliefs (Nyang 1981).

In the majority of African peoples, as Mbiti (1970) states

The Hereafter is only a continuation of life more or less as it is in its human form. This means that personalities are retained, social and political statuses are maintained, sex distinction is continued, human activities are reproduced in the Hereafter is a carbon copy of the present life. (Mbiti, 1979:211)

The other aspect of the Hereafter is the judgment. Mbiti (1980:211-2) observes that there are few ideas among Yoruba and Lodagan about judgment or reward in the Hereafter. But the majority of African peoples do not expect any form of judgment or reward in the hereafter. We can observe that the general ideas of the Hereafter in both belief systems are nearly similar.

4. Ancestors and Spiritual Forces

Roberts (1980:126) defines ancestralism as: the set of beliefs and behaviors characterized by the spiritualization of the ancestors and the worship of them by the living. This type of belief is widespread through the traditional African societies.

Before Islam the above belief had a special favor among the Arabs (Tabbarah: 1978:54). Islam abolished the worship of ancestors, but when Islam transformed into a folk religion in the vast majority of the Arab World's rural population, regional customs and inherited varieties of saint worship exerted a profound influence on the present day practices

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Sharabi, (1966:6), Gibb, (1962:138) and I.M. Lewis (1974:114) demonstrate that the cults of saints in North-East Africa conform well with the traditional emphasis placed on lineage of ancestors.

Mbiti (1970:382-332) observes many points of similarity between Islam and traditional African religions that facilitate quick or smooth conversion. He identifies some of these spiritual aspects as:

1.   Spiritual beings which are mentioned in Quran including angels, jinns and devils which are easily assimilated into the traditional religious milieu.
2.   Traditional heroes and forefathers, some of whom are in positions as intermediaries, fit into Muslim concept of saints.
3.   Spirit-possession cults tend to survive in local situations, as among the Swahili, Songhay, and West Africa secret societies. Badran and Khammash (1974:64) observe that the same cult is found in the Arab World under the name of Zar
4.   Matters of divination and magic. Islamic practice encourages divination and the use of good magic; it also recognizes the efficacy of sorcery and witchcraft but condemns them. Badran and Khammash (1974) state that even Islam prohibited magic although we find today many who practice magic in urban and rural areas in the Arab world.

Mbiti (1970:321) adopts the idea of D. P. Gamble that, "in spite of the impact of Islam, there is still a much deeper layer of pagan belief and observance among the Wolof...Men and women are loaded with amulets, round the waist, neck, arms, legs, both for protection against all sorts of possible evils and to help them achieve certain desires." Mbiti commented that these are typically African rather than Islamic. But this observance is not complete because the same phenomenon is still extant in Arab societies (Badran and Khammash:1974). This practice among Arabs enhances our suggestion that the Afro-Arab region is a cultural unit.

We find beneath the official doctrine of Islam, the old popular beliefs held by the masses who know little of the theological tenets of their religions. There is belief in innumerable demons and spirits, jinns, ghouls, and ifrits, the evil eye, as well as belief in and ritual worship of numerous saints, despite their inconsistency characteristic of religious thinking (Patai 1976:145).

Roberts (1980) 'concludes his study about Afro-Arab value system with use of the following remark about their similarities:

One can draw conclusions which are generally true for Terramedia as a whole. Spiritual force, throughout, like baraka or grace in Islam, is valued highly because of its inherent power; men, accordingly want to share it to increase their, own dynamism. Along with ancestralism, divinity as viewed by men, results in a widespread sense of dependence upon one's ancestors, subordination to one's living elders and the community, and belief in the traditional wisdom of the group. (Roberts, 1980: 133)

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Social Structure

Social structure is a part of the culture. The relation between man and society is determined by the nature of the social structure

Bottomore (1972:114) views social structure as those more permanent and important relationships and groups. Social organization is defined by R. Firth as the systematic ordering of social relations by acts of choice and decision. R. Firth (1972:114) observes that in the aspect of social structure is to be found the continuity principle that allows evaluation of situations and entry of individual choice.

The following discussion is restricted to the analysis of Afro-Arab structure within the above context. This will be done by an analysis of kinship, groups, family, clan and tribe systems. Those systems are the most important aspects in social relationships and groups in Afro-Arab society. Furthermore, it is in these systems that one finds the continuity principle of society. Here we refer to social relation into which men enter by their birth and not by their choice.

The above types of associations define the individual's obligations, dictates his duties, invites his loyalties, defines his activities and rewards him with their perquisites and privileges (Bierstedt: 1974:505).

According to Marion Levy (1967) kinship structure can be defined "as any membership unit, i.e., any organization,

whose members are chosen (or selected or become members, or are deemed members} as a function of orientations at least in part to considerations of biological docent and/or regularized sexual intercourse of some sort," (Levy, 1967:164) The importance of kinship in traditional societies comes from its implication for solidarity, responsibility, and loya1ity (Ward,1966:22; Mazrui, 1976:177; Kahl, 1968:327).

The basic structure of kinship in African and Arab societies is the same. Both of them have extended families, clans and tribes. Both of them trace their descent unilaterally. Moreover, they share the same function of kinship in their societies. In addition, in the case of marriage one finds that they share beliefs in polygamy, bride-wealth, method for choosing mates, and marriage between relatives.

Types of Kinship

To understand the type of kinship in Afro-Arab society we must understand the Lineage descent. Among the Tallensi of Africa, C.M. Forte (1976:57) explains the lineage structure as follows:

Father and adult sons are the elementary unit in the structure of the lineage that they claim to trace back to a remote founding ancestor; all its members call themselves his children--like the children of Israel. They are all cousins. Every man hopes to be the originator of a segment which will bear his name. The way in which the members of such groups cooperate depends upon the depth of the lineage (Forte 1976: 57).

William J. Goode (1963:23) noticed that the extended family system is the predominant family system in the Arab World.

This type of family usually consists of husband and wife, unmarried children, married sons and their wives and children, sometimes the grandfather and grandmother and they trace a patrilinear descent. When one family becomes large enough, one son and his wife and children may leave to reside in one compound with his father, then a new family will replicate the precedent and they still trace the same unilinear descent (Zuhair Hatab, 1976: 1978-9; Lutfiyya, 1970:505-6). This system in the Arab world is rooted in the Pre-Islamic period (Patai 1976:77) and enhanced by Islam (Hatab 1976:88).

El Daghestani (1970:559) explains what he characterized as tribal family in the Arab world. He says:

Such families consist of a large number of persons--men and women who are linked by ties of patriarchal relationship, bear the same name, acknowledge a single chief and claim the same origin. The Arabs call this type of family Al-Hamula if the family comprises five generations, or Tribe if it comprises ten generations. Al-Hamula equals Clan while tribe in Arabic is Qabila (El-Daghestani, 1970:559).

In Eastern Nigeria within the Afikpo lbo, one finds the same characteristic of the Arab extended family. According to Ottenberg (1966: 11), there is the extended family (Umudi or Ndebu): a father and his sons or a group of brothers if the father is dead--their wives, sons, and unmarried daughters. The same can be said about Hausa (Smith 1966:142) about Fu1ani, (Stenning 1966: 78-9) about the Rwanda, (D'Hertefe1t 1966:414-5) about the Ganda of Uganda (Southwold, 1966:106) and the Bantu Tiriki of Western Kenya (Sangree 1966:53).

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In order to illustrate the similarities of extended families in Northern (Hidd1e Eastern) of Terramedia and Southern (Sub-Sahara) of Terramedia, Roberts (1980: 115-8) examined the structure of the Arabic Bedouin family and that of Nsukka Igbo family of Eastern Nigeria and he found they differed slightly and found a large similarity between the Nsukka Igbo family and the Arab extended family.

Economically the extended family in both African and Arab societies is a basic unit which calls for the solidarity of all the members of the family and tribe (Ward, 1966; Daghistani, 1970; Patai, 1979; Apter, 1966; Roberts, 1980; Mazuri, 1976). This is so because the individual is not a' separate entity from the social structure, i.e. the family clan and/or tribe (Hatab 1976).

The above type of social structure calls for a special type of power practiced by the head of the family who always in both Arab and African families, is the father, or the elder brother if the father is dead. (Patai, 1979; Amnar, 1970; Ottenberg, 1966; Sangree, 1966: M. Forte, 1974).

Marriage

Marriage in all societies involved in this study is the base to establish families. Afro-Arab societies share in specific aspects of marriage such as polygamy, bridewealth, choice of mates, and marrying of relatives.

Polygamy as a type of marriage has a widespread acceptance among African and Arab societies. The polygamous family

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consists of a husband and his wives and their children. This type of family will be found among African societies such as the Afikpo Ibo of Nigeria (Ottenberg, 1966) among the Fulani of Northern Nigeria (Stenning 1966), among the Rwand of Rwands (D'hertefe1t, 1966)., The Banto Tiriki of Western Kenya (Sangree 1966) among the Yoruba of Nigeria (Lloyd 1966) among the Ganda of Uganda (Southwold 1966), among the Swazi of Swiziland (Kuper 1966), among the Suku of Southwestern Congo (Koptyoff 1966), among the Kpel10 of Liberia (Gibbs, Jr. 1966) and among the Rausa of Norther Nigeria (Smith 1966). Moreover the same type of this family is present in all Arab societies (Lutfiyyah, 1970; Ratab, 1976 and Goode, 1963).

Mbiti (1970:186) has observed that polygamy in African societies raises the social status of the family concerned sicne a big family holds great respect in the eyes of the community.

The bridewealth is widely prevalent in African and Arab societies. Bridewealth consists of stock or cash to the prospective wife. The size of bridewea1th depends upon the negotiation between a man and his prospective father-in-law (Gulliver 1966:77). Among the Arabs a part of the bridewealth is paid at the time of signing the marriage contract. The remainder has to be paid after the consummation of marriage or if a divorce occurred. .4mong the urban and rural poor, the girl's father is likely to keep the money and give only a token present to the bride (Goode 1963:72).

The Bantu Tiriki, as in so many African tribes, have the system of bridewealth which is the crucial element in the legitimization of a marriage (Sangree 1966:55). Several African and Arab societies share the right of the family to choose a bride for their son and, in most cases, the choice will be from relatives. The kinship system which gives the elders the power of decision making and the system of unilinear descent. In the Arab world as (Goode 1963:93) explained, the father has the right to choose the bride for his son. His choice at times reveals the preference for marrying the father's brother's daughter. In such a marriage both sides are interested in maintaining the honor of the same lineage and land and other property remain the same agnatic lineage.

In traditional African societies, Mbiti (1970) found that the parents and relatives choose the bride if their sons and if either the girl or the young man rejects, the negotiations for marriage are broken, although in some cases the parents may allow the girl or the boy to marry a freely chosen partner. It is normal that the parents give the full consent of their son or daughter. (Mbiti, 1970:178)

Family and Socialization

The family as the primary institution is responsible for the basic personality structure. It has a prominent role in socialization and in the development of basic personality traits and other social attitudes and values (Dawson and Prewitt 1967:107). Control initially is learned in the context of the family. The learning about allocation of power and

responsibility depends upon family responses to control situations (Levy 1967:170).

Patai (J970) observes that the influence of family of the individual in the Middle East is very great; that the individual is the product of the family. Men even in their thirties and forties maintain the subservience to family authority and reliance on the advice of elders (Patai, 1970:578).

The same thing can be said about the role of the family in African societies. D'Hertefelt (1966:419) observes socialization among the Rwand of Rwanda and states:

Until the age of four or five, children were not allowed to stroll outside their mother's enclosure and they were told to be clean. From that age on, the father's influence was more felt, especially by boys. Between five and ten, they were taught to look after goats, sheep and calves, and were assigned household tasks such as carrying water or gathering wood. Girls learned to sweep and to cook. Boys between ten and fifteen drove the cattle to pasture and were instructed in agricultural work. (D'Hertefelt, 1966:419)

In Moroccan families one finds the same type of socialization. From birth the child is in constant contact with his mother until weaning. From age 3 to 6 the father intervenes to correct the conduct of the child, at the request of the mother. And from 6-12 the supervision of the child during this time becomes more intense (Kabbaj 1979:431-4).

Within this type of socialization and the type of extended family, we see the vesting of authority in the male (patriarchal type), (Roberts 1980). The hierarchy of power in traditional African societies is in direct rapport with the

hierarchy of age (Ki-Zerbo 1964:47). With this type of hierarchy, the child learns to respect the elders and to be polite to them. The parental authority in the Tallensi is strong and is reinforced by dependence on the father in ritual as well as in economic matters.

In the Arab families the child learns that obedience to parents is a great value. El-Daghestani puts it in this way:

The Moslem to whatever class he belongs, believes implicitly that obedience to his parents is a duty no less sacred than observance of the teachings of the Koran and that all success in life depends upon this obedience and the degree of satisfaction which a man gives his parents by fulfilling his obligations towards them (1970: p. 565).

This obedience requires disciplined children guided by the parents. Abraham (1962:70-1) stated that the Akans, too, believed in the discipline of children, and entirely endorsed the right of the aged to instruct youth. "Wisdom was always preferred to authority as the arrangements of inheritance themselves suggest." In the religion of the Tallens; Wisdom is closely linked to family authority, which makes absolute in the sense of being supported by powers from whom there is no appeal (Forte 1976: 63-5).

In socialization among Arabs and Africans they stress sexual difference between boys and girls. Prothro (1979:584:5) found in Lebanon that: By the age of five there is a tendency for a child to identify to some degree with the like-sexed parent, thus demonstrating that role is being learned. In the Suku of Southwestern Congo the roles of the boys and girls are distinguished. In contrast to the boys who

are free from the household tasks, the girls are expected to help their mothers with household tasks almost as soon as they have learned to walk (Kopytoff 1966:455). Alongside with this distinction in the Arab societies, the attitude toward sex is generally repressive, and the children do not receive sex education (Prothro 1970:584).

Moreover, the same observation can be said on the Rwanda of Rwand, that the children do not receive instructions about sexual matters from their parents because it is forbidden (D'Hertefelt 1966:419).

The socialization process poses in Afro-Arab societies a type of behavior within the kinship structure differentiated according to the age, sex and the relationship existing between the persons involved (D'Hertefelt 1966:418). For example, the age-set can be found in the African and Arab societies which divide the people according to age group (Douglas,1974:76 and Patai,1970:l95). Such a division of the society into given groups create a specific unit of communication. On the other hand, the patriarchal type of the family will give the elders influence in communication which may not be found among the youngest.

Adams (1970:681) found that the interpretation of communications in an Egyptian village depends on factors more than mere substance of the communication. He explains thus:

Ordinarily the villager gives and receives communications whose content is so stereotyped that he pays little attention to them other than to note that they conform to the norms of traditional utterances. His interpretation of what is

said depends upon his attitude to the speaker as much as anything. If the speaker is a friend then what he says is, in general, accepted as being friendly. If the speaker is an enemy, then everything he says, however conciliatory, is suspect. The villager has few merely neutral relationships. (Adams, 1970:68)

One needs to emphasize that the factors selected for analysis above, viz. social structure and social organization are particularly crucial in" understanding the contexts within which communication operates. In nearly all aspects of cross-cultural or intracultural communication, social structure, social organization and value systems form significant components in the total process of communication (Sitaram and Haapoven,1979).

The following table summarizes the Afro-Arab world view factors:

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CHAPTER V

An Integrated-Reciprocal Model for Development Communication

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CHAPTER V

An Integrated-Reciprocal Model for Development Communication

In the preceding chapter constituents of an Afro-Arab centric model were discussed, highlighting aspects of a shared history, world view, belief system, social organization, and socialization. The above constituent parts form the parameters of the proposed model.

In the Afro-Arab context, the above parameters are crucial in the development process in general, but are of great importance in development communication. We will discuss in detail in this chapter, the proposed model which is essentially an Integrated-Reciprocal Model for Development Communication in the Afro-Arab context, and assess how it can work to effectively achieve development of the area.

In the discussion that follows, constituent parts of the model will be discussed to depict the characteristic features of (1) variables that build up the environment for a development communication process such as culture, socialization, personality, politics, economics, ideology, leadership, technology, and infrastructure and(2) variables that mold the development communication messages such as the development communicator; media, development research, time, feedback, audience and competition messages.

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To emphasize the integrative aspect of the model, the chapter will also incorporate the extant theories and concepts dealing with development and communication. An integration of development communication theories and communication effects theories is crucial in planning for development communication campaign in Afro-Arab context and other contexts. For example, the integration of the multi-step flow of communication, agenda setting, dependency model, needs gratification approach, and information-seeking paradigm is necessary for the development communicator to design his message.

Furthermore, the development communicator could also integrate development communication theories such as Lerner's empathy, and the significance of time as element of communication process, the importance of interpersonal communication (Rogers and Shoemaker) and the communicator--Clientele relationship of Grunig will give us better understanding of development communication. The function of mass media in Afro-Arab context is perceived as highly promising. So the role of the Afro-Arab mass media differs from the Western mass media. Consequently, the relation between the mass media and authority in Afro-Arab context has its implication on the control, development and ownership of mass media.

Mass media as extensions of exploitive relationships with multi-national corporations especially through the advertising of commercial products, and with the subsidies of foreign aids in Afro-Arab context are widely unacceptable. This suggests a pattern of government

ownership and control of mass media which gives the national development planner the opportunity to demonstrate the mass media as a tool for development. (figure page 118)

The order in which the constituent parts are discussed below does not indicate more or less importance, but rather, reflects the interdependency and reciprocity that exist among all parts. Each constituent part must be viewed as significant enough to cause an impact on the working of the model. The type of leadership, for example, can influence the type of ideology, politics, or economics that prevail in a given society.

AN INTEGRATED RECIPROCAL MODEL FOR DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATION

FIGURE 1

REFER TO IN TEXT

Culture

Every communication process occurs within the context of its culture. According to Karl Deutsch (1972) culture consists of socially stereotyped patterns of behavior, including habits of language and thoughts, carried on through various forms of social learning, particularly through methods of child rearing standardized in culture (Deutsch, 1972:27).

Earlier it was pointed out that the similarity of belief systems, social organization and socialization between Africans and Arabs who share mutual historical experiences suggests the Afro-Arab area as a cultural unit.

Within every culture there are social institutional patterns. In Afro-Arab society the extended family and tribal patterns are prevalent. The form of this pattern is not significant by itself, because we find this pattern also prevailing in Asia. But the significance of this pattern comes from its combination with belief systems and types of socialization and the norms and values which are adopted in the Afro-Arab societies. The patterns of communication in a society depend on the institutional patterns of that society and its values and socialization (Fagen 1966). Needless to say, any model that is developed with the aim of diffusing development messages has to recognize the role of culture in the entire process. As have been stated in the previous chapters, the cultural similarity of Africans and Arabs makes the proposed model feasible as far as this constituent element--culture, is concerned.

<u>Socialization</u>

Socialization occurs when individuals meet and mix with other persons in a given society learning in the process, the moves of the society. It is a series of social and psychological learning processes (Dawson and Prewitt, 1969). Within the socialization process, the society transmits its values, behavior, beliefs and patterns of communication. According to Stafford (1981), "Socialization entails the progressive acquisiting of characteristics, behavior-patterns, values, motives and beliefs, considered appropriate by a given culture" (Stafford, 1981: 11).

The role of socialization in any culture is assumed to affect the habit, the structure of personality of the members of a society, and the mechanisms by which culture is integrated (John Whiting, 1968).

Socialization in a real sense is a process of two phases; it is a process that facilitates learning with an end product--socialization. Donald Roberts (1973:175) explains that:

As process, communication functions to help define for the child the "way of life" he must internalize to mediate information about the cultural systems he must adopt or adapt. As product, the child's communication behavior reflects the definition of the world he has gained through socialization (Roberts 1973:175).

The family plays a major role in the process of socialization. It is the first social organization to which a person belongs, and it shapes the personality. In the family, the individual learns his social roles, as well as his role within the family

power structure; he learns, also appropriate sexual behavior for his society (Langston 1979:21).

In Afro-Arab societies, the individual learns the power relationship i.e. that suggests a specific type of influence and power for parents, elders and relatives, and it forms an age-set group. All these aspects will provide a type of communication which leaves for the above forms of power an effective role in communication process. "The systems of larger kinship groups and marital exchange often involve special communicative relationships between various types of kin...Such a relationship would be termed a respecy relationship or in the extreme case, an avoidance relationship" (Fisher 1973: 323).

We cannot disregard other socia1izating agents such as the peer groups, schools, and mass media (Dawson and Prewitt 1969; Langston 1979; Perkins,1975). Here we are concerned with the methods of socialization that can affect the communication process. Perkins (1975: 187) mentioned that the parental control, imitation, identification and group membership are the methods of socialization. Within Afro-Arab societies the control by parents and peer-group are crucial in socialization. Within Afro-Arab societies the control by parents and peer-group are crucial in socializing the children and youth. Both of them affect the personality of the individual and the way in which he will perceive a single item of information.

Within the socialization process the world view of a person will emerge. According to Stafford (1981),

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The emerging world view and the attendant self-image of the growing person will tend to duplicate cultural structure of hierarchy, authority, geometrical kinship or social roles and the like. The externa1izations and objectifications, emotively charged through accumulated experience and even unconscious memory, become internalized (usually) to a substantial degree in the process of socialization (Stafford, 1981:17).

With this factor so crucial in the life stream of a given society, a development model for communication in the Afro-Arab context would have to incorporate, somehow, the peculiar socialization process and patterns in the given region. It is precisely for the above reasons that the preceding discussion was presented. Lack of an understanding of the socialization process in a given society can affect any attempt to generate messages for human development.

Personality

The distinctive characteristics of the individuals may be notable for communication success as well as their failures. Personality is the patterns of behaviors, attitudes and values that are characteristics of a given individual.

According to Greenstein (1975), "Personality refers to a construct that is introduced to account for the regularities in an individual's behavior as he responds to diverse stimuli" (p.3). This definition leaves a wide space for personality role in communication, since the communication process involves sender and receiver. As Pfeiffer (1972) explains:

Communication never takes place in isolation, but always in a 'field' between sender and receiver. A message is never solely connected with either a sender or a receiver. Each person in the interaction is always both sender and receiver, and the nature of the field between the interactants is determined by the context of the interaction, as well as by the personalities, experiences, expectations and perceptions of the participants (Pfeiffer, 1972:186).

Even if the above characterizes interpersonal communication only, it is still important to take that context into account in the development communication process. In development communication the interpersonal channels are vital, since the effect of mass media can be achieved through multi-step flow of information.

Personality, as a factor in communication process, helps to determine the effectiveness of the source of influence and credibility (Raven:1965). It is important to indicate that the

individual's personality affects the evaluation of the communicator which, in turn, will reflect the ability to respond negatively or positively to the message. As Sears and Whitney (1973) explained: "The individual's evaluation of the communicator is an important factor in determining his response to persuasive communications. Positively evaluated communicators are more likely to elicit acceptance of the communication (Whitney 1973:274-5).

The inter-relation between culture, socialization, and personality is clear. Socialization is achieved through its cultural milieu. In turn, socialization affects the type of personality of the individual. All these factors are essential in the communication process.

Leadership

In this study we are specifically concerned with two types of leadership: (1) political leadership and (2) opinion leadership among groups or the nation as a whole.

The necessity of leadership in every society is unquestionable. Robert Nibset (1970) contends that: "The demands of effective leadership, like the demands of freedom and security, necessitate a large amount of autonomy and functional significance in those spheres of society which are intermediate to the individual and the state" (p. 353).

Leadership can be defined according to Franklyn Haiman (1970) as: "The process whereby an individual directs, guides, influences, or controls the thoughts, feeling or behavior of other human beings toward a particular end (Haiman, 1970:355).

Our concern here for political leadership in Afro-Arab countries stems from the fact that the leaders are policy makers, planners and ideologists who have the power to direct, to guide, to influence, and to control their people toward a particular end. The mass media, therefore, is a powerful tool to help in achieving their goals. The leaders shape the messages, especially the charismatic leaders who perform major functions in Afro-Arab countries. Charismatic leaders such as Nkrumah, Nyerere, Nasser,Sekoui Toure and Qadhafi have left their impact on their societies mainly through the impact of media. The charismatic leaders, according to Seligman (1971), "are the architects and spokesmen of the drive for economic matters. They have mass followers and circles of elites who elaborate the ideology of leadership and translate it into action (Seligman, 1971: 242-3). Maybe here emerges the importance of political leaders as communicators who have the power of influencing the masses. They can recruit circles of leaders linked to them. These leaders, in turn, can play the role of communicators to achieve the objectives of the whole leadership. Binder (1972:398-9), for example, describes the political skills and leadership qualities and the charisma of Nasser. Those features helped the political and administrative reforms that served to integrate the social and

economic structures in Egypt. According to Schermerhorn (1968)

The charismatic leader is unquestionably endowed with authority. He attracts his follower or followers not only because he has so-called personal magnetism, but also because he embodies, often in novel ways, well-established values. This influence, more often than not, extends to a wide circle of individuals and becomes a social force (Schermerhorn 1968:5).

The second type of leadership is opinion leadership. This type of leadership recognizes that the effect of mass communication seems to occur in the context of the Multi-Step Flow Model which states that certain members of the audience are influential in shaping the decisions of their peers (Rogers, 1973). According to Rogers we can define the opinion leaders as "the source of information or opinion, and their followers are receivers. Some opinion leaders initiate communication for their messages (opinion-giving). Other opinion leaders are sought by their followers (opinion-seeking)" (Rogers, 1973: 297).

In Afro-Arab societies where leaders can be described as manifesting patriarchal characteristics, the role of leadership becomes vital in affecting the mass. Sharabi (1979) pointed out that:

the central aspect of Arab political life is its patriarchal character. In both family and society, relations are vertical, based on domination and control, as in the father-son, shepherd-flock relations… In the Arab family, as in the larger society, the individual is continually socialized into the values of vertical relations, into accepting authority from above. On the political level, patriarchal power continually reinforces itself by upholding these values (Sharabi, 1979:102).

The same observation can be said about African societies and their power relationships. According to Drake (1964), the Africa traditional authority can be explained thus:

The controls of kinship groups were basic. Within kinship groups (family or clan) although lineage or clan leaders had extensive executive and judicial authority, there was a wide measure of discussion and consultation by adults of both sexes when crucial decisions were involved. Discussion centered on the expediency of concrete actions within the framework of customary rulers; rules were enforced by sacred sanctions (Drake, 1964: 299).

So, the political leadership has its power within this relation. The opinion leadership may have their power from their status in the social structure. For example, in an Egyptian village in 1963, an Arab scholar, Abu-Lughod (1970) found that the personal flow of communication from mass media was the most important source of news in the village sample studied.

In Afro-Arab countries, where we find a high percentage of illiteracy and low percentage of access to mass media, the opinion leaders gain advantage of playing a critical role in the flow of communication process. So the communication process must be an integrated one, and an effective one. Lucian Pye (1966) explains

A modern communication system involves, however, far more than just the mass media; the complex inter-relationships between general and specialized informal opinion leaders and between and more passive publics are integral parts of the whole communications system (Pye, 1966:158).

The role of political leaders and opinion leaders in development communication cannot be overstated.

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Many students of political science examine the concepts of ideology. For our study, we adopt the definition of Waltzer (1971: 61). Political ideology is a belief system that explains and justifies a preferred political order for society either existing or proposed, and offers a strategy (processes) institutional arrangements (programs) for its attainment. This ideology is composed of articulated sets of ideas, ends and purposes, which help members of the system to interpret the past, explain the present and offer a vision for the future.

In this sense, ideology is a political tool as Mehden (1964: 117) saw it. It is useful in achieving both individual and national goals. David Apter (1965:328) argues that ideology helps in establishing identity and solidarity. He stresses the role of ideology in binding a community together.

The ideology will orient the development process, and will orient the society to its societal goals. And to achieve that, the authority which adopts that ideology will utilize all available means (among them mass media) to achieve that given ideology. For this reason the political ideology is an important tool in the Third World countries.

As Anderson et. al. (1967) argue:

political ideology seems far more important in the emerging nations than in the advanced industrial societies. One speaks of an "end of ideology" in the West as increasing consensus is achieved on the purposes, goals, and institution of the established order… For the increasingly pragmatic Western nations, the continued importance of ideology is one of the more distinctive features of the politics of the developing regions. This is a little thrilling, for

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here there are still causes to be joined and battles to be won. (Anderson et. al., 1967:145-7)

Anderson et. al. go on to say that ideology defines the things we have in common, the purposes of our "togetherness" which may be peculiarly necessary in culturally plural societies. For new states seeking to replace more traditional forms of political obligations, to answer the questions of why one should obey this new group of leaders. This function is an important factor to achieve full development and in building sound new societies.

The political ideology shapes the life of the Afro-Arab countries. As elsewhere, most ideologies of the Third World are only partial guides for social behavior with broadly varying ambitions to achieve universality. It is this point of view that is held by Anton Bebler (1980:372). It is applicable to the Libyan political ideology (The Third Universal Theory of Col. Qadhafi). Bebler states two functions of ideology in the Third World. They are (1) legitimizing the new social and political order, and (2) reshaping prevailing social norms. The latter is to be achieved by implanting social norms of a "new society" or by re-establishing the norms of the "golden past" and by eliminating corrupt foreign, usually Western social norms (Bebler, 1980:376). These two functions are applicable to the political ideology in Afro-Arab context which reshapes the political and economic institutions. Thus, in most of the developing nations, leaders are conscious of the importance of the media in achieving their development plans which conform to their ideologies.

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Sayed Rahim (1978:151-2) has characterized communication messages in rural development in developing countries as ideological or informational. The ideological messages emphasize political ideas to motivate and guide action or explain the world in terms of an action-oriented ideology. He gives an example of the success of this approach by saying:

In Tanzania, communication and education has been instrumental in evolving a new social-political infrastructure for formulation and implementation of decentralized self-reliant rural development projects. Strong communication linkages between the poor rural communities and the central authority have been established (Rahim, 1978:151-2).

Ideology, in a real sense, determines the role of communication either to maintain the system or to change the system. This view differs from what Grunig (1978:85) argues that"... it is 'natural' for communication to maintain the system, unnatural for it to change the system." Afro-Arab countries are undergoing social change and development which, in most cases, is enhanced by political ideology. As Mittelman (1975) explained:

In modernizing societies, ideology may provide a vehicle for mobilization, a tool to inspire the masses and one of the chief means of eliciting commitment. Handled adroitly, ideology represents a potentially valuable resource. Ideological modernization--the use of new norms to bring about social change is a dynamic process (Mittelman 975:45).

Politics

Politics, according to Black (1969), means in the broadest sense, the conceptualization and implementation of plans and action. Black states further that politics "provides the

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organization basis for a society. Political struggles are struggles for the power to put into effect programs derived from the working assumption of one or another group of leader. Such programs often embrace wide areas of human experience and occasionally in revolutionary times may seek to effect sweeping changes in all aspects of a society" (Black, 1967:57-8).

In Afro-Arab countries, the political structures often have a significant influence on the whole societal structure. The structure sets up policies or programs covering economics, education, health, agriculture, commerce, industry, security, and communications.

Mass media or communications in Afro-Arab countries are either owned or controlled by governments. So the political leaders as Pye (1966) explains,

are expected to have some of the qualities of the prophets and the soothsayer for political power always has a dynamic dimension involving the issue of control over future developments. The communication process informs people as to how farsighted or nearsighted their leaders are (Pye, 1966:155).

The political implications of communication lies in power with control (Schramm 1967). This can be seen in Afro-Arab countries in many aspects such as owning the mass media and/or controlling them by censorship, seizures and taxation.

Afro-Arab governments are concerned with the control of the media for the following reasons:

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1. They offer better communication between authority and the masses. This organization helps politicians and leaders to implement their policies in all aspects, economic, cultural. agricultural and educational.

2. Media offer a way of controlling the effects of communication to prevent undesired change in their society. That is so because mass media can create an imbalance in the values of the society. Huntington (1971) explains

The communications network of a society is undoubtedly much more subject to governmental influence. Rapid gains in some of the most desired areas of modernization--such as mass media exposure, literacy and education may have to be purchased at the price of severe losses in political stability... It is simply to argue that governments must balance the values won through rapid increase in communications against the values jeopardized by losses in political stability (Huntington. 1971:480).

The political perception of the role of mass media in development and national integration is essential in determining the relations between the mass media and political leader in one hand and, on the other, it affects development communication.

Almond and Powell (1966) states:

In most transitional areas the political leaders see development of modern mass media as a force for enhancing national unity, as well as a force for shaping and encouraging modernization. Breaking down language barriers and differences in knowledge belief and custom, communication expansion, serves to bridge systems previously characterized by very heterogeneous communication flow (Almond and Powell, 1966:174).

Hence, in Afro-Arab countries we can observe that communication development depends on political decisions. Also, we can see that the content of messages is subject to political factors. Moreover, the quantity and quality of internal and external flow of information are not mere political decisions. These decisions may have inter-connections with other factors such as economic, ideological, personal. But, at the end, the political leader who has the power will decide or he has the choice of selecting alternatives among others.

Economics

Economics as a variable can affect the full development of mass media. The nation's general level of economic development will determine the extent to which its mass media will develop. Economic limitations as Fagen (1966:56:7) explains are imposed on electrification of the whole nation to make the TV receivers operate on a national scale, the diffusion of other media, electronic or print, depends --in a real sense-- on financial capacity. The prosperity or poverty of audiences can determine their capacity to have an access to mass media directly, i.e., by having TV sets, radio sets, books, magazines, and/or newspapers.

In Afro-Arab countries the electronic media, in particular, are owned by governments, so the budgets of these media comes from the national budgets. The majority of Afro-Arab countries, with the exception of the oil-producing countries, are poor. Such a status affects the budget of mass media,

which, in turn, determines the quantity and the quality of mass media programs. Budgetary constraints also affect the size of staff operating the mass media. Hence, the production of development messages will be adversely affected by lack of funds.

The economics of a given Afro-Arab country will affect, also, the nature of ownership. Because of the low circulation of newspapers, the western type of ownership does not satisfy the Afro-Arab context. Private ownership could invite external finance to support the Afro-Arab mass media which may disrupt the development. Blake (1979a) explains it in this way:

Africa also needs a condition where subversive elements from outside will not be permitted to perform disruptive communication. The presence of private newspapers and other media (though doubtful because of the financial burdens) could invite external elements to fund such media and disrupt progress (Blake, 1919a:226).

A good example for this phenomenon comes from Lebanon which has a private free press in the Western concept. Nabil Danjani (1975) explains how the Lebanese press presents an example of what happens when the media depend on patronage from foreign and domestic interests. Danjani explains:

Financial assistance or other forms of subsidies, pours into the Lebanese press from foreign embassies, foreign companies as well as from local groups, including the Lebanese government. In return, the recipient newspaper is expected to propagate and support the policies of its subsidizer (Dajani, 1975: 168).

The current economic situation in Africa was characterized by the World Bank (1981) as following:

But for most African countries, and for a majority of the African population, the record is grim and it is not exaggeration to talk of crisis. Slow overall economic growth, sluggish agricultural performance coupled with rapid rates of population increase and balance-of-payments and fiscal crises--these are dramatic indicators of economic trouble (p. 2).

This situation affects all aspects of a given society. It could restrain development as a whole. It could limit expansion in education in the training of technicians, professionals, and managers.

The cooperation between rich Afro-Arab countries and the poor ones will help, partly, in solving the economic problem. This aspect incidentally was a major concern of the Afro-Arab summit conference in 1977.

Technology

Technology is the major means of adjusting people to the environment. It is basic to survival of a culture (Arensberg and Niehoff, 1974). By technology one culture can transmit and interact with others. Nowadays, new information technologies become available from radio, telestar and computers. New media technology increases communication channels and increases the distribution of information.

Most Afro-Arab countries suffer from economic problems which affect, in turn, their ability to acquire a suitable communication technology which will give the masses access to information that can enhance development.

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Ruggels et. al. (1978), observe that

The development of a modern communication system requires heavy investment in costly communication technology. Typically, nations have been constrained to go slowly in acquiring communications technology because of the competing demands on their scarce financial resources (Ruggels et. a1. 1978:129).

Technology transfer to Afro-Arab countries is restricted by several factors:

1.   Few developed countries monopolize technology and its market. Furthermore, it is commercialized.
2.   Economic restrictions limit acquisition of most modern equipment.
3.   Knowledge of how the activity is carried out.
4.   Technological development and changes cause outdating of equipment quickly.

According to Frances Stewart (1970), technology changes continuously with new or improved products, new materials or new uses of old materials and new techniques of production, the need to acquire technology is not once for all, but a continuing one.

Technology changes in television well illustrate Stewart's statement. When a nation decides to change from black to white to color TV, financial problems may develop, particularly, in African and Arab countries. This shift from one type to another requires importing the hardware and, in many cases, the software also from the developed countries.

New communication technology offers developing nations efficient media to be utilized for dissemination of development messages. The new communication technology cannot be useful in development unless software is produced locally to satisfy the needs of national development. From Arab-oil countries, Ruggels et. al. (1978) took an example:

In the recent experience of the Middle East Oil-producing nations has taught us anything, it is the need to strike a balance between the sophistication of new communication technology. Only through locally produced content can communication technology make a maximum contribution to national development (Ruggels et. al., 1978:145).

Development Communicator

The Development Communicator is one of the most important constituents of the development communication process. He must have special qualification to succeed in addressing his audiences effectively. These can be knowledge, identification of rhetorical patterns, arid credibility.

Knowledge refers to the communicator's knowledge of the subjects concerned; knowledge of communication theories of effect and process; knowledge of the nature of his audience, and knowledge of the socio-economic constraints.

Identification of rhetorical patterns according to Blake (1979b) is required for successful communication in the Third World. He argues that,

Identification of common or identifiable symbols is necessary because we usually find ourselves communicating messages that seem identifiable to us but which are alien to the African farmer and other members of the

developing societies. This is seen in many African countries where farm broadcasts are made technical language, accompanied at times by demonstration (Blake, 1979:89).

Credibility, according to Hovland, Janis and Kelley (1953), deals with the communicator's expertise and his trustworthiness. While in Afro-Arab context expertise is very important, trustworthiness may be significantly more important within tribal relations. Sometimes trustworthiness may be so important for the communicator that without it his expertise is useless. A successful development communicator must have both the merits of expertise and trustworthiness in order to function well.

In Afro-Arab countries, there is a need for professional communicators who are able to play a constructive role in facilitating the nation-building process and its development (Lucian Pye 1967). Even when we look at extant models of communication, the need for the communicator (source) to understand his audience, structure his message appropriately, select the appropriate channel, and solicit feedback, is constantly emphasized. One cannot ask for less in the development context.

Message

The message must be designed to be consistent with the needs of planned programs. It is important to utilize an adequate language that is familiar to the audiences that is consistent with their levels of knowledge. The message must not contrast with essential values of the audiences, such as

family solidarity age-respect, and authority of the elders (Feliciano 1978).

Particular attention must be paid to some basic characteristics of message development and design such as clarity, perspicuity, vividness, appropriateness, authenticity, and vivacity. Given the fact that several Afro-Arab societies utilize stylistic devices such as metaphors and to a large extent proverbs, maxims, and parables, message planners and developers should incorporate as much as is feasible of such devices to amplify the messages. This particular element is crucial because uptake, adoption, and implementation of innovations and desired programs from development planners and communicators are dependent upon the quality of the message's structure, form, content and composition. More importantly the complexity of the messages may require above, but also amplification devices such as definition, example, description and details.

Such a crucial constituent in all communication processes cannot be lightly handled in the development content. Like the development communicator, those who structure development messages should be well trained in the procedure.

Media

Choosing the appropriate channel is the responsibility of the communicator. To decide what channel to use depends upon many factors. Among the factors are, the nature of the

audience, the availability of the medium and economic factors.

In Afro-Arab countries with a high percentage of illiteracy, and the low rate of the distribution and transmission of the television, the radio still seems to be the major mass medium upon which a development communicator can rely. In a real sense, in most Afro-Arab countries, the state owns and controls the mass media. So, this offers an opportunity to the communicator to utilize the whole available media. As we indicated earlier, the mass media can have impact upon the multi-steps flow of communication. The communicator may design his messages on different levels. One can address the literate people, who among whom, may be found the opinion leaders. Through printed media such as newspapers, magazines, and pamphlets, the opinion leaders could share information.

Other messages can address the illiterate people through the radio and television if it is available and, also, through inter-personal and group channels. The communicator can utilize traditional ways of communication such as storytelling and songs.

The use of multiple media is more effective than any single medium in development. As Feliciano (1978:201) claims that radio messages supported by leaflets and further reinforced by personal follow-ups prove more effective than radio alone or radio-leaflet reinforcement without personal follow-ups. For example, for instructional purposes, a film

followed by group discussion was more effective than the use of film alone.

The Audiences

In mass communication process, the audience is the first major component. The development communicator's concern essentially is to deliver his message to the audience. In every mass communication process the audiences are differentiated, stratified and inter-related (DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach 1976).

There are many variables that affect the way in which the audiences receive, interpret and respond to messages. In Afro-Arab countries the audiences as in any other societies are governed by their culture and socialization which determine their behavioral mechanism.

As we mentioned earlier, the Afro-Arab societies are patriarchal and collectivist. This leaves room for the leadership a significant role in the communication process. However, the behavioral mechanism also depends on other variables, such as, the level of literacy, socio-economic status which may or may not give the audience access to mass media.

In development communication the design of messages must take into account the exposure decisions of audiences which are governed by timing, personality and educational differences, socio-economic status, and the overall capacity

of understanding the messages and absorbing the skills (Davison, et al.,1976)

The new communication technologies offer for the development communicator the ability to reach a wider public. The design of messages may be elaborated to satisfy the public appeal and individual appeal since the concern is with an effective message development. This need suggests that a specific developmental campaign will benefit the public, collectively, and the individuals as members of that public. This combination of public and individual appeal seems to be successful (Davison,1974:73).

According to Doob (1966:258-9) it is important to realize who in fact the audience is at the moment of preparing the communication.

The ability of the audience to comprehend the communication is important to see the potential of messages. Yet the effect can be successful only if the audience can comprehend the meaning of the messages as the communicator intended to deliver his meaning. Doob further observes that:

Since (communicator's) intention is embedded in a communication, the problem really becomes one of highlighting the relation between the content of the communication as analyzed from some standpoint other than that of the audience and people's own decoding or interpretation of what they perceive (Doob, 1966:259).

In development communication, it seems important to understand the needs of the audiences. This makes the

communication process an appropriate two-way flow (Grunig,1978 and Rogers 1976).

In planning the development communication campaign, the communicator must take in to account the communication behavior of his audiences. According to the uses and gratification approach, the audiences are actively utilizing media contents. This will interpret the ways in which humans create and gratify needs (Katz et. al. 1974:12). A fundamental part of communication behavior of audiences deals with activities of the selection process of communication (i.e. seeking, avoiding and processing of information (Donohue and Tipton 1973:243).

Competing Messages

In the era of multiple flow of information, the Third World in general suffers from competing foreign mass media, which carry messages that export alien cultural values and conflicting interest of the Third World countries. This type of unbalanced flow of information makes competitive foreign messages a challenge to the development messages in the developing areas. This phenomenon was characterized as media imperialism. Isaac A Sepetu, Minister for Information and Broadcasting of Tanzania, (1978) explained the disruptive effect of the flow of information which promotes alien cultural values on consumption in third world societies. According to Sepetu,

This has three grave consequences. First, it makes it very difficult for the developing of national industries to rationalize consumption for better development. Secondly, it develops among the people a habit of insatiable

acquisiveness which ultimately leads to committing of crimes and corruption. And thirdly, it makes it very difficult for the non-alien countries to develop their own cultural identity in the absence of cultural policy due to the lack of corresponding information and cultural policy (Sepetu, 1978:61).

For the development communicator, then, it is important to take into account, the flood of foreign media and their harmful effects on the audiences. In Africa, as Hachten (1971) explains,

This flood of foreign media fare is extremely significant. In one sense, it denotes the new African nations' increasing enmeshment in the international network of mass communications, as part and parcel of their involvement in the modern world. In another sense, it may be another indication of the lingering "neo-colonialist" relationship between African and Western nations as well as proof of the inadequacy of their own media (Hachten, 1971:32).

National development requires self-protection from outside disruptive effects. So the development communicator needs to keep his audience at a distance from the international flow of information or at least to design his messages by taking into account the possible damaging effects of the international mass media. Such effects may weaken the national mass media of communication.

Government ownership and control of mass media in Afro-Arab countries may be desirable partially to manipulate and control the quantity and quality of mass media so as to promote national development and to achieve integration. As Katz and Wedell (1980) note:

In the developing countries government control of broadcasting usually involves much more than the allocation of broadcasting frequencies under license to broadcasting

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organization. Political considerations have progressively caused control to extend to the content of services. In Africa all national broadcasting systems are not only government-controlled but also government-operated (Katz and Wedell, 1980:42).

Time

By time, we are referring to the aspects of flow of time, timeliness and duration. Timing deals with the appropriate selection of a given time during which the message is disseminated. As Seymour-Ure (1974:28) observes:

The time at which a piece of information is transmitted may make all the differences to its significance. The timing of communication process is probably one of the most important determinants of mass media effects... Where timing is important the most trivial increment of information may change the course of events, without any need for those changes in attitude which so many researchers look for (p. 28).

Timeliness deals with the ability of the development communicator to be conversant with what issue would capture the audience's attention and interest at a given period; utilization of strategies such as the overall frequency and intensity with which the message is disseminated. According to Seymour-Ure (1974:35), frequency of communication means "repetition in more or less the same form over a period of time." Moreover, he referred to intensity as "the relationship between a communication and other communications going on at the same time" (p. 37).

Duration will, of course, focus on the length of time involved for the entire project being conducted. In an

agenda-setting research, McCombs (1977: 91) found evidence about the influence of the media on voter's perceptions of the key issues over time. Time as a quantity in communication process may have different implications (Parker, 1973). Kline (1977) exemplified that concept:

The length of time that a particular process operates will be importantly related to the consequences. The time dimension in development communication process can be controlled by both the communicator and the audience. While the communicator can control the selection and the time of transmission media, the audience can control more directly the messages which are transmitted over the communication channel. He can adapt his time to see or hear a specific program or he can decide to disregard it C Kline, 1977: 195).

Pre and Post Program Implementation Information

Here we are concerned with two kinds of Pre Program Implementation information.

1. Organized or planned information comes to the development communicator as a result of communication research before implementation of a program which can be called feedfront (Cassata and Asante 1979).
2. Spontaneous or unplanned information comes to the development communicator from the target population (audiences) about their perception, feelings, and attitudes towards issues that affect the proposed program.

Post program implementation information concerns the audiences and the communication researchers. After the implementation of the program, essentially, the development

communicators are concerned with feedback on their messages. Information opinions and other effects that get back to communicator will provide him with information about audiences and the effects of the mass media (Schramm, 1964).

There are two kinds of Post-Information "feedback;" firstly, organized or planned, post information comes from the development researchers who conduct research about the effect of the development messages. Secondly, spontaneous or unplanned feedback comes from the audiences as reaction to mass media messages. These kinds of information will help in the breakdown of the barriers and constraints in communication imposed by the audiences.

The importance of the feedback comes from the ability of the communicator to adjust his communication according to the reaction of his audience (Doob 1966).

Communication research in our model will play two major roles; (1) it will provide the planners and communicators some basic information to design a specific development program and (2) it will provide the planners and communicators feedback on audiences and effect that help in eva1uting and modifying their messages.

Communication researchers in Afro-Arab countries should not be over-sensitive towards to the use of the Western scientific research methods. Because as Nwankwo (1982:47) observed: "There does not

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seem to be anything un-African about the essence of the social scientific method or of the scientific method in general." Below we are presenting a comparison between different approaches to development communication (See Table 3).

CHAPTER VI

APPLICATION AND IMPLICATION OF

THE MODEL

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<u>Application and Processes</u>

The constituent parts of the model have been presented. Therefore, the actual working of the model will now be discussed. First, it is important to note that the basic elements of extant communication models are apparent. As Berlo (1960) observes, communication is interactive. It is a process. The proposed model falls within the above context. We have the source, the message, the channel, and the receiver. In addition, there is a provision for multiple feedback. Essentially, then, it is an interactive process. Furthermore, the model relies on some other major elements of the process of communication. The proposed model identifies a key element of noise. Noise could be discerned at the level of competitive messages. The essential differences that could be discerned in the proposed model and other models are: (a) the context within which the model is proposed to be tested; (b) the addition of certain cultural and developmental elements such as time, competitive messages, pre and post information generation; and (c) the emergence of the model out of a peculiar context. This is to say that while western researchers who investigated development (Grunig, for example) utilized extant concepts and theories such as the applicability of the two-step flow or multi-step flow, this model is emergent. It manifests basic

structural components as identified above, but incorporates the peculiar cultural manifestations in the proposed context. We now move on to examine the processes involved in the proposed model.

In order to examine the Integrated-Reciprocal Model for the Development of Communication (See figure 1, Chapter V) in Afro-Arab context, we will focus on three elements:

1. Development communication
2. Afro-Arab context
3. Development process

In Figure (2), we present the Integrated-Reciprocal model as applied to the Afro-Arab context. In this model those two circles represent contemporary Afro-Arab-Context. The first circle represents the unique peculiarities of culture and world view as summarized in Table 2, Chapter IV. The second circle represents the unique experiences that are manifested in similarities of leadership, ideology, politics, economics and technology. (See Table 1, Chapter III.).

The above proposed model presents a theoretical framework for communication development in Afro-Arab context. That context according to Afro-Arab documents[1] represents a milieu of mutual interests of past, present and future, history, and development.

INTEGRATED RECIPORACAL MODEL
Applied to the Afro-Arab Context
(Figure 2)

DEVELOPMENT & COMMUNICATION

1. **Interpersonal, intergroup, organizational, Mass & International Communication**
2. **Integration of Mass-media & traditional Channels**
3. **Communication Research**
4. **Integration of Communication Theories of Effect & Development**

EXTANT AFRO-ARAB CONTEXT

culture

technology

Ideology   Economics

leadership   Politics

Personality   Socialization

DEVELOPMENT

1. National
2. Human
3. Economic
4. Education
5. Technological

Development

As we explained earlier, the Afro-Arab context has its own peculiarity. Within this context the role of the state is crucial in planning and implementing the development plans. The role of the state, in a real sense, is presented through it leadership with their politics, ideology, culture and also through the technology and economic capacity of the state and its policies.

As the model suggests, it is predicated on a complex environmental setting. The setting, represented by two external lines (circles) in the model greatly influences the "process" aspect of the model. The first circle deals with the following factors that have already been identified and explained, culture, socialization, and personality. The second circle deals with economics, technology, ideology, and leadership. All of the above factors combined, directly influence the running of the prescribed model. Without taking the above into account, it will be quite difficult to have an effective functioning of the model. An adumbration of a development project can demonstrate how exactly the model functions.

Model Applied to Family Planning Communication

Let us take a family planning campaign in an Afro-Arab state such as Egypt. In planning any family campaign program, several of the contextual factors immediately come into play. A factor such as culture is extremely crucial. Within culture, one could touch on steadfast values of

religion that negate the very notion of family planning. So what does the state do in effecting such a campaign? It is quite apparent that if the culture of the masses is not fully integrated into the whole prospect, contradictions might occur that will result in the dismissal of the intended messages.

An effective communicator may discover in that given culture some elements which could enhance his messages (Eisenstad,1978; Gusfield, 1971). For example, in Egypt, in a family planning campaign, the planners and communicators encountered some resistance from the religious leaders with traditional beliefs. Both the planners and communicators made references to sayings of the prophet Mohammad, and the political authority persuaded the religious leadership of AI-Azhar[2] as communicators to enhance their campaign.

1As example see:

Sharja Declaration: The Afro-Arab Symposium 14-18 December 1976. Sharja United Arab Emirates.

Khartoum Declaration About Afro-Arab Cooperation: The Afro-Arab Symposium for Liberation and Development 7-11 January 1976, Khartoum, Sudan.

Declaration and Work Program for Afro-Arab Cooperation. The Afro-Arab Summit Conference: 7-9 March 1977, Cairo, Egypt.

See all these documents and others in "Al-Ta'won Al Arabi-Al Ifriqi" by Yosef Al Hassan. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar El-Wahdah 1982: pp. 171:213.

Al-Azhar is the highest Moslem religious authority in Egypt.[2]

Besides the above context of culture and belief, the type of socialization in Afro-Arab context as explained earlier creates a patriarchal personality which leaves an important role for the effectiveness of the leadership, the elders and the family. This type of authority in Egypt according to Binder (1972) is one that reflects the virtues taught in the family and one that understands the essence of the national community in family terms (Binder, 1972:411). The persons of authority tend to be assimilated into the role and character of the father, or in rare cases, into that of the mother. So the development communicator in order to deliver his family planning message could utilize the role of the elders in their communities and could utilize a communicator who relates to a specific area through family, clan, and/or tribe- particularly in rural areas. So the traditional family system can prove an access to effective communication that could help in the development process. As Gusfield (1971) observes, "The role of traditional values in the form of segmental loyalties and principles of legitimate. authority is of great importance in understanding the possibilities for the occurrence of unified and stable policies at a national level" (Gusfield, 1971: 20).

Moreover, the role of the charismatic leader as an effective communicator is important. Nasser in Egypt was a good

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[2]Al-Azhar is the highest Moslem religious authority in Egypt.

example of a leader who addressed the masses effectively. In many situations, the political leadership must have access to the development communicator to utilize the interpersonal communication and inter-group communication through political and social organizations such as parties and professional unions.

The communicator must design his message in accordance with his resource. He will be governed by the budget of his campaign, the human resources, the technical capacity and the nature of the audience.

The budget determines many things; (1) what kind of channels the communicator can use; (2) how long it can be used; (3) how many channels can be used; (4) How many and what kind of staff and expertise the communicator can recruit. In the case of a family planning campaign in Egypt, the communicator used multiple channels since the state itself adopted the campaign and since the state owns and controls (directly or indirectly) the mass media (Binder 1972). Since national planning in Egypt-as in other Afro-Arab states is the responsibility of the state, the state can offer the required resources to implement planned projects.

One of the strategies that the successful communicator utilizes to help in implementing a campaign is to obtain necessary information before operating his campaign. This advanced planning can be achieved through cooperation between himself and other" institutions which have basic information about the needs of the audiences and their attitudes towards the project at hand. Such information

comes from the feedback that reaches institutions such as health institutions, welfare institutions and educational institutions. Furthermore, information could be obtained directly from communication researchers. Is it needless to say, such data are valuable in designing the messages to meet the audiences' needs and to have a suitable appeal for them. Utilizing this procedure within the framework of the model, the campaign may have two paths, "top-down" and "bottom-up."

The communicator must be aware that in the era of the "global village," he is not the only one in the stimulus field of the entire process. For example, there are many competitive messages such as those coming in from the British Broadcasting Cooperation and the Voice of America, and other print media. These messages may compete with his messages and interrupt his efforts by attracting his audiences to listen and/or read the competitive messages. The audiences may disregard and/or miss messages designed for them within the country.

What is being done in this adumbration is to demonstrate how the various elements in the proposed model have impact on the entire process of message generation, preparation, and dissemination. If a given campaign that deals directly with development is conceived, the role of each constituent part of the model becomes crucial. Even though the adumbration deals with domestic development campaigns, the model could be applied through bi and multi-lateral dimensions involving the promotion of programs in several Afro-Arab states at simultaneously.

In this concluding chapter, the above aspect of "inter-national." (bi or multi-lateral projects) is discussed, using as data base, documents and statements from Afro-Arab meetings that tend to point toward the direction of a need for a model such as the one proposed.

Implication

The Afro-Arab states as a region have progressed in communication among themselves and with others. Nowadays, the reality of the Afro-Arab nations manifests itself in a close relationship among the people and demands tied development planning. This could be accomplished through a variety of channels such as the O.A.U., the Arab League, bilateral and multi-lateral relations.

In the early 1950s Nasser of Egypt spoke about the ties that make Egypt with Arab World and Africa an integral and indivisible whole, that should be defended as such and not as an isolated unit. He mentioned three circles; 1) the Arab circle; 2) the African circle, and 3) the Islamic circle. Concerning the second circle, Nasser stated,

As for the second, circle-the African Continent Circle… we cannot under any condition, even if we want to, stand aloof from the terrible and terrifying battle now raging in the heart of that continent between 5 million whites and 200 million Africans. We cannot stand aloof for one important and obvious reason--we ourselves are in Africa…(Nasser 1954: 149).

The Afro-Arab documents emphasize the mutual culture, the mutual historical heritage and the mutual future of the Afro-Arab. (Sharja Declaration 1976 ; Khartoum Declaration 1976; Declaration and Work program for Afro-Arab

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Cooperation 1977; Luanda Declaration 1981; and Annual Report 1980 of Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa).

Khartoum Declaration of the Afro-Arab Symposium for Liberation and Development states that the aim of Afro-Arab Cooperation in the first place is development and that must occur through scientific dialogue and planning aimed at the national interests of all Afro-Arab states. This Declaration, also, insists on the educational, cultural, and information cooperation in all levels. Moreover, the Symposium recommended that the Arab League and O.A.U. pursue the implementation of the recommendation and suggestions of the Symposium.

The cooperation for development between African and Arab states has taken place through many Afro-Arab organizations and mutual projects such as The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), The Arab Fund for economic and social development, The Islamic Bank for Development, The Arab Fund for the Technical Assistance for Afro-Arab states, the Arab-Afro Bank and others. For example, see Table (5) for the Total Arab aid to African Countries and Table (6) for the BADEA Assistance to African Countries.

The BADEA Annual Report 1980 as an example of cooperation has pointed out that:

In order to qualify as Official Development Aid "ODA" capital transfers must contain a grant element of 80%. It is also worth noting that Arab ODA to

Africa in 1979 ($533 million) represented a little less than one quarter of the continent's total ODA inflows ($2.4 million) during the same year.

In 1980 Arab aid to Africa amounted, according to BADEA's preliminary estimates to $1,55.43 million-an increase of 115% over the 1979 level." (Badea Annual Report 1980:10)

Financial aid is one important aspect of Afro-Arab cooperation for development. The awareness of the development process complicated and is one which calls for the utilization of human resources and information. Hence, the development plans in Afro-Arab countries place emphasis on the development of the human resource and millions of other resources.

The Afro-Arab current situation needs more efforts towards mutual cooperation. Economic development is at a low level except for the oil-producing countries. For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa countries, there is a present economic crisis which affects the several aspects of development. The World Bank (1981) explains this crisis as follows:

But for most African countries, and for a majority of the African population, the record is grim and it is no exaggeration to talk of crisis. Slow overall economic growth, sluggish agricultural performance coupled with rapid rates of population increase, and ba1ance-of-payments and fiscal crisis--these are dramatic indicators of economic trouble (The World Bank, 1981:2).

According to the World Bank (1981) the implication of the slow growth in Africa is low income and so limited access to basic services. We find the highest rates of death in the world and life expectancy is the lowest. Only 25 percent of the population has some obstacles which restrain development such as limited formal education, health,

diseases, very rapid population growth and inadequate nutrition. (See Table 4 and see the Appendices)

It is expected that the future of the continent will be bright. The development of African material and human resources will help to solve the economic problems of Africa. Since the African

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potential is promising, an elaborate cooperation between Arabs and Africans would spell success for both.

The Arabs, with their flow of the oil, carried their responsibility towards Africa. Arabs and Africans see the cooperation between both groups as necessary to help the development of the

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region. The Afro-Arab leaders in their Summit Conference at Cairo 1977 stated that the liberation and development of

the Afro-Arab region is one inseparable cause (Afro-Arab Economic and Financial Cooperation Declaration 1977).

The same conference stated that Afro-Arab Cooperation has crossed positive stages towards participation in the development process and the control of Afro-Arab people of their resources. The conference observed that the seize of Afro-Arab cooperation in the economic and financial field has multiplied seven times through the past three years.

One of the leading Arab institutions in charge of cooperation with Africa is Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA). According to its documents the BADEA was created in response to a resolution adopted at the Sixth Arab League Summit Conference held in Algiers in November, 1973. The Bank began operations in March 1975. The BADEA supports projects which have national importance for the country's concern and which normally is part of that country's economic development plan. Also, BADEA supports projects of regional impact that benefit several countries.

BADEA represents a working model for Afro-Arab Cooperation. A report from BADEA (1980:10) explains the nature of its operations in the following terms:

BADEA has consistently maintained a fruitful working relationship and mutual consultants with both the O.A.U. and the Arab League. In the course of 1980, the Bank was closely involved in all matters of cooperation. Acting along with the two Secretaries-General, BADEA helped enhance political dialogue in tandem with the Economic Commission for Africa of the UNO, worked to advance Arab-African trade cooperation.

BADEA, represents the potential and possibility of Afro-Arab cooperation for development. Taking our model in consideration and the context in which it can work, it is feasible to see an Afro-Arab institution function to plan, and implement development communication campaigns in a single country or in a regional basis.

The Afro-Arab cooperation in the economic and financial fields (See Tables No.5 & 6) can be enhanced by cooperation in other fields. If this coalition is supported, the development of the area would be accelerated.

Our model presents a framework in which a communicator can work in an Afro-Arab region. The context of that model which we have presented as Afro-Arab centric perspective presents a solid basis for Afro-Arab cooperation and for strengthening the relation between both groups.

Our proposed model, which is based on understanding the Afro-Arab context, has implications which serve the development of the Afro-Arab region. While speaking about development communication in the Afro-Arab context, we should consider the current situation that has resulted from complex cultural, social and historic developments.

Therefore, communication should receive top priority since communication can support development plans, cultural ties, and can enhance the political, economic, and commercial cooperation. Effective Communication can secure the interests of the people of the region.

Within the O.A.U., Arab League, mutual work committees and bilateral relations, it is possible to begin mutual plans for development in areas such as family planning, rural development, women's programs. There will have to be design communication campaigns through the above organizations and other means.

In Afro-Arab region there is a need for establishing an Afro- Arab Communication Council. Such a council could be directed by the O.A.U. and the Arab League. Such a council which could be formed from Afro-Arab information ministers and other experts would formulate, promote, and coordinate Afro-Arab development communication campaign and could promote the cooperation between Afro-Arab states in communication fields such as training, exchange programs, financial assistance, and technical cooperation. Such a council could be responsible for supervised researches and mass-media activities. Proposals for these activities will be made below.

Mutual Afro-Arab development communication campaign would call for the establishment of mass communications center for the Afro-Arab region in order that it would have its own network of mass media including radio, television, newspaper and Afro-Arab news agency. This network should participate in the development process, counter external competitive messages if necessary and strengthen the ties among the Afro-Arab peoples.

On the other hand, there is a need for an Afro-Arab Communication Research Center that could formulate

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communication policy, which, according to Sommerland (1978) "must be founded upon a knowledge of the existing system of communication and how it works; of the impact of the mass media and their effects on society; and of the communication needs of the people and the government" (Sommerland, 1978:88)

The Afro-Arab Communication Research Center is supposed to respond to basic needs; 1) theoretical sophistication needs and 2) improved methodology (Lee, 1978). Communication research will aim to achieve the following purposes which have been suggested by UNESCO in its International Programmed Communication Research.

Firstly, communication and planned social change: This suggests that the relationship between communication and development is to be elaborated, mainly on a national basis, and should ensure the cross-national focus of the research studies involved. Also, it should enable the experience of one country to contribute to the better development communication planning and strategy of another. So the above suggests that development and communication will be a dynamic process which takes into account all variables which have been discussed above. The research would suggest constant evaluation and assessment of operational process and effects of development communication messages.

Secondly, Mass media and man's view of society: This proposes a multi-national program of communication research calling for multi-disciplinary approach into a single,

more universal problem area such as family planning in Afro-Arab countries. Hence, it is expected that multi-lateral cooperations between Afro-Arab states and institutes would be manifested in the formulation of the research and the exchange and use of information in development campaign.

Thirdly, Research into international communication structures: The implications and effects of international communication are of enormous importance in the formulation of national communication policies and in planning. For example, satellites open immense possibilities for communication across geographical, political and cultural boundaries. Such communications (competitive messages) can disrupt national communication policies.

In addition to the above, communication research should explore the following areas:

1.   The relationship between media growth and urbanization (as suggested by Lerner).
2.   The differences and or similarities .in exposure habit to mass media between the urban and rural audiences in Afro-Arab countries. This work will help in the designing of suitable messages for both groups.
3.   The effect of international communication (competitive messages) on the native audience.
4.   The effectiveness of using a specific channel of communication.
5.   The nature and flow of information among the audiences.

6. Critical analysis of the Afro-Arab development communication program.

7. Analysis of the internal and external constraints on development.

Cooperation between African and Arab states in the communication field would help in satisfying the needs of communication system with well-trained men and women. This can be achieved by exchanging expertise and by training personnel in the available communication institutes such as ones in Nigeria, Egypt and Syria.

Since the mass media plays a vital role in nation building and development, there is a tendency towards a concentration of government ownership and control of those media. Such manipulation of mass media in most Afro-Arab countries provides the governments with the channels through which they are going to implement their policies.

The government's ownership and control of mass media need to search for equilibrium between the public and the individual. At the same time, it must leave space for critics of the government and its institutions and plans. This design will create media that is not blindly pro-government. It is healthy when the mass media has a critical function among other functions. Such criticism if it is constructive will help in correcting and guiding the development plans and will challenge policy makers.

The All African Peoples Conference which was held at Tunis in January 1960 adopted resolutions which insist on

the importance of intercultural and international communication between African states and their people. The resolution on African unity of the above conference states recommends the following decision which enhances the intercultural communication:

1.   The granting by the Independei7t states of bursaries to students of different regions of Africa in order to deepen human and cultural contacts.
2.   The exchange of agricultural experts in order to compare and extend beneficial techniques and experiments to their respective national economics.
3.   The organization within the framework of national broadcasting of African cultural, musical and folklore programmers, in order to become better acquainted on a continental scale with the personality of the different regions of Africa.
4.   The promotion of exchanges between African States of teachers and of students.
5.   The organization of sporting and cultural events, likewise are exhibitions, between African States.
6.   Recommends strongly to the Independent African States to facilitate movements of citizens by abolishing visas.

Seventeen years later the Summit Conference of Afro-Arab States held at Cairo recommended that the Afro-Arab states commit themselves to develop bi-lateral and multi-lateral

agreements with a comprehensive and long-term cooperation in the following fields:

a.   Political and diplomatic arena
b.   Economic and financial field
c.   Commercial field
d.   Educational, Cultural, Scientific, Technical and Information field

In the last field the Afro-Arab leaders approved to make agreements about the following:

1.   Cultural exchange and festivals
2.   Students scholarship training and sports
3.   Workers and syndicates activities
4.   Cooperation in mass media such as press, news agencies, tele-communication, radio and television.
5.   Exchange of information and experiences and assistance in solving social problems.
6.   Encouragement to facilitate cooperation in tourism field.

The understanding of Afro-Arab centric perspective gives an opportunity for development of more cooperation between the Afro-Arab states and facilitates the implementation of the above recommendations.

We believe that the issues which concern the people of the Afro-Arab world need concentrated and varying

communication efforts to handle and explain them. While it is one of the responsibilities assumed by the communication institutions, every individual government assumes a special and direct responsibility in the respective country.

The above decisions and recommendations emphasize the importance of cooperation in the fields of communications and culture in the Afro-Arab world and we, therefore, recommend the following in this regard:

1.   The encouragement of exchange visits by journalists, writers, intellectuals and the organization of seminars and lectures for the Afro-Arab countries.

2.   The establishment and support of friendship societies.

3.   The organization of cultural symposia including art exhibitions, folk art forms and cinema films.

4.   The reservation of certain pages in newspapers and magazines published by the governments which are members of the O.A.U. and Arab League to promote and support the ideology of the Afro-Arab Unity.

5.   The selection of the cultural work of different writers from the Afro-Arab countries for translation to assure wider dissemination.

6.   The issue of a monthly collective magazine to strengthen the cultural and scientific cooperation among the Afro-Arab countries.

7.   The facilitating of movement of individuals among the Afro-Arab countries and encouragement of visits by students and workers.

8.   Exchange scholarships, visiting professorships.

9. Support for the teaching of the Afro-Arab languages.

10. The translation of valuable books supporting the objectives of the Afro-Arab Cooperation and strengthening human relations.

11. The issue of special publications to analyze issues of concern to the Afro-Arab countries.

12. The dedication of prizes for literature and art work competitions at the Mediterranean level.

13. The organization of a collective mobile exhibition to display the Afro-Arab civilization.

14. A collective folklore band to perform Afro-Arab folk arts.

These suggestions are high aspiring and relate to developing a concept about the role of communications, taking into consideration the communication process factors referred to above. The development of plans to create such communication is an urgent necessity to face the challenges that agitate the people of the Afro-Arab world every day. There is also an urgent necessity to confront the external cultural invasions. Should circumstances or capabilities not permit the implementation of these suggestions as a whole or at once, they may be implemented in part and aspiration to execute them all shall remain the responsibility of all of us who confront the current situation.

CHAPTER VII

Summary and Conclusion

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Although Afro-Arab relations are historical, cultural, geographical, and ethnic, yet most writers who deal with the African world view disregard its Arab dimension (Daniel, 1974; Asante,1980; Diop, 1963; Williams, 1976). The Arabs of North African make up 75% of the whole Arab population and about 25% of the population of Africa. The Arabs of Africa include a significant number of Blacks, particularly in Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Egypt and Libya.

Racial integration between Arabs and East Africans is a historical fact with many consequences. For example, the Swahili language resulted, in part, from constant Arab-Bantu marriages. Furthermore, Arab traders and settlers stimulated the development of the Swahili civilization by bringing in new techniques of knowledge, writing, architecture, religion, law, government and commerce. So it was that the Bantu-Arab hybrid produced this unique civilization. (Murphy,1972; Davidson, 1968).

It is important to point out that Afro-Arab cultural relation existed before and continued during the penetration of Islam in Africa. Ethiopia, for example, has a mixed population of Agau and Arab especially in its Axum region from which the first major Ethiopia civilization emerged. Also, the Afro Asiatic language stock, although associated closely with

Caucasoid peoples in northern Africa and Arabia, includes the languages of a number of important Negroid peoples, such as the Rausa and several others of the Nigerian plateau and Bornu areas.

In addition, strong cultural similarities can be discerned that clearly demonstrate the close bond between Arabs and Africans. For instance, cultural similarities in belief systems, temporal and supernatural relationships and the basic mores of society clearly manifest themselves in both Arab and African communities (Roberts 1980). Family structures among both Arab and traditional Africans are the same, polygamy being widely accepted as a form of marriage which unites more than the members of the conjugal unit. Marriage, thus, is considered a means for reinforcing extensive group value, including the perpetuation of the species, rather than primarily as a means of promoting the happiness of nuclear families as an individual.

All the above can be essential in understanding the African world view and in formulating what may be called an Afro-Arab-centrist model, or perspective, a centrism that encompasses both African and Arab elements.

A close look at the historical relation and current situation in the Afro-Arab region will give an idea of the strong relationship between both groups as manifested by historians. Further, the study of the Afro-Arab world view will give us three major factors that unify the world view of both groups. (See Table 2 Chapter IV).

The above factors are important in understanding Afro-Arab communication processes and will lead us to perceive that the Afro-Arab region needs an effective communication system that will help in the development of the area. Thus, our concern primarily deals with communication in Afro-Arab context, specifically, the role of the mass media with respect to national development.

To achieve the above goal, we have evaluated the theories, models, and paradigms which deal with communication effects to see how they can fit in the Afro-Arab context. None of the theories and models of communication effect, such as the Bullet theory, the Limited Effects Model, the Moderate Effects Model and the Powerful Effects Models, can alone interpret the process of media effect in Afro-Arab context. So we have suggested an integrated approach of all the theories. Such approach will help the development communicator in planning his campaigns.

Dealing with Afro-Arab development communication needs an examination and evaluation of the existing theories of development communication. The theories of development communication have emerged from the Western context. So these theories which have been expressed by scholars such as Lerner, Rogers, Grunig, and others do not deal with the Third World context in general and, specifically, do not deal with the Afro-Arab needs. Those theories manifest Eurocentric elements which disregard certain factors that affect communication in the Afro-Arab context. Criticizing those theories does not mean that we refuse or refute the Western theories of communication development because

they are western. On the contrary, we see that the complexity of the development process requires a deep understanding of the theories of development in the context where it is to occur. Hence, we have been eclectic and have incorporated some elements of these theories in an Afro-Arab model for development communication. For example, in our proposed model, we have integrated elements from Lerner, Rogers, Grunig and others to present an effective model for development communication (See Table 3 and Figures 1&2.) In our model, we recognize the importance of the communication environment which can affect the communicator and the audience as explained in Figures 1 & 2.

In the first place, we consider culture, socialization, and personality as the three intervening variables that fit in the first circle of the Afro-Arab communication environment. In the second circle, we considered economics, technology, politics, ideology and leadership as important intervening variables in the development communication process. The communication process in our model consists of integrated elements of S.M.C.R. Model of Ber1o and other elements such as noise in Shannon and Weaver Model and Feedback.

The integrated-reciprocal model presented in Chapter V, Figure (1), then, allows for interaction between the societal system, the audiences, the media system (communicator message, channels and communication research) and the international system (through competitive messages) and other types of intervene through finance, aids, political power, etc.

The model leaves for the feedback an important role in a sense that the prior feedback combined with prior research results can be valuable information in designing the development messages. Moreover, the post feedback and research results will keep the communication process in a continuous interaction that will help the communicator to develop and/or modify his messages to accommodate his audiences. This model admits that the effectiveness of mass media on the audiences depends upon the wholesome use of the constituents of the model. So the affected segments of the audiences will be flexible and mobilized on a small or large scale depending on how the development campaign is prepared.

Conclusion

To conclude the model proposed above presents a theoretical framework for the development communication in the Afro-Arab context. Our proposed model manifests basic structural components as identified earlier, but incorporates the peculiar cultural manifestations in the given contexts. This model incorporates theories of communication effects and models of development communication in one unified approach. Needless to say, the Western communication approaches to development carried their Euro-centric view, but that does not require dismissal of these approaches because they are Western. The validity of any model approach or theory stems from its capability for applicati9n in a specific context. Hence an integration of the Western theories becomes necessary for Afro-Arab context as we have done.

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The model suggests a strong relationship among a variety of variables; (socio-economic, political, personal, and communication variables.) The relation of these variables to development communication is important to avoid mistakes in planning and implementation of development communication campaigns.

The proposed model could deal with three key aspects of development campaigns in Afro-Arab countries. Firstly, it could be applied to domestic development campaigns; secondly, it could be applied at bi-lateral levels; and thirdly, multi-lateral levels. The second and third levels involve the promotion of programs in bi and multi-lateral levels in Afro-Arab states simultaneously.

Along with the obvious benefits to be accrued from an Afro-Arab development communication plan that have been here discussed, one must approach the concept/idea with certain knowledge that a program of this sort is greater than the sum of its parts. A holistic view of the model presented here suggests that an Afro-Arab unified venture in this context could only release a synergy in development communications that could strengthen weak links, improve the present conditions, and pave the way for future paradigms of inquiry to make a better life for those concerned.

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Table 1. Key indicators of development

	Population			Gross national income (GNI)		PPP gross national income (GNI)		Gross domestic product per capita % growth	Life expectancy at birth Years	Under-5 mortality rate Per 1,000	Adult literacy rate % of people 15 and above	Carbon dioxide emissions Million tonnes
	Millions	Avg. annual % growth	Density people per sq. km	Billions of dollars	Per capita dollars	Billions of dollars	Per capita dollars					
	2003	1990–2003	2003	2003	2003	2003	2003	2002–2003	2002	2002	2002	2000

Table 2. Poverty and income distribution

Economy	National poverty lines				International poverty lines							Percentage share of income or consumption	
		Population below the poverty line (%)				Population below $1 a day %	Poverty gap at $1 a day %	Population below $2 a day %	Poverty gap at $2 a day %				
	Survey year	Rural	Urban	National	Survey year					Survey year	Gini index	Lowest 20%	Highest 20%
Albania	2002	29.6	..	25.4	2002 b	<2.0	<0.5	11.8	2.0	2002 c,d	28.2	9.1	37.4
Algeria	1998	16.6	7.3	12.2	1995 b	<2.0	<0.5	15.1	3.8	1995 c,d	35.3	7.0	42.6
Angola		..	..	..		..	..	..	..		..	..	..
Argentina	1998	..	29.9	..	2001 b	3.3	0.5	14.3	4.7	2001 c,d	52.2	3.1	56.4
Armenia	1998–99	44.8	60.4	53.7	1998 b	12.8	3.3	49.0	17.3	1998 c,d	37.9	6.7	45.1
Australia		..	..	..		..	..	..	..	1994 e,f	35.2	5.9	41.3
Austria		..	..	..		..	..	..	..	1997 e,f	38.0	8.1	38.5
Azerbaijan	2001	..	..	49.6	2001 b	3.7	<1.0	9.1	3.5	2001 c,d	36.5	7.4	44.5
Bangladesh	2000	53.0	36.6	49.8	2000 b	36.0	8.1	82.8	36.3	2000 c,d	31.8	9.0	41.3
Belarus	2000	..	..	41.9	2000 b	<2.0	<0.5	<2.0	0.1	2000 c,d	30.4	8.4	39.1
Belgium		..	..	..		..	..	..	..	1996 e,f	25.0	8.3	37.3
Benin	1995	..	..	33.0		..	..	..	..		..	..	..
Bolivia	1999	81.7	..	62.7	1999	14.4	5.4	34.3	14.9	1999	44.7	4.0	49.1
Bosnia & Herzegovina	2001–02	19.9	13.8	19.5		..	..	..	..	2001	26.2	9.5	35.8
Botswana		..	..	..	1993 b	23.5	7.7	50.1	22.8	1993	63.0	2.2	70.3
Brazil	1990	32.6	13.1	17.4	2001 b	8.2	2.1	22.4	8.8	1998 e,f	59.1	2.0	64.4
Bulgaria	2001	..	..	12.8	2001 b	4.7	1.4	16.2	5.7	2001 e,f	31.9	6.7	38.9
Burkina Faso	1998	51.0	16.5	45.3	1998 b	44.9	14.4	81.0	40.6	1998 c,d	48.2	4.5	60.7
Burundi	1990	36.0	43.0	..	1998 b	58.4	24.9	89.2	51.3	1998 c,d	33.3	5.1	48.0
Cambodia	1997	40.1	21.1	36.1	1997 b	34.1	9.7	77.7	34.5	1997 c,d	40.4	6.9	47.6
Cameroon	2001	49.9	22.1	40.2	2001 b	17.1	4.1	50.6	19.3	2001 c,d	44.6	5.6	50.9
Canada		..	..	..		..	..	..	..	1998 e,f	33.1	7.0	40.4
Central African Rep.		..	..	..	1993 b	66.6	38.1	84.0	58.4	1993 c,d	61.3	2.0	65.0
Chad	1995–96	67.0	63.0	64.0		..	..	..	..		..	..	..
Chile	1998	..	..	17.0	2000 b	<2.0	<0.5	9.6	2.5	2000 e,f	57.1	3.3	62.2
China	1998	4.6	<2.0	4.6	2001 b	16.6	3.9	46.7	18.4	2001 c,d	44.7	4.7	50.0
Hong Kong, China		..	..	..		..	..	..	..	1996 e,f	43.4	5.3	50.7
Colombia	1999	79.0	55.0	64.0	1999 b	8.2	2.2	22.6	8.8	1999 e,f	57.6	2.7	61.8
Congo, Dem. Rep.		..	..	..		..	..	..	..		..	..	..
Congo, Rep.		..	..	..		..	..	..	..		..	..	..
Costa Rica	1992	25.5	19.2	22.0	2000 b	2.0	0.7	9.5	3.0	2000 e,f	46.5	4.2	51.5
Côte d'Ivoire		..	..	..	1998 b	15.5	3.8	50.4	18.9	1998 c,d	45.2	5.5	51.1
Croatia		..	..	..	2001 b	<2.0	<0.5	<2.0	<0.5	2001 c,d	29.0	8.3	39.6
Czech Rep.		..	..	..	1996 b	<2.0	<0.5	<2.0	<0.5	1996 e,f	25.4	10.3	35.9
Denmark		..	..	..		..	..	..	..	1997 e,f	24.7	8.3	35.8
Dominican Rep.	1998	42.1	20.5	28.6	1998 b	<2.0	<0.5	<2.0	<0.5	1998 e,f	47.4	5.1	53.3
Ecuador	1994	47.0	25.0	35.0	1998 b	17.7	7.1	40.8	17.7	1998 e,f	43.7	3.3	58.0
Egypt, Arab Rep.	1999–00	23.3	22.5	16.7	2000 b	3.1	<0.5	43.9	11.3	1999 e,f	34.4	8.6	43.6
El Salvador	1992	55.7	43.1	48.3	2000 b	31.1	14.1	58.0	29.7	2000 e,f	53.2	2.9	57.1
Eritrea	1993–94	..	..	53.0		..	..	..	..		..	..	..
Estonia	1995	14.7	6.8	8.9	1998 b	<2.0	<0.5	5.2	0.8	2000 e,f	37.2	6.1	44.0
Ethiopia	1999–00	45.0	37.0	44.2	1999–00 b	26.3	5.7	80.7	31.8	2000 c,d	30.0	9.1	39.4
Finland		..	..	..		..	..	..	..	2000 e,f	26.9	9.6	36.7
France		..	..	..		..	..	..	..	1995 e,f	32.7	7.2	40.2
Georgia	1997	9.9	12.1	11.1	2001 b	2.7	0.9	15.7	4.6	2001 c,d	36.9	6.4	43.6
Germany		..	..	..		..	..	..	..	2000 e,f	28.3	8.5	36.9
Ghana	1998	49.9	18.6	39.5	1999 b	44.8	17.3	78.5	40.8	1999 c,d	30.0	5.6	46.6
Greece		..	..	..		..	..	..	..	1998 e,f	35.4	7.1	43.6
Guatemala	2000	74.5	27.1	56.2	2000 b	16.0	4.6	37.4	16.0	2000 e,f	48.3	2.6	64.1
Guinea	1994	..	..	40.0		..	..	..	..	1994	40.3	6.4	47.2
Haiti	1995	66.0	..	65.0		..	..	..	..		..	..	..
Honduras	1993	51.0	57.0	53.0	1998 b	23.8	11.6	44.4	20.1	1999 e,f	55.0	2.7	58.9
Hungary	1997	..	..	17.3	1998 b	<2.0	<0.5	7.3	1.7	1999 e,f	24.4	7.7	37.5
India	1999–00	38.2	24.7	28.6	1999–00 b	34.7	8.2	79.9	35.3	1999–00 c,d	32.5	8.9	41.6
Indonesia	1999	..	..	27.1	2002 b	7.5	0.9	52.4	15.7	2002 c,d	34.3	8.4	43.3
Iran, Islamic Rep.		..	..	..	1998 b	<2.0	<0.5	7.3	1.5	1998	43.0	5.1	49.9
Ireland		..	..	..		..	..	..	..	1996 e,f	35.9	7.1	43.3
Israel		..	..	..		..	..	..	..	1997 e,f	35.5	6.9	44.3
Italy		..	..	..		..	..	..	..	2000 e,f	36.0	6.5	42.0
Jamaica	2000	25.1	..	18.7	2000 b	<2.0	<0.5	13.3	2.7	2000 c,d	37.9	6.7	46.0
Japan		..	..	..		..	..	..	..	1993 e,f	24.9	10.6	35.7
Jordan	1997	..	..	11.7	1997 b	<2.0	<0.5	7.4	1.4	1997 c,d	36.4	7.6	44.4
Kazakhstan	1996	39.0	30.0	34.6	2001 b	<2.0	<0.5	8.5	1.4	2001 c,d	31.3	8.2	39.6
Kenya	1997	53.0	49.0	52.0	1997 b	23.0	6.0	58.6	24.1	1997 c,d	44.5	5.6	51.2
Korea, Rep.		..	..	..	1998 b	<2.0	<0.5	<2.0	<0.5	1998 e,f	31.6	7.9	37.5
Kuwait		..	..	..		..	..	..	..		..	..	..
Kyrgyz Rep.	1999	69.7	49.0	64.1	2001 b	<2.0	<0.5	27.2	5.9	2001 c,d	29.0	9.1	38.3
Lao PDR	1997–98	41.0	26.9	38.6	1997–98 b	26.3	6.3	73.2	29.6	1997 c,d	37.0	7.6	45.0
Latvia		..	..	..	1998 b	<2.0	<0.5	8.3	2.0	1998 e,f	32.4	7.6	40.3
Lebanon		..	..	..		..	..	..	..		..	..	..
Lesotho		..	..	..	1995 b	36.4	19.0	56.1	33.1	1995 c,d	63.2	1.5	66.5
Lithuania		..	..	..	2000 b	<2.0	<0.5	13.7	4.2	2000 c,d	31.9	7.9	40.0
Macedonia, FYR		..	..	..	1998 b	<2.0	<0.5	4.0	0.6	1998 c,d	28.2	8.4	36.7
Madagascar	1999	76.7	52.1	71.3	1999 b	49.1	18.3	83.3	44.0	2001 c,d	47.5	4.9	53.5
Malawi	1997–98	66.5	54.9	65.3	1997–98 b	41.7	14.8	76.1	38.3	1997 c,d	50.3	4.9	56.1

Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified.

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Table 2. Poverty and income distribution—continued

Economy	National poverty lines Population below the poverty line (%)				International poverty line							Percentage share of income or consumption	
	Survey year	Rural	Urban	National	Survey year	Population below $1 a day %	Poverty gap at $1 a day %	Population below $2 a day %	Poverty gap at $2 a day %	Survey year	Gini index	Lowest 20%	Highest 20%
Malaysia	1989	..	..	15.5	1997 b	<2.0	<0.5	9.3	2.0	1997 ef	49.2	4.4	54.3
Mali	1998	75.9	30.1	63.8	1994 b	72.8	37.4	90.6	60.5	1994 cd	50.5	4.6	56.2
Mauritania	2000	61.2	25.4	46.3	2000 b	25.9	7.6	63.1	26.8	2000 cd	39.0	6.2	45.7
Mexico	1988	..	..	10.1	2000 b	9.9	3.7	26.3	10.9	2000 ef	54.6	3.1	59.1
Moldova	1997	26.7	..	23.3	2001 b	22.0	5.8	63.7	25.1	2001 cd	36.2	7.1	43.7
Mongolia	1995	33.1	38.5	36.3	1995 b	13.9	3.1	50.0	17.5	1998 cd	44.0	5.6	51.2
Morocco	1998–99	27.2	12.0	19.0	1999 b	<2.0	<0.5	14.3	3.1	1998–99 cd	39.5	6.5	46.6
Mozambique	1996–97	71.3	62.0	69.4	1996 b	37.9	12.0	78.4	36.8	1996–97 cd	39.6	6.5	46.5
Myanmar		..	..	..		..	..	..	..		..	..	..
Namibia		..	..	..	1993 b	34.9	14.0	55.8	30.4	1993 ef	70.7	1.4	78.7
Nepal	1995–96	44.0	23.0	42.0	1995 b	37.7	9.7	82.5	37.5	1995–96 cd	36.7	7.6	44.8
Netherlands		..	..	..		..	..	..	..	1994 ef	32.6	7.3	40.1
New Zealand		..	..	..		..	..	..	..	1997 ef	36.2	6.4	43.8
Nicaragua	1998	68.5	30.5	47.9	2001 b	45.1	16.7	79.9	41.2	2001 cd	55.1	3.6	58.7
Niger	1989–93	66.0	52.0	63.0	1995 b	61.4	33.9	85.3	54.8	1995 cd	50.5	2.6	53.3
Nigeria	1992–93	36.4	30.4	34.1	1997 b	70.2	34.9	90.8	59.0	1996–97 cd	50.6	4.4	55.7
Norway		..	..	..		..	..	..	..	2000 ef	25.8	9.6	37.2
Pakistan	1998–99	35.9	24.2	32.6	1998 b	13.4	2.4	65.6	22.0	1998–99 cd	33.0	8.8	42.3
Panama	1997	64.9	15.3	37.3	2000 b	7.2	2.3	17.6	7.4	2000 ef	56.4	2.4	60.3
Papua New Guinea	1996	41.3	16.1	37.5		..	..	..	..	1996 cd	50.9	4.5	56.5
Paraguay	1991	28.5	19.7	21.8	1998 b	14.9	6.8	30.3	14.7	1999 ef	56.8	2.2	60.2
Peru	1997	64.7	40.4	49.0	2000 b	18.1	9.1	37.7	18.5	2000 ef	49.8	2.9	53.2
Philippines	1997	50.7	21.5	36.8	2000 b	14.6	2.7	46.4	17.2	2000 cd	46.1	5.4	52.3
Poland	1993	..	..	23.8	1999 b	<2.0	<0.5	<2.0	<0.5	1999 cd	31.6	7.3	42.5
Portugal		..	..	..	1994 b	<2.0	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	1997 ef	38.5	5.8	45.9
Romania	1994	27.9	20.4	21.5	2000 b	2.1	0.6	20.5	5.2	2000 cd	30.3	8.2	38.4
Russian Federation	1994	..	..	30.9	2000 b	6.1	1.2	23.8	8.0	2000 cd	45.6	4.9	51.3
Rwanda	1993	..	..	51.2	1983–85 b	35.7	7.7	84.6	36.7	1983–85 cd	28.9	9.7	39.1
Saudi Arabia		..	..	..		..	..	..	..		..	..	..
Senegal	1992	40.4	..	33.4	1995 b	26.3	7.0	67.8	28.2	1995 cd	41.3	6.4	48.2
Serbia & Montenegro		..	..	..		..	..	..	..		..	..	..
Sierra Leone	1989	76.0	53.0	68.0	1989 b	57.0	39.5	74.5	51.8	1989 cd	62.9	1.1	63.4
Singapore		..	..	..		..	..	..	..	1998 ef	42.5	5.0	49.0
Slovak Republic		..	..	..	1996 b	<2.0	<0.5	2.4	0.7	1996 ef	25.8	8.8	34.8
Slovenia		..	..	..	1998 b	<2.0	<0.5	<2.0	<0.5	1998–99 ef	28.4	9.1	35.7
South Africa		..	..	..	1995 b	7.1	1.1	23.8	8.6	1995 cd	59.3	2.0	66.5
Spain		..	..	..		..	..	..	..	1990 ef	32.5	7.5	40.3
Sri Lanka	1995–96	27.0	15.0	25.0	1995–96 b	6.6	1.0	45.4	13.5	1995 cd	34.4	8.0	42.8
Sweden		..	..	..		..	..	..	..	2000 ef	25.0	9.1	36.6
Switzerland		..	..	..		..	..	..	..	1992 ef	33.1	6.9	40.3
Syrian Arab Rep.		..	..	..		..	..	..	..		..	..	..
Tajikistan		..	..	..	1998 b	10.3	2.6	50.8	16.3	1998 cd	34.7	8.0	40.0
Tanzania	2000–01	38.7	..	35.7	1992 b	19.9	4.8	59.7	23.0	1993 cd	38.2	6.8	45.5
Thailand	1992	15.5	10.2	13.1	2000 b	<2.0	<0.5	32.5	9.0	2000 cd	43.2	6.1	50.0
Togo	1987–89	..	..	32.3		..	..	..	..		..	..	..
Tunisia	1995	13.9	3.6	7.6	2000 b	<2.0	<0.5	6.6	1.3	2000 cd	39.8	6.0	47.3
Turkey		..	..	..	2000 b	<2.0	<0.5	10.3	2.5	2000 cd	40.0	6.1	46.7
Turkmenistan		..	..	..	1998 b	12.1	2.6	44.0	15.4	1998 cd	40.8	6.1	47.5
Uganda	1997	..	..	44.0		..	..	..	..	1999 cd	43.0	5.9	49.7
Ukraine	1995	..	..	31.7	1999 b	2.9	0.6	45.7	16.3	1999 cd	29.0	8.8	37.8
United Kingdom		..	..	..		..	..	..	..	1999 ef	36.0	6.1	44.0
United States		..	..	..		..	..	..	..	2000 ef	40.8	5.4	45.8
Uruguay		..	..	..	2000 b	<2.0	<0.5	3.9	0.8	2000 ef	44.6	4.8	50.1
Uzbekistan	2000	38.5	22.5	27.5	2000 b	21.8	5.4	77.5	28.9	2000 cd	26.8	9.2	36.3
Venezuela, RB	1989	..	..	31.3	1998 b	15.0	6.9	32.0	15.2	1998 ef	49.1	3.0	53.4
Vietnam	1993	57.2	25.9	50.9	1998 b	17.7	3.3	63.7	22.9	1998 cd	36.1	8.0	44.5
Yemen, Rep.	1998	45.0	30.8	41.8	1998 b	15.7	4.5	45.2	15.0	1998 cd	33.4	7.4	41.2
Zambia	1998	83.1	56.0	72.9	1998 b	63.7	32.7	87.4	55.4	1998 cd	52.6	3.3	56.6
Zimbabwe	1995–96	48.0	7.9	34.9	1990–91 b	36.0	9.6	64.2	29.4	1995 cd	56.8	4.6	55.7

a. Based on expenditure. b. Based on income. c. Refers to expenditure shares by percentiles of population. d. Ranked by per capita expenditure. e. Refers to income shares by percentiles of population. f. Ranked by per capita income.

Table 3. Economic activity

	Gross domestic product		Agricultural productivity Agr. Value added per agricultural worker 1995 dollars		Value added as % of GDP			Household final cons. expenditure % of GDP	General gov't. final cons. expenditure % of GDP	Gross capital formation % of GDP	External balance of goods and services % of GDP	GDP implicit deflator
	Millions of dollars 2000	Avg. annual % growth 1990–2003	1990–92	2000–2002	Agricultural 2000	Industry 2000	Services 2000	2000	2000	2000	2000	Avg. annual % growth 1990–2003
Albania	6,124	4.6	1,137	1,868	25	19	56	93	8	23	–24	26.9
Algeria	65,960	2.4	1,781	1,919	11	65	24	45	8	32	14	14.7
Angola	13,189	3.2	218	137	9	65	27	63	.	32	5	518.4
Argentina	129,735	2.3	7,282	10,317	11	35	54	63	11	15	11	4.9
Armenia	2,797	1.5	..	2,827	24	38	38	85	10	20	–15	119.9
Australia	510,382	3.8	24,500	36,327	4	26	71	60	18	24	–3	1.9
Austria	251,456	2.1	15,593	33,828	2	32	66	58	19	22	1	1.7
Azerbaijan	7,124	2.4	..	1,029	16	54	29	60	10	52	–23	65.6
Bangladesh	51,897	4.9	244	318	22	27	52	77	5	23	–6	3.1
Belarus	17,460	0.6	..	3,038	10	37	53	60	21	22	–3	252.3
Belgium	300,217	2.1	30,479	57,462	1	27	72	55	21	19	4	1.8
Benin	3,498	5.0	397	621	36	14	50	80	13	19	–12	7.8
Bolivia	8,024	3.5	681	754	15	33	52	77	15	11	–3	7.1
Bosnia & Herzegovina	6,960	17.8	..	7,634	17	35	48	88	25	19	–32	3.5
Botswana	7,388	4.7	777	535	2	48	50	28	32	25	14	9.0
Brazil	480,338	2.6	2,982	4,899	6	21	73	58	20	20	2	118.9
Bulgaria	19,859	–0.2	3,409	8,282	12	27	61	69	17	21	–8	75.1
Burkina Faso	4,182	4.2	148	185	31	19	50	83	13	19	–15	4.7
Burundi	669	–1.5	176	151	49	19	32	93	8	10	–10	12.0
Cambodia	4,299	6.6	..	422	36	28	36	80	6	22	–8	3.4
Cameroon	12,449	2.7	837	1,213	45	19	37	71	12	17	–1	4.4
Canada	834,390	3.2	29,425	43,064	..	..	..	56	19	20	5	1.5
Central African Rep.	1,198	1.8	383	502	61	25	14	75	13	18	–6	3.9
Chad	2,648	3.0	171	211	38	17	46	81	7	45	–33	6.7
Chile	72,416	5.6	4,854	6,226	9	34	57	63	11	22	3	7.1
China	1,408,852	9.5	227	338	15	53	32	44	13	42	1	4.9
Hong Kong, China	158,596	3.7	..	..	0	12	88	57	11	23	9	1.0
Colombia	77,559	2.3	3,889	3,619	14	31	55	71	14	16	–2	17.0
Congo, Dem. Rep.	5,608	–3.9	250	212	58	19	23	92	4	7	–3	617.0
Congo, Rep.	3,518	1.8	486	469	6	61	33	35	18	23	24	7.9
Costa Rica	17,482	4.8	3,721	5,270	8	29	63	69	15	18	–2	14.9
Côte d'Ivoire	13,734	2.4	779	1,046	28	21	52	63	12	10	16	7.3
Croatia	28,322	1.7	..	9,741	8	29	62	67	21	27	–9	53.0
Czech Republic	65,438	1.4	..	6,382	4	40	57	53	21	28	–2	9.2
Denmark	212,404	2.4	29,551	63,131	3	27	71	48	26	20	6	2.0
Dominican Rep.	15,915	5.7	2,061	3,281	11	32	57	80	7	22	–9	9.1
Ecuador	26,913	1.9	4,726	3,310	9	29	62	70	12	22	–4	3.9
Egypt, Arab Rep.	82,427	4.5	1,000	1,316	16	34	50	72	13	17	–2	7.8
El Salvador	14,396	4.0	1,619	1,678	9	32	59	88	11	17	–16	5.7
Eritrea	734	4.0	..	68	15	24	61	104	34	22	–60	70.3
Estonia	8,360	1.5	..	3,650	5	30	65	62	18	32	–12	35.5
Ethiopia	6,638	4.3	..	154	42	11	47	79	19	21	–19	5.4
Finland	161,549	2.9	23,140	42,306	3	33	64	51	22	20	8	2.0
France	1,747,903	1.9	30,635	59,243	3	25	72	55	24	19	2	1.5
Georgia	3,937	–3.2	..	..	21	23	56	81	10	21	–12	185.0
Germany	2,408,655	1.5	16,783	33,686	1	30	69	59	19	18	4	1.6
Ghana	7,659	4.3	542	571	35	25	40	83	11	19	–14	26.4
Greece	133,045	2.7	10,578	13,860	7	22	70	67	16	23	–6	7.5
Guatemala	24,738	3.8	1,932	2,115	22	19	58	90	5	17	–12	9.3
Guinea	3,626	4.2	228	286	25	36	39	83	6	14	–4	5.2
Haiti	2,745	–0.8	..	..	27	16	57	103	.	21	–24	19.4
Honduras	6,971	3.0	856	1,037	13	31	56	74	14	29	–17	16.2
Hungary	82,805	2.4	5,133	5,625	4	31	65	67	11	24	–2	16.4
India	588,966	5.8	342	401	23	26	52	65	13	24	–2	6.0
Indonesia	208,311	3.5	674	748	17	44	40	69	9	16	6	15.3
Iran, Islamic Rep.	136,833	4.0	2,613	3,737	11	37	53	64	10	30	–3	24.6
Ireland	148,553	7.6	..	..	3	42	54	47	15	24	15	3.0
Israel	103,689	4.3	..	..	..	..	..	60	31	16	–7	8.2
Italy	1,465,895	1.6	13,990	27,064	3	29	69	60	19	20	1	3.4
Jamaica	7,817	0.7	1,232	1,487	5	29	66	74	18	27	–19	18.6
Japan	4,326,444	1.3	25,293	33,077	1	31	68	56	17	26	1	–0.5
Jordan	9,860	4.6	1,810	1,145	2	26	72	80	23	23	–26	2.5
Kazakhstan	29,749	–0.6	..	1,753	8	39	53	59	13	26	2	120.2
Kenya	13,842	1.8	265	213	17	19	64	70	19	16	–5	12.2
Korea, Rep.	605,331	5.5	..	13,747	3	35	62	55	13	29	3	4.0
Kuwait	35,369	2.9	..	..	..	..	..	56	26	9	9	2.6
Kyrgyz Rep.	1,737	–1.5	..	1,861	39	23	38	68	19	18	–4	72.2
Lao PDR	2,036	6.3	462	621	51	23	26	..	..	22	..	28.6
Latvia	9,571	–0.1	..	2,773	5	24	71	62	18	31	–10	31.5
Lebanon	19,000	4.6	..	29,874	12	20	68	96	13	17	–26	12.2
Lesotho	1,135	3.4	591	535	16	42	42	85	33	34	–52	9.5
Lithuania	18,213	0.0	..	3,431	7	34	59	64	20	21	–6	45.0
Macedonia, FYR	4,705	0.1	..	4,243	12	30	57	85	12	22	–18	48.0
Madagascar	5,454	2.1	160	155	29	15	55	82	10	16	–8	16.0
Malawi	1,731	3.1	77	124	38	15	48	85	20	8	–13	30.9

Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified.

Table 3. Economic activity—continued

	Gross domestic product		Agricultural productivity Agr. Value added per agricultural worker 1995 dollars		Value added as % of GDP			Household final cons. expenditure % of GDP 2003	General govt. final cons. expenditure % of GDP 2003	Gross capital formation % of GDP 2003	External balance of goods and services % of GDP 2003	GDP implicit deflator Avg. annual % growth 1990-2003
	Millions of dollars 2000	Avg. annual % growth 1990-2003	1988-90	2000-2002	Agricultural 2000	Industry 2000	Services 2000					
Malaysia	100,161	5.9	5,678	6,912	9	49	42	46	14	22	18	3.4
Mali	4,326	4.9	251	274	36	27	37	79	10	22	-11	6.0
Mauritania	1,120	4.4	382	447	19	30	51	82	18	41	-41	5.6
Mexico	626,080	3.0	1,579	1,913	4	26	70	69	13	20	-2	16.5
Moldova	1,964	-5.9	..	971	23	25	53	95	18	22	-34	78.9
Mongolia	1,180	1.7	1,124	1,444	28	15	57	63	19	31	-13	40.5
Morocco	44,491	2.7	1,823	1,513	18	30	52	64	20	23	-6	2.3
Mozambique	4,320	7.0	126	136	23	34	43	59	11	45	-15	24.0
Myanmar	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	15	..	24.6
Namibia	4,650	3.7	1,055	1,545	10	31	59	58	28	24	-10	10.3
Nepal	5,835	4.6	188	203	40	21	39	79	10	26	-14	6.9
Netherlands	511,556	2.7	34,647	59,476	3	26	71	50	24	20	5	2.4
New Zealand	76,256	3.2	20,966	28,740	..	..	..	60	19	20	2	1.6
Nicaragua	4,108	4.3	1,255	1,618	18	25	57	78	16	31	-25	28.3
Niger	2,738	2.7	211	197	40	17	43	82	12	16	-10	5.2
Nigeria	58,202	2.7	509	729	37	29	34	57	26	22	-5	23.1
Norway	221,579	3.4	21,358	37,073	2	38	60	43	20	20	17	3.2
Pakistan	68,815	3.6	544	719	23	23	53	73	12	15	0	8.6
Panama	12,916	4.1	2,192	2,967	6	14	81	70	7	26	-3	3.0
Papua New Guinea	3,395	2.8	695	823	26	39	35	..	..	..	..	7.6
Paraguay	5,814	1.7	3,261	3,318	21	27	52	81	8	25	-15	11.2
Peru	61,011	3.9	1,399	1,863	8	29	64	72	10	19	-1	18.1
Philippines	88,574	3.5	1,354	1,458	14	32	53	72	11	19	-2	7.7
Poland	209,560	4.7	..	1,879	3	31	66	70	16	19	-5	17.7
Portugal	149,454	2.6	5,391	7,567	4	30	66	67	21	28	-10	4.0
Romania	68,350	0.2	2,340	3,588	12	36	52	76	9	21	-5	78.1
Russian Federation	430,491	-1.8	..	3,826	5	34	61	53	16	20	11	106.4
Rwanda	1,637	2.3	220	254	42	22	36	85	14	20	-19	10.6
Saudi Arabia	188,479	2.1	7,348	15,796	5	51	44	37	26	20	18	1.7
Senegal	5,496	4.0	352	354	17	21	62	75	14	20	-9	3.0
Serbia & Montenegro	19,176	0.5	..	..	..	..	..	86	19	18	-23	52.9
Sierra Leone	750	-3.1	766	359	52	31	17	92	20	18	-31	24.6
Singapore	91,342	6.3	27,156	42,920	0	35	65	41	12	13	33	0.6
Slovak Rep.	31,960	2.5	..	..	4	30	67	55	21	25	-1	9.3
Slovenia	26,294	4.0	..	37,671	3	36	61	53	22	25	0	9.6
South Africa	159,886	2.3	3,428	4,072	4	31	65	67	14	15	4	9.0
Spain	836,100	2.8	12,860	22,412	3	30	66	58	18	26	-2	3.8
Sri Lanka	18,514	4.7	677	725	20	26	54	76	9	23	-7	9.0
Sweden	308,795	2.3	30,186	40,368	2	28	70	49	28	17	6	1.8
Switzerland	308,465	1.0	..	..	..	..	..	61	14	21	4	1.1
Syrian Arab Rep.	21,517	4.3	2,056	2,636	23	29	48	66	11	24	0	6.6
Tajikistan	1,303	-3.2	..	617	23	20	56	91	9	19	-19	147.0
Tanzania b	9,872	3.7	174	187	43	17	40	77	15	18	-10	17.4
Thailand	143,160	3.7	768	863	9	41	50	62	9	23	6	3.4
Togo	1,759	2.1	458	503	41	22	37	83	9	22	-14	5.9
Tunisia	24,282	4.6	2,228	3,115	13	30	58	64	15	25	-4	3.9
Turkey	237,972	3.1	1,848	1,848	13	22	65	67	14	23	-3	68.7
Turkmenistan	6,011	0.8	..	690	25	44	30	55	13	33	0	226.9
Uganda	6,198	6.8	285	346	33	22	45	76	15	23	-14	8.0
Ukraine	49,537	-5.3	..	1,576	14	40	46	60	16	19	5	155.0
United Kingdom	1,794,858	2.6	29,138	32,918	1	26	73	66	20	16	-2	2.0
United States	10,881,609	3.2	27,975	53,907	2	23	75	70	16	18	-4	2.0
Uruguay	11,182	1.5	6,832	8,177	9	27	64	73	12	11	3	23.9
Uzbekistan	9,949	1.2	..	1,449	35	22	43	57	19	17	7	162.4
Venezuela, RB	84,790	0.5	4,449	5,399	3	43	54	70	6	12	12	39.5
Vietnam	39,157	7.5	192	256	23	39	38	66	6	32	-4	11.6
Yemen, Rep.	10,831	5.8	329	412	15	40	45	74	14	17	-5	18.6
Zambia	4,298	1.4	188	194	19	30	51	84	11	16	-11	41.0
Zimbabwe	8,304	1.1	292	355	17	24	59	72	17	8	2	32.3
World	36,356,240 t	2.6 w	.. w	1,051 w	4 w	28 w	68 w	62 w	17 w	20 w	7 w	
Low income	1,101,435	4.7	329	383	25	25	50	68	13	22	-3	
Middle income	5,965,500	3.3	..	818	11	38	51	60	13	25	2	
Lower middle income	4,146,612	3.4	522	716	12	40	48	58	13	27	2	
Upper middle income	1,838,894	3.0	..	4,027	7	32	61	65	13	18	4	
Low & middle income	7,066,806	3.4	492	627	13	36	51	61	13	24	2	
East Asia & Pacific	2,058,713	7.2	..	..	14	49	38	52	12	33	3	
Europa & Cen. Asia	1,386,511	0.2	..	2,376	9	31	60	61	16	21	2	
Latin Am. & Carib.	1,730,888	2.7	2,770	3,591	7	25	68	62	16	19	3	
Mid. East & N.Africa	636,565	3.2	1,917	2,340	11	41	48	54	18	23	5	
South Asia	755,772	5.5	343	412	23	25	52	68	12	23	-2	
Sub-Saharan Africa	417,336	2.7	382	360	14	29	57	68	16	18	-1	
High income	29,270,317	2.5	..	..	2	27	71	63	18	19	0	

a. Data on general government final consumption expenditure are not available separately; they are included in household final consumption expenditure. b. Data cover mainland Tanzania only.

Table 4. Trade, aid, and finance

	Merchandise trade								External debt		
	exports	imports	Manufactured exports % of total merchandise exports 2002	High technology exports % of manufactured exports 2002	Current account balance Millions of dollars 2000	Net private capital flows Millions of dollars 2002	Foreign direct investment Millions of dollars 2002	Official development assistance Dollars per capita 2002	Total Millions of dollars 2002	Present value % of GNI 2002	Domestic credit provided by banking sector % of GDP 2002
	Millions of dollars 2000	Millions of dollars 2000									
Albania	450	1,079	86	1	-409	136	135	101	1,312	20	43.6
Algeria	25,300	12,050	2	4	..	1,023	1,065	12	22,800	42	28.7
Angola	9,075	4,175	..	..	-7,437	1,420	1,312	32	10,134	120	5.5
Argentina	29,349	13,813	31	7	9,559	681	785	0	132,314	66	62.4
Armenia	678	1,269	61	2	-186	108	111	96	1,149	34	7.3
Australia	70,358	88,618	29	16	-30,875	..	16,364	..	..	..	83.9
Austria	96,187	97,678	82	15	-2,392	..	886	..	..	..	124.3
Azerbaijan	2,592	2,626	6	8	-2,021	1,313	1,392	43	1,398	21	8.5
Bangladesh	6,820	9,660	92	0	739	132	47	7	17,037	22	40.2
Belarus	9,964	11,505	64	4	-505	227	247	4	908	7	17.5
Belgium	267,179	250,399	79	11	9,982	..	73,635	..	..	..	115.4
Benin	425	765	6	0	-153	41	41	34	1,843	38	5.0
Bolivia	1,560	1,575	17	7	-347	601	677	77	4,867	23	62.3
Bosnia & Herzegovina	1,440	4,645	..	..	-2,096	299	293	143	2,515	34	35.8
Botswana	2,480	2,085	91	0	..	35	37	22	480	8	-29.5
Brazil	73,084	50,665	54	19	-7,686	9,861	16,566	2	227,932	48	63.6
Bulgaria	7,439	10,742	61	..	-1,648	808	600	48	10,462	79	23.7
Burkina Faso	340	710	19	7	-448	8	8	40	1,580	16	12.4
Burundi	38	155	7	2	-39	-2	0	24	1,204	110	32.1
Cambodia	1,623	1,724	..	..	-64	54	54	37	2,907	68	6.8
Cameroon	1,885	1,970	7	1	..	38	86	40	8,502	57	15.7
Canada	272,054	245,618	63	14	18,630	..	20,501	..	..	..	92.6
Central African Rep.	130	97	..	..	..	4	4	16	1,066	78	13.2
Chad	230	852	..	..	..	900	901	28	1,281	37	10.9
Chile	20,875	19,320	16	3	-594	2,781	1,713	-1	41,945	62	73.9
China	438,370	412,840	90	23	35,422	47,107	48,308	1	168,255	14	165.4
Hong Kong, China	224,040	207,168	95	17	17,414	..	9,682	1	..	..	144.5
Colombia	13,010	13,744	38	7	-1,417	947	2,023	10	33,853	46	36.7
Congo, Dem. Rep.	1,260	1,489	..	..	..	32	32	16	8,726	171	0.2
Congo, Rep.	2,645	1,110	..	..	-62	331	331	115	5,152	228	11.4
Costa Rica	6,112	7,621	63	37	-946	602	662	1	4,834	33	36.9
Côte d'Ivoire	6,059	3,750	21	3	767	117	230	65	11,816	91	20.7
Croatia	6,164	14,199	73	12	-2,039	3,604	980	37	15,347	78	62.9
Czech Republic	48,723	51,306	89	14	-4,485	10,382	9,323	38	26,419	46	45.8
Denmark	67,807	58,749	66	22	4,697	..	6,410	..	..	..	156.6
Dominican Rep.	5,547	7,970	34	7	-875	1,351	961	18	6,256	30	45.1
Ecuador	5,988	6,534	10	7	-1,222	2,103	1,275	17	16,452	95	28.0
Egypt, Arab Rep.	5,750	13,280	35	1	622	437	647	19	30,750	29	109.9
El Salvador	3,136	5,763	58	6	-384	1,419	208	36	5,828	46	..
Eritrea	56	600	..	..	-223	21	21	54	528	40	148.9
Estonia	5,618	7,967	72	12	-1,150	1,586	285	51	4,741	86	48.6
Ethiopia	535	2,015	14	..	-70	71	75	19	6,523	63	61.9
Finland	52,834	41,312	85	24	9,295	..	8,156	..	..	..	64.7
France	384,662	388,373	81	21	25,744	..	52,020	..	..	..	105.8
Georgia	444	1,058	35	38	-392	148	165	60	1,838	42	19.6
Germany	748,375	480,772	86	17	53,513	..	35,547	..	..	..	144.7
Ghana	1,945	3,225	16	3	-106	27	50	33	7,338	13	31.9
Greece	13,040	45,379	52	10	-10,405	..	53	..	..	..	109.5
Guatemala	2,395	6,150	35	7	-1,193	61	110	21	4,676	21	15.7
Guinea	824	764	28	0	-41	0	0	32	3,401	47	12.5
Haiti	330	1,200	..	..	..	6	6	19	1,248	23	37.3
Honduras	1,332	3,276	26	2	-289	100	143	64	5,395	50	34.1
Hungary	42,697	47,747	86	25	-2,644	221	54	46	34,958	64	53.8
India	54,740	69,743	75	5	4,656	4,944	3,030	1	104,429	17	58.5
Indonesia	60,650	32,390	54	16	6,085	-6,996	-1,513	6	132,208	89	59.4
Iran, Islamic Rep.	33,360	27,580	9	3	..	816	37	2	9,154	7	45.3
Ireland	92,695	52,789	88	41	-2,990	..	24,897	..	..	..	110.6
Israel	31,577	36,430	93	20	-174	..	1,649	115	..	..	93.6
Italy	290,231	289,017	88	9	-21,942	..	14,899	..	..	..	99.6
Jamaica	1,215	3,815	64	0	-1,119	540	481	9	5,477	82	27.6
Japan	471,934	382,959	93	24	136,215	..	9,087	..	..	..	312.5
Jordan	3,000	5,579	68	3	-619	-31	56	103	8,094	83	89.6
Kazakhstan	12,900	8,327	19	10	-69	4,431	2,583	13	17,538	80	13.0
Kenya	2,395	3,735	24	10	-530	39	50	13	6,031	40	43.2
Korea, Rep.	194,325	178,784	92	32	6,092	..	1,972	-2	..	..	101.9
Kuwait	21,550	11,165	..	..	4,192	..	7	2	..	..	105.8
Kyrgyz Rep.	582	717	33	6	-32	-54	5	37	1,797	93	11.4
Lao PDR	371	508	..	..	-82	25	25	50	2,664	85	12.3
Latvia	2,896	5,248	59	4	-956	496	382	37	6,690	85	39.6
Lebanon	1,458	7,035	69	3	-3,587	4,803	257	103	17,077	102	185.7
Lesotho	427	914	..	..	-719	73	81	43	637	45	10.7
Lithuania	7,252	9,870	58	5	-1,214	760	712	42	6,199	49	18.0
Macedonia, FYR	1,336	2,206	70	1	-177	113	77	136	1,619	37	15.9
Madagascar	626	843	..	..	-270	8	8	23	4,518	33	18.4
Malawi	480	720	0	3	-174	6	6	35	2,912	51	21.6
Taiwan, China	150,646	127,258	94	42	25,678	..	..	0	..	..	..

Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified.

Table 4. Trade, aid, and finance—continued

	Merchandise trade		Manufactured exports % of total merchandise exports 2002	High technology exports % of manufactured exports 2002	Current account balance Millions of dollars 2002	Net private capital flows Millions of dollars 2002	Foreign direct investment Millions of dollars 2002	Official development assistance Dollars per capita 2002	External debt		Domestic credit provided by banking sector % of GDP 2002
	exports Millions of dollars 2000	imports Millions of dollars 2000							Total Millions of dollars 2002	Present value % of GNI 2002	
Malaysia	100,726	81,067	79	58	7,190	4,807	3,203	4	48,557	57	154.2
Mali	985	1,010	..	..	–370	102	102	42	2,803	47 c	16.5
Mauritania	369	471	..	..	..	16	12	135	2,309	56 c	–8.2
Mexico	165,334	178,990	84	21	–9,150	10,261	14,622	1	141,264	26	38.0
Moldova	791	1,403	31	4	–92	77	111	33	1,349	78	29.1
Mongolia	516	787	36	0	–105	78	78	85	1,037	69	17.1
Morocco	8,701	14,158	66	11	413	15	428	21	18,601	51 c	84.5
Mozambique	730	1,305	8	3	–657	381	406	112	4,609	27 c	13.4
Myanmar	2,802	2,515	..	..	–389	69	129	2	6,556	..	35.7
Namibia	1,155	1,590	52	1	730	..	..	68	..	..	49.0
Nepal	650	1,730	67	0	–165	9	10	15	2,953	31	43.2
Netherlands	293,437	261,135	74	28	16,467	..	28,534	..	..	..	160.4
New Zealand	16,505	18,559	28	10	–3,530	..	823	..	..	..	118.2
Nicaragua	590	1,865	19	5	–888	206	174	97	6,485	77	93.0
Niger	350	510	3	8	..	0	8	26	1,797	26 c	8.5
Nigeria	20,255	10,890	0	0	..	639	1,281	2	30,476	82	26.5
Norway	68,130	39,895	22	22	28,643	..	502	..	..	..	54.0
Pakistan	11,901	13,034	85	1	3,597	379	823	15	33,672	45	43.5
Panama	905	2,980	12	1	–408	180	57	12	8,298	84	90.7
Papua New Guinea	2,146	1,193	2	19	288	–46	50	38	2,485	82	25.9
Paraguay	1,289	2,079	15	3	376	34	–22	10	2,967	42	28.0
Peru	8,864	8,494	21	2	–1,116	3,131	2,391	18	28,167	56	23.9
Philippines	37,065	39,301	50	65	2,090	3,549	1,111	7	59,342	77	60.5
Poland	52,285	66,887	82	3	6,178	5,075	4,131	30	69,521	37	35.0
Portugal	31,172	44,821	86	7	–7,549	..	1,790	..	..	..	148.9
Romania	17,618	24,003	81	3	–1,525	3,173	1,144	31	14,683	37	13.2
Russian Federation	135,162	74,496	22	13	35,905	8,011	3,009	9	147,541	50	26.7
Rwanda	60	240	3	1	–192	3	3	44	1,435	40 c	11.3
Saudi Arabia	88,500	34,089	10	0	11,889	..	..	1	..	..	70.1
Senegal	1,330	2,270	51	4	..	94	93	45	3,918	53 c	22.6
Serbia & Montenegro	2,522	7,140	..	..	–1,750	507	475	237 e	12,681 l	102	..
Sierra Leone	91	320	..	..	15	5	5	68	1,448	103 c	48.4
Singapore	144,134 d	127,898	85 d	60	18,704	..	6,097	2	..	..	83.5
Slovak Rep.	22,035	22,318	85	3	..	5,460	4,012	35	13,013	61	51.7
Slovenia	12,738	13,812	90	5	15	..	1,865	87	..	..	46.0
South Africa	36,452 g	38,141 g	63 g	5	–1,456	783	739	14	25,041	22	147.5
Spain	151,876	200,088	78	7	–23,676	..	36,727	..	..	..	129.6
Sri Lanka	5,080	6,455	74	1	–264	206	242	18	9,611	48	43.6
Sweden	100,939	82,317	81	16	10,624	..	11,828	..	..	..	75.2
Switzerland	100,550	96,345	93	21	26,017	..	3,599	..	..	..	174.4
Syrian Arab Rep.	5,990	4,835	7	1	1,440	224	225	5	21,504	117	27.9
Tajikistan	798	881	13	42	–41	–10	9	27	1,153	89	21.3
Tanzania	990	2,120	17	2	–964	224	240	35	7,244	19 c,h	10.0
Thailand	80,253	75,679	74	37	7,965	–1,992	900	5	59,212	49	116.0
Togo	425	558	43	1	–169	75	75	11	1,581	92	17.0
Tunisia	8,027	10,909	82	4	–844	1,625	795	49	12,625	65	74.4
Turkey	46,573	67,734	84	2	–1,527	7,582	1,037	9	131,556	77	59.1
Turkmenistan	3,403	2,516	7	5	–74	..	100	8	..	..	19.7
Uganda	525	1,240	8	12	–353	148	150	26	4,100	22 c	15.4
Ukraine	17,954	23,021	67	5	2,891	–576	693	10	13,555	35	27.5
United Kingdom	303,890	388,282	79	31	–26,713	..	29,179	..	..	..	145.3
United States	724,006	1,305,648	81	32	–541,834	..	39,633	..	..	..	246.6
Uruguay	2,169	2,190	37	3	354	107	177	4	10,736	65	93.3
Uzbekistan	2,936	2,576	..	..	659	–11	65	7	4,568	38	..
Venezuela, RB	23,650	9,306	13	3	7,423	–1,639	690	2	32,563	33	15.0
Vietnam	19,660	24,020	..	..	–604	759	1,400	16	13,349	35	44.0
Yemen, Rep.	4,355	2,892	..	..	340	114	114	31	5,290	40	–0.5
Zambia	940	1,503	14	2	..	186	197	63	5,969	127	46.7
Zimbabwe	1,225	2,835	38	3	..	–3	26	15	4,066	..	58.7
World	7,479,592 t	7,624,797 t	78 w	21 w	.. s	..	630,827 s	11 w	.. s	..	179.5 w
Low income	176,218	198,033	47	4	..	7,151	12,941	12	523,464	..	46.9
Middle income	1,813,068	1,675,174	60	18	..	146,679	134,145	9	1,815,384 U	..	82.9
Lower middle income	1,147,024	1,066,326	60	17	..	98,852	91,104	8	1,147,339	..	97.9
Upper middle income	666,731	608,848	60	21	..	47,828	43,041	12	668,045 U	..	53.0
Low & middle income	1,989,214	1,873,207	60	17	..	153,831	147,086	10	2,338,848	..	77.7
East Asia & Pacific	746,144	676,038	79	32	..	47,524	54,834	4	497,354	..	143.0
Europe & Central Asia	458,205 h	474,286 h	57	10	..	53,739	32,931	27	545,842	..	36.0
Latin America & Carib.	374,300	359,950	48	16	..	34,544	44,682	10	727,944	..	46.0
Middle East & N. Africa	222,781	155,327	19	2	..	5,359	2,653	21	189,810	..	72.1
South Asia	79,505	102,282	77	4	..	5,697	4,164	5	168,348	..	55.3
Sub-Saharan Africa	109,680	105,324	35	4	..	6,968	7,822	28	210,350	..	65.0
High income	5,491,151	5,741,481	82	23	..	..	483,741	..	..	..	204.1

a. Regional aggregates include data for economies that are not specified elsewhere. World and income group totals include aid not allocated by country or region. b. Includes Luxembourg.
c. Data are from debt sustainability analysis undertaken as part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. d. Includes re-exports. e. Aid to the states of the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia that is not otherwise specified is included in regional and income group aggregates. f. Data are estimates and reflect borrowing by the former Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia that are not yet allocated to the successor republics. g. Data on total exports and imports refer to South Africa only. Data on export commodity shares refer to the South African
Customs Union (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland). h. GNI refers to mainland Tanzania only. i. The aggregates reflect country groupings from *Global Development
Finance 2004*. j. Includes data for Gibraltar not included in other tables. k. Data include the intratrade of the Baltic states and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Table 5. Key indicators for other economies

	Population			Gross national income (GNI) [a]		PPP gross national income (GNI) [b]		Gross domestic product per capita % growth 2002–2003	Life expectancy at birth Years 2002	Under-5 mortality rate Per 1,000 2002	Adult literacy rate % of people 15 and above 2002	Carbon dioxide emissions Thousands of tons 2000
	Thousands 2000	Avg. annual % growth 1990–2003	density people per sq. km 2000	Millions of dollars 2000	per capita dollars 2000	Millions of dollars 2000	per capita dollars 2000					
Afghanistan	28,766 [c]	3.7	44	..	.. [d]	..	..	..	43	257	..	905
American Samoa	70	..	353	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	286
Andorra	69	1.8	136	..	..	..	..	..	..	7	..	..
Antigua & Barbuda	79	1.6	179	719	9,160	753	9,590	0.4	75	14	..	352
Aruba	97	..	577	..	.. [f]	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,924
Bahamas, The	317	1.6	32	4,684	15,110	5,067	16,140	–0.6	70	16	..	1,795
Bahrain	712	2.7	1,003	7,569	11,260	11,288	16,170	1.8	73	16	88	19,500
Barbados	271	0.4	630	2,512	9,270	4,080	15,060	0.8	75	14	100	1,176
Belize	259	2.4	11	807	3,190 [i]	1,476	5,640	1.8	74	40	77 [g]	780
Bermuda	64	0.4	1,280	..	.. [f]	..	..	..	..	..	..	462
Bhutan	874	2.9	19	578	660	..	..	4.0	63	94	..	396
Brunei	356	2.5	68	..	.. [f]	..	..	..	77	6	..	4,668
Cape Verde	470	2.5	117	701	1,490	2,558 [h]	5,440 [h]	2.4	69	38	76	139
Cayman Islands	39 [j]	..	150	..	.. [f]	..	..	..	..	..	..	286
Channel Islands	149	0.3	745	..	..	..	..	..	79	..	..	..
Comoros	600	2.5	269	269	450	1,056 [h]	1,760 [h]	0.1	61	79	56	81
Cuba	11,299	0.5	103	..	..	..	..	..	77	9	97	30,913
Cyprus	770	0.9	83	9,373	12,320 [i]	15,042 [h]	19,530 [h]	3.3	78	6	97 [g]	6,423
Djibouti	705	2.8	30	643	910	1,550 [h]	2,200 [h]	1.8	44	143	..	385
Dominica	71	–0.1	95	239	3,360	362	5,090	–0.7	77	15	..	103
Equatorial Guinea	494	2.6	18	437	930 [i]	..	..	12.8	52	152	..	205
Faeroe Islands	46	–0.2	33	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	649
Fiji	835	1.1	46	1,969	2,360	4,517 [h]	5,410 [h]	3.5	70	21	..	725
French Polynesia	243	1.6	66	..	.. [f]	..	..	..	74	..	..	542
Gabon	1,344	2.6	5	4,813	3,580	7,656	5,700	1.2	53	85	..	3,499
Gambia, The	1,421	3.3	142	442	310	2,591 [h]	1,820 [h]	6.3	53	126	..	271
Greenland	56	0.1	0	..	..	..	..	..	69	..	..	557
Grenada	105	0.1	308	396	3,790	702	6,710	1.4	73	25	..	213
Guam	162	1.5	295	..	..	..	..	..	78	..	..	4,071
Guinea-Bissau	1,489	2.9	53	202	140	983	660	–16.9	45	211	..	264
Guyana	769	0.4	4	689	900	3,035 [h]	3,950 [h]	–1.0	62	72	..	1,598
Iceland	286	0.9	3	8,813	30,810	8,619	30,140	1.2	80	4	..	2,158
Iraq	24,700	2.4	56	..	.. [i]	..	..	..	63	125	..	76,336
Isle of Man	74	0.7	125	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Kiribati	96	2.2	132	84	880	..	..	0.4	63	69	..	26
Korea, Dem. Rep.	22,612	1.1	188	..	.. [d]	..	..	..	62	55	..	188,857
Liberia	3,374	2.5	35	445	130 [i]	..	..	–2.3	47	235	56	399
Libya	5,559	2.0	3	..	.. [e]	..	..	..	72	19	82	57,125
Liechtenstein	33	1.3	207	..	..	..	..	..	..	11	..	..
Luxembourg	448	1.2	171	19,683	43,940	24,385	54,430	0.3	78	5	..	8,482
Macao, China	444	1.4	..	6,335	14,600 [i]	9,624 [h]	21,920 [b]	..	79	..	97 [i]	1,634
Maldives	293	2.5	977	674 [i]	2,300	..	..	6.1	69	77	97	499
Malta	399	0.8	1,247	3,678	9,260	7,096	17,870	..	78	5	93	2,814
Marshall Islands	53	1.1	265	143	2,710	..	..	2.0	65	66	..	..
Mauritius	1,225	1.1	603	5,012	4,090	13,789	11,260	2.1	73	19	84	2,895
Mayotte	166	..	400	..	.. [f]	..	..	..	60	..	..	..
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	125	2.8	174	261	2,090	..	..	–0.1	69	24	..	..
Monaco	32	1.1	16,842	..	.. [f]	..	..	..	..	5	..	..
Netherlands Antilles	220	1.1	275	..	.. [f]	..	..	..	76	..	97	9,929
New Caledonia	225	2.2	12	..	.. [f]	..	..	..	74	..	..	1,667
Northern Mariana Islands	80	..	159	..	.. [e]	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Oman	2,599	3.6	8	19,877	7,630 [i]	32,885	13,000	..	74	13	74	19,775
Palau	20	2.2	43	150	7,500	..	..	1.5	70	29	..	242
Puerto Rico	3,898	0.7	439	42,057	10,950	62,674	16,320	..	77	..	94	8,735
Qatar	624	1.9	57	..	.. [f]	..	..	..	75	16	..	40,695
Samoa	178	0.8	63	284	1,600	1,015 [h]	5,700 [h]	1.9	69	25	99	139
San Marino	28	1.5	277	..	..	..	..	..	..	6	..	..
São Tomé & Príncipe	157	2.4	164	50	320	..	..	2.5	66	118	..	88
Seychelles	84	1.4	186	626	7,480	1,336	15,960	–6.5	73	16	92 [i]	227
Solomon Islands	457	2.8	16	273	600	746 [h]	1,630 [h]	0.7	69	24	..	165
Somalia	9,626	2.3	15	..	.. [d]	..	..	..	47	225	..	..
St. Kitts & Nevis	47	0.8	130	321	6,880	516	11,040	2.4	71	24	..	103
St. Lucia	161	1.4	263	650	4,050	839	5,220	0.8	74	19	..	322
St. Vincent & the Grenadines	109	0.2	280	361	3,300	719	6,590	2.8	73	25	..	161
Sudan	33,546	2.3	14	15,372	460	63,145 [h]	1,880 [h]	3.6	58	94	60	5,221
Suriname	438	0.7	3	847	1,950 [i]	..	..	..	70	40	..	2,118
Swaziland	1,106	2.8	64	1,492	1,350	5,359	4,850	0.6	44	149	81	391
Timor-Leste	810	0.7	54	351	430	..	..	..	..	126	..	..
Tonga	102	0.5	142	152	1,490	703 [h]	6,890 [h]	1.7	71	20	..	121
Trinidad & Tobago	1,313	0.6	256	9,538	7,260	12,405	9,450	3.1	72	20	98	26,362
United Arab Emirates	4,041	6.3	48	..	.. [f]	78,977 [h]	21,040 [h]	–5.0	75	9	77	58,913
Vanuatu	210	2.7	17	248	1,180	605	2,890	–0.2	69	42	..	81
Virgin Islands (U.S.)	112	0.6	329	..	..	..	..	..	78	..	..	13,106
West Bank & Gaza	3,367	4.1	..	3,734	1,110	..	..	–5.2	73	..	..	..

Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. a. Preliminary World Bank estimates calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. b. Purchasing power parity, see the Technical Notes. c. Estimate does not account for recent refugee flows. d. Estimated to be low income ($765 or less). e. Estimated to be upper middle income ($3,036 to $9,385). f. Estimated to be high income ($9,386 or more). g. National estimates based on census data. h. The estimate is based on regression; others are extrapolated from the latest International Comparison Programme benchmark estimates. i. Estimated to be lower middle income ($766 to $3,035). j. Refers to GDP and GDP per capita.